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In recent years, the European higher education sector has received increas-
ing attention from policy makers and researchers. In the face of greying popula-
tions and the trend towards globalization, Europe shows an increased awareness
about the crucial role of higher education in developing its knowledge economy.
Given Europe’s proximity to the world technology frontier, growth economists
have pointed out that there is a growing need for highly-educated people and that it
should therefore invest more in higher education (e.g. Aghion, 2006). Confronted
with these high expectations, the higher educationsector faces tough challenges
hindering the ful￿llment of its role in providing education as well as carrying out
research (an overview is provided by van der Ploeg & Veugelers, 2007). We touch
upon some of the key challenges here, focusing upon those that tie in closely with
the research questions addressed in this dissertation.
With respect to education, funding problems are one concern, if not the most
important. On average, EU countries spend 1.3% of their GDP on the ￿nancing of
tertiary education, compared to 3.3% in the US (OECD, 2006). The difference in
the overall level of expenditures can be related to the way higher education is ￿-
nanced. The prevailing view on higher education in Europe is that the government
provides education services as a public good, characterized by high subsidies and
low tuition fees. Since public funds are limited and any increase primarily serves
to keep up resources per student given rising enrolment rates, keeping higher ed-
ucation (nearly) free for students implies a clear spending limit. The restriction
on private contributions exposes another issue, namely the over-regulation of Eu-
ropean higher education institutions. Not only tuition fees but also decisions with
respect to offering additional study programs are often subjected to centralized
control. Finally, the often relatively small scale of European higher education in-
stitutions contrasts with their expanding array of responsibilities, such as dealing
with increasing student numbers at bachelor level, carrying out high-quality basic
research and commercializing scienti￿c discoveries.
1With respect to Europe’s challenges in the realm of scienti￿c research, evi-
dence shows that Europe lags behind the US in both the volume and impact of re-
search being done, controlling for population differences (Dosi et al., 2006). This
raises the question what drives scienti￿c excellence and how one stays at the fore-
front of knowledge production. The issue of making more ef￿cient use of human
capital not only pertains to the star scientists, but also to the less productive scien-
tists, who, given their large share in the researcher population, represent an enor-
mous potential for increased research output.
As a result of its recognized importance, the higher education sector itself has
become the subject of intense study in order to gain a deeper understanding of the
main challenges it is facing. We brie￿y indicate how this dissertation, consisting
of four empirical studies, ￿ts into a broader research agenda for higher education
3.
The ￿rst two essays deal with the education side and model the demand for
(undergraduate) higher education. The results from these modeling efforts are used
to simulate policy measures, in particular increased tuition fees and reduced supply.
The ￿rst essay looks at the potential effects of increased tuition fees on participa-
tion, schooling decisions and welfare. These simulations offer concrete evidence
in the discussion on both the appropriate level and differentiation of student’s pri-
vate contributions for their higher education. From an institutional perspective,
the results also offer an insight in the consequences of relinquishing control of tu-
ition fees by the government, handing it over as a decision variable to institutions
instead. The second essay leverages the demand model by simulating unilateral
cuts of study programs by colleges and universities and examining the effects on
schooling decisions and welfare. This analysis relates to the ef￿ciency debate and
the challenge of reaching suf￿cient scale to cope with extending duties, mentioned
above. The intricacies of providing the right incentives to institutions (from a wel-
3 The largest Belgian research initiative that has looked into these issues in recent years is ar-
guably the Interuniversity Attraction Poles project IAP P5/26, titled ￿Universities and Firms: A
comparative Analysis of the Interaction Between Market Processes, Organizational Strategies and
Governance￿ and carried out in 2003-2007. It was funded by the Belgian Science Policy and ad-
dressed a range of research themes in an interdisciplinary fashion. A new phase of the research
project (IAP P6/09) will be carried out in 2007-2011 under the title ￿Higher Education and Re-
search: Organization, Market Interaction and Overall Impact in the Knowledge-Based Era￿.
2fare perspective) are demonstrated by analyzing one particular set-up of a funding
scheme aimed at encouraging institutions to cut part of their supply.
The third and fourth essay deal with the research side, both presenting a
model of research productivity at the level of the individual researcher. The skew
output distribution triggers our interest in analyzing (persistent) top research per-
formance and in characterizing the whole output distribution. Our analysis of star
performance in the third essay contributes to the debate on the role of accumulative
advantage in science. The fourth essay includes the ￿lesser Gods￿ in the analysis
and compares the reasons that make researchers who display increasing levels of
productivity write more papers or publish higher quality work. In both the third
and fourth essay, the focus lies on career and ￿system￿ incentives like rank, addi-
tional funding, reduced teaching load, and other variables that make for interesting
opportunities for policy intervention.
The overarching theme that connects the four essays is excellence, in the
provision of education and in scienti￿c productivity. We evaluate the performance
of the higher education system in terms of participation and overall welfare, while
research output is measured in terms of publications and citations.
The remainder of this introduction discusses the four essays that make up this
dissertation in more detail. We clarify which question(s) each essay tries to answer,
summarize the key ￿ndings and discuss the main limitations.
Excellence in Education
Essay 1: Participation and Schooling in a Public System of Higher
Education
The￿rstessaytiesintotheissueofhighereducation￿nancing. Asdiscussedabove,
students’ private contributions cover only a marginal part of the true cost of their
higher education. This essay contributes to the discussion whether public higher
3education systems may bene￿t from incorporating more market-oriented princi-
ples, such as increased tuition fees.
The analysis comprises two main parts. First, using a discrete choice model,
we analyze the determinants of participation (whether to study) and schooling
(where and what to study
4) in the Flemish public system of higher education.
Given the lack of variation in tuition fees, we focus on the impact of travel costs
in pupils’ decisions as a measure of their sensitivity to costs, whilst controlling for
high school background and demographics. Second, using the estimates from the
model, we simulate the effects of increased tuition fees. We look at the impact on
both demand and welfare.
The dataset comprises all high school pupils in Flanders who completed high
school in 2001 and are thus eligible to enter higher education. This group nearly
fully covers the in￿ow into ￿rst-year undergraduate higher education, making this
part of higher education an essentially closed system with virtually no students
entering from outside the region. An essential component of the dataset is the
detailed information on travel costs from pupils’ homes to each higher education
campus. This is complemented by basic demographics (viz. gender, nationality)
and extensive information on prior schooling and ability (e.g. years of repetition
in high school, type and religious af￿liation of high school, high school education
content area).
Determinants of participation and schooling decisions
The estimates of the demand model show that pupils perceive the available insti-
tutions and programs as close substitutes relative to the outside option: the nested
logit approach allows inferring that travel costs hardly affect the participation de-
cision i.e. demand for higher education is found to be very inelastic.
4 A study option is de￿ned on the basis of its location (campus), the type of higher education
(academic -, long vocational - or short vocational programs) and the study ￿eld (e.g. biomedical
sciences).
4Conversely, travel costs are found to have a strong impact on schooling de-
cisions. This ambiguous role of travel costs is the key ￿nding arising from the
demand model and plays a central role in the second part of our analysis where
we simulate the effects of tuition fee increases on both participation and on total
welfare.
Simulation of increased tuition fees
As a direct consequence of the parameter estimates, the estimated cost elasticities
indicate that fee increases have a small effect on overall participation. This holds
for both uniform fee increases as well as increases differentiated by type or study
￿eld. Differentiated fee increases represent a strong incentive for students to sub-
stitute towards the cheaper programs.
With respect to the welfare effects, we ￿nd that uniform cost-based tuition
fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains whereas the additional gains from
fee differentiation are relatively unimportant. These welfare gains are quite large
under conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a
substantial redistribution from students to outsiders.
Anumberofassumptionsunderliethesesimulationsofincreasedtuitionfees,
which are discussed here in terms of their impact on the results.
First, we assume that an introduction of increased fees would be accom-
panied by an income-contingent student loan system. Such a system avoids that
students would not opt out of higher education because of dif￿culties to ￿nance
educational expenses in the face of increased fees. In the absence of such a system,
the most capital-constrained students may drop out of higher education, implying
a higher cost elasticity than estimated by the model. To the extent that low-income
students are overrepresented in certain higher education programs, enrollment in
these programs may suffer more from a given fee increase than attendance in other
programs. Such an increased likelihood to substitute away from more expensive
programs by lower-income students in principle leads to lower welfare than when
5students face no capital constraints, although this would depend on the precise sub-
stitution pattern.
Second, a progressive tax system does not distort the incentive to invest in
higher education when assuming that students can deduct educational expenses
from their future taxable income (Bovenberg & Jacobs, 2005; Jacobs & van der
Ploeg, 2005). In other words, an substantially increased fee may in￿uence the
cost-bene￿t analysis of some prospective students to the extent where they decide
to opt out of higher education. In absence of such a tax deductibility measure, we
may therefore expect that the impact on participation as reported in the paper is
underestimated.
Third, we assume that the private returns to higher education are equal to
the social returns i.e. we do not include the social gains from higher education in
our analysis. This assumption may impact the reported results in the sense that
the negative impact on consumer surplus may generally be underestimated. For
uniform fee increases, the small effect on participation suggests the bias is likely
to be small, provided the size of these spillovers is modest. The scarce evidence
on the existence of social returns indeed suggests that they are small (Jacobs & van
der Ploeg, 2005). If one considers the implementation of non-uniform fee increases
(i.e. varying over programs or study ￿elds) and if positive spillovers are program-
speci￿c, then the bias may be more important. Speci￿cally, given the sensitivity
of students to costs in their schooling decision, increasing fees for programs with
high(er) social returns will lead to a larger decrease in consumer surplus than our
analysis measures.
Finally, we consider the government and the higher education institutions as
an integrated entity. The underlying idea is that the government has full control
over the higher education institutions so that the latter don’t change the quality
or diversity of their supply in response to an increase in fees. Using the variable
subsidies per student as a proxy for the variable costs, this allows a simple producer
surplus expression. In a more decentralized system where institutions could make
their own decisions with respect to the number of programs they offer and where
differentiated fees would strengthen reputation-based competition, the outcome of
6our analysis may be rather different. However, the maintained assumption does
correspond to current reality where the government has a clear role in controlling
diversity and quality of supply.
Essay 2: Reducing Supply Diversity in Higher Education
In this paper we analyze possible reforms in higher education from a different per-
spective. While the ￿rst essay looks into the effects of higher private contributions
by students, the focus in the second essay turns to diversity in higher education
supply. First and foremost, we analyze whether the supply of study programs in
Flemish higher education has proliferated beyond what is socially desirable. A sec-
ond question is whether a funding system containing a simple ￿nancial incentive,
aimed at encouraging institutions to cut part of their supply, is effective in increas-
ing overall welfare. This analysis was carried out amidst a funding system reform
in Flanders and we analyze one of the incentives that was originally proposed as a
key component of the new funding system which will enter in vigor on 1 January
2009.
This essay may be considered a natural extension of the previous one in the
sense that it analyzes more drastic reforms than those considered in the ￿rst paper.
While the ￿rst essay examines the effects of limited fee increases for a range of
study programs, the second paper imposes a drastic increase in the fee of a study
program, thereby driving demand for that program to zero. A key difference with
the ￿rst paper is that we must now take into account the change in ￿xed costs:
while we could abstract from ￿xed costs in the producer surplus calculation in
the case of increased tuition fees, we must account for the ￿xed cost saving in
the case of elimination of study programs. Since these costs are unobserved, we
assume bounds on the ￿xed costs associated with study programs, which allows an
unambiguous conclusion for the majority of currently offered study programs.
The analysis contains two main parts. First, we analyze the social desirability
of unilateral program cuts by institutions. This analysis is based on the estimation
7of a demand model for higher education. The model extends the one in the ￿rst
essay using a more detailed de￿nition of study alternatives, allowing for a richer
speci￿cation. We ￿nd that the social desirability of cutting programs at institutions
is limited to less than 10% of the cases, due to the students’ low willingness to
travel and relatively limited variable and ￿xed cost savings. So with respect to
their schooling decision students are very sensitive to travel cost and any reputation
effects that may convince students to travel further are not suf￿cient to offset the
strong preference for nearby options. Note that this ￿nding is consistent with the
analysis in the ￿rst essay, which also included the participation decision in the
analysis and showed that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as
close substitutes relative to the outside option. Or, more informally, both essays
￿nd that students dislike traveling to more distant study alternatives, while the ￿rst
essay adds that they dislike even more not studying at all.
Second, we contrast these welfare effects with the pro￿t incentives given by
a funding system that contains a rudimentary ￿nancial incentive to cut supply. We
￿nd that such a system, which closely resembles the originally proposed version
of the new funding system for Flemish higher education, would often be off-target.
In general, it gives an incentive to cut the smaller programs. However, we ￿nd
that for the large part of supply where program cuts are undesirable, the system
nevertheless encourages to cut at least one third of those programs. Furthermore,
for the minority of cases where program cuts are actually desirable, we ￿nd it
provides the wrong incentive for up to half of the cases. These ￿ndings emphasize
the complexities in regulating the diversity of supply in higher education, and serve
as a word of caution towards the various other measures that have recently been
proposed.
Comments on the estimation of pupils’ sensibility to costs
A key concern in our analysis is the reliability of the estimate of the travel cost
parameter as an accurate measure of pupils’ sensitivity to costs. Therefore, we go
8into the assumptions underlying the calculation of the travel cost variable and we
discuss possible endogeneity issues.
We have de￿ned an individual’s annual travel costs as consisting of two com-
ponents: the transportation cost and the opportunity cost of time, in line with Train
& McFadden (1978). Our measure of travel cost embodies a number of assump-
tions. First, we assume a certain number of trips for a commuting student to attend
the campus of her choice, viz. 10 trips/week during the 30 weeks of the academic
year. We explicitly model a non-linear effect of travel cost on utility: students may
go on residence, thereby reducing the number of trips in exchange for a rental cost.
Second, the transportation costs are based on a kilometer cost of 0.25 Euro,
multiplied by the travel distance by road while the opportunity cost of time is based
on a cost of 8 Euros/hour, multiplied by the road travel time. These assumptions al-
low the conversion of travel distance and travel time to an integrated cost measure,
which permits a single parameter estimate re￿ecting pupils’ cost sensitivity. While
the kilometer cost is commonly used to quantify the cost of car travel, the value
chosen to represent students’ opportunity cost of time corresponds to the typical
wage for student jobs. Together, these assumptions imply a certain rate of substitu-
tion between time and money. It may be argued that such a ￿one size ￿ts all￿ does
not capture individual heterogeneity in this trade-off: individuals may have idio-
syncratic preferences for different means of transportation that imply a different
trade-off between time and money, independent from in￿uences like income, pol-
icy initiatives to promote public transport, etc. The estimated speci￿cation allows
individuals to show a different sensitivity to travel costs depending on their indi-
vidual characteristics, viz. gender, nationality, age, type and content of high school
education. A particular concern with respect to the potential heterogenous impact
of travel costs, is that students enrolled in different types of higher education
5 may
re￿ectadifferentsensitivitytotravelcost. Evidencethattheestimatedspeci￿cation
does pick up such differences in cost sensitivity is given by the cost elasticities
6:
5 I.e. academic -, long vocational - or short vocational programs.
6 Also, split-sample regressions for the different types of higher education suggest a higher travel
cost sensitivity for the students in short vocational programs compared to those in long vocational
or academic programs.
9there are examples of program ￿elds with a similar market share that show different
cost elasticities. For example, academic social studies students are more cost sen-
sitive than vocational exact science students and vocational arts students are more
cost sensitive than academic arts students. An extension of the model that would
more fully account for individual heterogeneity is to estimate individuals’ rate of
substitution between time and money from the data, using for example a random
coef￿cients model.
In general however, such differences in sensitivity to travel cost are likely to
be the consequence of the endogeneity of travel costs. For example, unobserved
income differences may translate into a different rate of substitution between time
and money. Although we do not observe family income, alternative speci￿cations
were estimated including average income and unemployment rates at the level of
the postal code, as a way to control for income effects. However, there appears
to be too much variation in income at this aggregate level for these controls to be
signi￿cant. It is important to note that the observed high school background vari-
ables
7 may capture substantial part of the variation in pupils’ socio-economic back-
grounds. For example, the estimates show that pupils from catholic high schools
and those who had a classical languages and/or science education (within the gen-
eral high school education type) are less cost sensitive, while pupils who had a
technical high school education with a social orientation are more cost sensitive.
As a result, the in￿uence of socio-economic situation will be re￿ected in the esti-
mates of the interaction terms. Any remaining endogeneity of travel costs due to
income effects would be such that for lower income students the travel cost para-
meter will be overestimated.
Another source of endogeneity of travel costs besides income, is a student’s
social network at home: some students may have very strong ties to their social
and family network at home compared to others, leading to the choice for more
nearby higher education locations and an overestimate of the impact of travel costs.
7 I.e. the type of high school (general, technical versus professional), the catholic versus non-
catholic orientation of the school, the pupil’s content area focus (e.g. classical languages).
10Besides the true travel cost effect, social network- and income effects are likely to
be important reasons for the observed preference for nearby study locations.
A￿nalin￿uenceonroadtravelcostwewanttopointout, arepolicyinitiatives
to lower students’ travel costs by means of cheap train tickets
8. As a result, pupils’
observed choices may re￿ect the availability of cheap rail travel
9. Our estimate of
the impact of travel cost on pupils’ utility is then the combined effect of road travel
cost and the compensating effect of rail travel.
Given these comments, what is the bottom line as far as the estimate of the
travel cost parameter is concerned? Recall that, ultimately, our interest in the travel
cost parameter is driven by the objective to simulate the impact of increased tuition
fees on pupils’ decisions. Given the lack of variation in fees across institutions or
study programs we cannot directly estimate pupils’ sensitivity to these fees. There-
fore, we need another measure of pupils’ sensitivity to higher education expendi-
tures and we take pupils’ responsiveness to travel costs as a proxy of their sensi-
tivity to fees. Referring back to the preceding discussion, the issues of individual
heterogeneity and endogeneity (due to the in￿uence of income effects, social net-
works, cheap rail travel, etc.) may lead to inaccuracies in the estimate of the travel
cost parameter. The fact that the estimate of the travel cost parameter may pick
up the effect of cheap rail travel is a lesser issue: we are not interested in know-
ing the impact of road travel costs as such. Rather, we want to measure the effect
of incurred travel costs, where these may include the use of other means of trans-
portation. As discussed above, income and social network effects may introduce an
upward bias for the travel cost estimate for subgroups of students. However, given
the richness of the estimated speci￿cation that includes proxies for these socio-
economic characteristics, the model may be expected to control to a large extent
for these in￿uences. A more conclusive answer to the question whether there is a
difference in sensitivity in travel costs between students would require additional
8 E.g. products like the students’ rail ticket ￿Go-Pass￿ which charges students a ￿xed fee per trip
i.e. independent of the distance traveled.
9 The role of train travel may also differ across the population, depending on individual prefer-
ences for advantages of rail travel vis-￿-vis road travel such as the possibility for reading or social
contacts
11data to rule out omitted variable bias. Referring to the discussion above, indicators
of the strength of students’ ties to social networks back home would be the mem-
bership of sports clubs, youth associations, etc. This data could be recorded sys-
tematically in student registration records. Information about the envisaged means
of transportation to campus could be collected at time of enrolment. Alternatively,
information on actual modes of mobility may be gathered through the compulsory
mobility surveys that not only large companies but also education institutions carry
out bi-annually.
Excellence in Research
Essay 3: Top Research Productivity and its Persistence
The focus in this essay lies on the top end of the research productivity distribu-
tion: the star scientists. More speci￿cally, our objective is to identify the factors
that determine whether a researcher ever ends up in this ￿top league￿, and if she
does, which variables explain whether she is able to repeat that top performance.
By examining top performance in research productivity and its persistence over
time, this paper contributes to the debate on cumulative advantage effects in aca-
demic research. The custom-built data set contains the publications of biomedical
and exact scientists at the KU Leuven from 1992 till 2001 and allows taking into
account factors like gender, age, cohort, rank, promotion, seniority, teaching load
and access to research funding.
A consequence of our choice to focus on scienti￿c excellence is that we need
to separate the group of highly proli￿c researchers from the others, provided a
meaningful distinction between the top group and the less productive scientists can
be made. Therefore, we carry out a clustering of the researchers’ yearly publi-
cation records distinguishing between three productivity categories (top, medium,
low) while controlling for discipline and temporary gaps in research output. Given
12that the members of the resulting clusters differ signi￿cantly in their mean publi-
cation output, these discrete productivity categories give us meaningful thresholds
to separate different productivity levels, which permits us to analyze entry into
and exit from these different groups. In addition, these temporal productivity clus-
ters allow a precise de￿nition of what constitutes persistent top performance, viz.
continuous membership of the top productivity category over time. Although one
could argue that the underlying publication counts represent a richer source of in-
formation, it is not clear what part of the distribution represents the truly eminent
scientists as opposed to ￿merely good￿ researchers. It is this discrete jump to star
status that we are interested in, motivating the conversion of publication counts into
discrete productivity clusters. We ￿nd that about one quarter of the scientists in the
sample achieves top performance at least once in the observation period, with six
out of a hundred scientists being persistently top. Using mobility matrices, we ￿nd
that top productivity generally is persistent over time: previous top performers are
more likely to reach top status in next periods.
We use the entry of a researcher into the top performance category to de-
￿ne the event of interest in the duration analysis, where we address the research
questions discussed above. A hazard model predicting the time towards ￿rst top
performance con￿rms the importance of gender, with females being signi￿cantly
less likely to reach top performance. Age and seniority effects are not signi￿cant,
but rank and hierarchical position, as well as access to excellence funding are im-
portant for explaining the hazard to ￿rst top performance. There is only limited
evidence with respect to the substitution effect of teaching load on top research
performance. Correction for scienti￿c discipline, full time position and organiza-
tional membership is important. Low previous performers are less likely to reach
top status, con￿rming that ￿rst top performance is a gradual, accumulative process,
as the Matthew effect or a learning perspective would predict.
When analyzing subsequent top performances, we ￿nd strong support for
the accumulative process, with the hazard to next top performance being signi￿-
cantly and increasingly positively affected by previous top performance. Rank is
13important not only in predicting ￿rst top performance, but also for persistency in
top performance, supporting the accumulative effect. Also the gender bias remains
signi￿cant in explaining subsequent top performance, but this time with the depen-
dence on previous top performance in favor of females, suggesting that the gender
effect is mainly a selection problem into ￿rst top. While funding and head of unit
position are important for selecting into ￿rst top performance, they are less predic-
tive for subsequent top performance. And ￿nally, the correction for unobservable
individual heterogeneity, like ability, is signi￿cant, suggesting that talent remains
an integral part of the story of top performance and its persistence.
Essay 4: The Great Divide in Scienti￿c Productivity. Why the
Average Scientist Does Not Exist
Like the third essay, the starting point of our analysis is the skewness that char-
acterizes scienti￿c output, with a small number of scientists responsible for the
lion’s share of publications and citations. While the previous essay examined pro-
ductivity determinants of (persistence in) scienti￿c excellence, here we widen the
scope and aim to characterize the whole productivity distribution. Although the
skew distribution suggests substantial heterogeneity among researchers, previous
work on scienti￿c productivity has typically focused on explaining average pro-
ductivity. This ignores the potentially strongly different impact of regressors at
different points in the distribution. An example is the often observed ￿gender ef-
fect￿: male researchers typically publish more papers than female researchers, on
average. This essay examines whether such effects operate evenly across the whole
distribution, in which case a focus on average productivity alone would be justi￿ed,
or whether they impact some points in the distribution more than others. In addi-
tion, we contrast effects on research quantity (using publication counts) with the
impact of the same variables on research quality (using citation counts).
Our empirical approach uses quantile regressions to estimate the effects of
age, gender, funding, teaching load and other observed characteristics of academic
researchers on various locations in the distribution of publications and citations.
14From a methodological point of view, two key issues should be noted. First, we
employ recent advances in quantile regressions that allow its application to count
data. Second, we account for unobserved heterogeneity of researchers by estimat-
ing a random-effects model, exploiting the panel nature of our dataset.
Estimation of the model using the same dataset as in the previous essay, i.e. a
panel of biomedical and exact scientists at the KU Leuven in the period 1992-2001,
shows strong support for the quantile regression approach, revealing the differen-
tial impact of various regressors along the distribution. Further, the results show
that the magnitude of effects typically decreases towards the top of the distribution.
This may be explained in terms of the predominance of talent as a key success
factor at the high end of the distribution and/or may point to a progressive loss
of incentive power with quantile for factors like funding, rank, etc. As far as the
comparison of the quantity and quality distribution is concerned, we ￿nd that fund-
ing, teaching load and a scientist’s entry cohort have a different impact on research
quantity than on research quality.
Although one must be careful generalizing the results based on a single uni-
versity, we argue that the ￿ndings are informative with respect to the management
of scientists. In particular, they may instill the right expectations in administrators
who implement incentive programs or make funding decisions. For example, our
estimates indicate that a reduced teaching load for below-average productive re-
searchers in an attempt to ￿pull them on board￿ is unlikely to lead to an envisaged
increase in publications. The results with respect to funding suggest that, given the
current funds distribution, there is a limit to the bene￿cial effects of competition
in awarding research funds, strongly concentrating them into the hands of a just
a few star scientists. While the top end of the distribution may face diminishing
returns, research money ￿owing to the lower half of the distribution may be well
spent given the sizeable effects on research output, both in terms of quantity and
quality.
15Chapter 1: Participation and Schooling in
a Public System of Higher Education
Abstract
We
10 analyze the determinants of participation (whether to study) and schooling
(where andwhat tostudy) in apublic systemof highereducation, based ona unique
dataset of all eligible high school pupils in an essentially closed region (Flanders).
We ￿nd that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as close sub-
stitutes relative to the outside option, implying an ambiguous role for travel costs:
theyhardly affecttheparticipationdecision, buthavea strongimpactonthe school-
ing decision.
To illustrate how our empirical results can inform the debate on reforming
public systems, we assess the effects of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost-based
tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from
fee differentiation are relatively unimportant. These welfare gains are quite large
under conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a
substantial redistribution from students to outsiders.
1.1 Introduction
Public systems of higher education are experiencing increased challenges in many
European countries. The number of students has more than doubled over the past
thirty years. Public spending increased at the same rate, because governments
maintained very low tuition fees and high subsidies per student. Despite these
large public investments, there seems no evidence that the public systems per-
formed better than the more market-oriented systems in the Anglo-Saxon coun-
10 This chapter is joint work with Frank Verboven.
16tries.
11 This has lead to an increasing awareness that the public systems should
incorporate more market-oriented principles. This is illustrated by the recent U.K.
policy reforms to drastically raise tuition fees, accompanied with the introduction
of income-contingent student loans.
Against this background we analyze the participation decisions (whether to
study) and schooling decisions (where and what to study) of all eligible pupils in a
public system of higher education. We focus on the role of travel costs, controlling
for the pupils’ high school background and demographics. We use our empirical
results to analyze the effects of raising the tuition fees on both participation and
total welfare.
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique data set of all high school pupils
eligible to enter higher education in the essentially closed region of Flanders.
12 A
￿rst key feature of our data set is the information on the pupils’ locations, from
which it is possible to compute the travel costs to all available study options. A
second key feature is the information on the educational choices at the highly dis-
aggregate level of the study program. Our central empirical ￿nding is that pupils
perceive the higher education institutions and programs as close substitutes. This
implies an ambiguous role for travel costs: college proximity hardly in￿uences the
participation decisions, but has a strong impact on the schooling decisions. Put dif-
ferently, pupils are highly cost elastic regarding the decision where and what to
study, but much less so regarding the decision whether to study.
13
11 If anything, public systems appear to have performed worse than the private systems. Regarding
educational performance, a frequently used measure is the student participation rate. According to
the E.P.I. (Usher et al. (2005), participation rates tend to be lower in countries with lower private
contributions (with the exception of Finland and the Netherlands). Regarding research performance,
most top universities come from the more market-oriented Anglo-Saxon countries. Jacobs and van
der Ploeg (2005) provide a detailed comparison of the relative performance of public and private
institutions.
12 Flanders is the Northern part of Belgium, where Dutch is spoken. While access is open, in
practice the undergraduate system has been quite closed from the French-speaking part and from
other countries. See for example van Heffen and Lub (2003) for an overview.
13 Our empirical analysis also accounts for other choice determinants than travel costs. Most
notably, we ￿nd an important role of high school background in both the participation and schooling
decisions.
17The effects of tuition fee reform on participation follow directly from our
estimated cost elasticities.
14 A uniform tuition fee increase only has a small impact
onoverallparticipation, thoughcomparativelymoreonpupilswithalow-levelhigh
school background. Differentiated fee increases also have a small effect on overall
participation, but they imply large substitution effects across institutions and/or
study ￿elds.
The effects of tuition fee reform on total welfare can be summarized as fol-
lows. (1) The total welfare gains from raising tuition fees are quite large if one
accounts (in a conservative way) for the social cost of public funds, but small if
one ignores that cost. (2) Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of
the attainable total welfare gains. The additional gains from cost-based tuition fee
differentiation by program type or program ￿eld are surprisingly unimportant. (3)
Tuition fee reforms imply a large redistribution from students to outsiders (who do
not study). The overall conclusion is that uniform fee increases achieve most of the
total welfare gains, as well as a fairer distribution between students and outsiders.
Previous empirical research has mainly looked at the effects of tuition fee on
overall participation in higher education. These studies typically focus on the U.S.
where it is possible to exploit tuition fee variation at the state level. Estimates on
the participation effects of an increase in fees by $ 1,000 are in the range of 3￿8%;
see Kane (1995), Dynarski (2003) and Cameron and Heckman (2001). We ￿nd a
considerably lower participation effect of about 1%. This is perhaps not surprising
since the current level of fees is low in the public system we consider.
Only few studies have looked at the effects of tuition fees at the level of
the institution, and none at the more detailed level of the program ￿eld. Most
closely related to our work is Long (2004), who conducted a comprehensive study
on the role of tuition fees and travel costs at the level of the institution.
15 She ￿rst
estimates a conditional logit model for the schooling decision (where to study) and
14 To identify the effects of tuition fees, we assume that pupils respond in the same way to tuition
fees as to travel costs. We motivate this approach in our econometric framework (see section 1.3.2).
15 Some other studies incorporated distance to college to explain the participation decision, see
Rouse (1995) or Frenette (2003). However, with the exception of Long (2004) these studies do not
observe which college the pupils actually choose, so that distance is usually proxied by the distance
to the most nearby college (regardless of whether that college is actually chosen).
18subsequently a binary logit model for the participation decision. Consistent with
our own ￿ndings, she ￿nds that tuition fees have a higher impact on the schooling
than on the participation decision. We extend Long’s model and analysis in several
respects. First, we consider the participation and schooling decisions in a more
general integrated nested logit framework. This approach allows us to infer the
impact of tuition fees on both participation and schooling from variation in travel
costs among pupils (in the absence of tuition fee variation in a public system).
16
Second, we consider the schooling decision at the even more disaggregate level
of both the institution and the program ￿eld. Finally, we conduct a total welfare
analysis on the effects of uniform and differentiated tuition fee increases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
discuss some key features of the higher education system in Flanders. This is rep-
resentative for several other public systems of higher education, and it introduces
our subsequent questions. In section 3 we introduce the empirical model of ed-
ucational choice, and our estimation approach to handle the very large data set.
The fourth section discusses the empirical results. We compare the estimates from
our disaggregate nested logit model (at the level of the institution and study pro-
gram) with those of aggregate logit and nested logit models (section 1.4.1). We
also compute the estimated cost elasticities at various levels: total market level,
colleges versus universities, and the four main program ￿elds (section 1.4.2). Fi-
nally, we estimate the welfare effects of uniform and differentiated fee increases
(section 1.4.3). Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The market for higher education in Flanders
We begin with a description of the supply and demand characteristics of the market
for higher education in Flanders in 2001 (the year of our data set). We focus on the
aspects that are relevant for the students’ ￿rst-year decisions. At that point students
16 We are able to compute the distance and travel costs of each pupil to each alternative based on
information of the pupils’ home address postal code, whereas Long (2004) only observes the pupils’
high school address postal code.
19essentially only consider the public (heavily subsidized) institutions, and almost
always choose to study within the region of Flanders. The system is therefore
essentially a closed public system of higher education, representative for many
other European systems, but quite distinct from the U.S. system.
1.2.1 Supply of higher education
Institutions and programs
There are two types of higher education institutions in Flanders: colleges and
universities. The colleges focus exclusively on teaching and offer vocational study
programs, which are oriented to professional training. Universities are also active
in research, and theyoffer academic studyprograms. Bothcolleges and universities
either have a catholic or a non-catholic orientation. They sometimes have multiple
campuses, especially the colleges.
The vocational programs offered at the colleges are either short programs
(one cycle of 3 years), or long programs (two cycles comprising a total of 4 or
5 years). The academic programs at universities are always long programs (two
cycles).
17 The programs can be divided into four ￿elds: arts, social sciences, bio-
medical sciences, and exact sciences. Each ￿eld consists of several elemental study
options, e.g. nursing (a vocational program in biomedical sciences) or civil engi-
neering (an academic program in exact sciences).
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the supply of higher education in the year
2001-2002. The top panel shows the number of campuses, broken down by type
of institution and program ￿eld. The total number of campuses is 53, the majority
being college campuses (44 versus 9 university campuses). Colleges more often
have a catholic af￿liation, whereas universities more often have a non-catholic af-
￿liation. Colleges show a higher degree of specialization, since they typically do
17 In recent years, the long vocational programs at colleges have shown a trend towards conver-
gence to their academic counterparts at the universities (e.g. the economics or the engineering
programs). This development has in part been stimulated by the government. Already in 1991,
a Decree stipulated the same rules for two-cycle vocational programs at colleges as for academic
programs at universities. Colleges offering two-cycle programs also became entitled to do applied
research by means of co-operation agreements with universities. More recently, the Bologna Dec-
laration leading to the Bachelor￿Master reforms has strengthened these developments.
20not offer all program ￿elds. For example, only 12 out of the 44 college campuses
offer arts. Universities tend to be less specialized. All non-catholic universities of-
fer programs in biomedical and exact sciences, and all catholic universities offer
programs in arts and social sciences.
The bottom panel of Table 1.1 shows the corresponding student numbers.
The number of students is higher at colleges than at universities (25,182 versus
12,299). But the number of college campuses is comparatively even higher, so
that the average scale at college campuses is generally lower than at university
campuses. It is also evident that most students choose programs in social sciences,
especially at the colleges, followed by programs in the exact sciences.
To give an idea of the geographic coverage of higher education supply across
the region of Flanders, Figure 1.1 shows the locations of the campuses on a map.
The upper map refers to the universities, the lower one to the colleges. Focus
only on the circle areas for now. Each circle refers to a different campus, and is
proportional to the number of ￿rst-year students. The ￿gure shows that there is
broad geographic coverage of higher education, with the exception of the ￿corners￿
in the West and in the East. However, this broad coverage is entirely due to the
colleges. University coverage is concentrated around two main university cities
(Ghent and Leuven).
The role of the government
As in most other European countries the undergraduate system of higher edu-
cation in Flanders is entirely public. We only provide a very stylized overview here.
Van Heffen and Lub’s (2003) country report provides a more detailed description.
18
Both universities and colleges receive subsidies for teaching; universities in
addition receive subsidies for research. The subsidies for teaching consist of a
￿xed and a variable component. The variable subsidies differ across the various
study programs to account for differences in the variable cost per student. Ac-
cording to CHEPS (Deen et al. (2005)), the cost per student tends to be lower
for classroom-based programs (arts and social sciences) than for laboratory-based
18 For shorter descriptions covering a large set of countries including the region of Flanders, we
refer to Maassen (2000) or Eurydice (2000).
21programs (biomedical and exact sciences). To account for this, the Flemish gov-
ernment has traditionally maintained a relatively simple system of four subsidy
categories at colleges and three categories at universities. It has recently proposed
to revise the rates to distinguish between additional categories, in line with the
practices in seven benchmark countries.
19 Table 1.2 shows the (student-weighted)
average variable subsidies per student, for the four program ￿elds at colleges and
universities. The ￿rst panel shows the averages using the current subsidy rates,
the second using the proposed revised rates. The table shows that the subsidies,
and hence the estimated variable costs per student, are lower in arts and social sci-
ences than in biomedical sciences and exact sciences. They also tend to be lower
at colleges than at universities. The proposed revised rates show a larger variation,
especially across the different program ￿elds.
The variable subsidies are only part of the government’s ￿￿rst ￿ow￿ budget
onhighereducation.
20 AccordingtoCantillonetal. (2005), thetotalbudgetisabout
e 8600 per student, so that the variable part only accounts for about 38 percent of
public spending. The remaining part is independent of the number of students and
can be viewed as a measure of the ￿xed costs to be covered.
In addition to the subsidies, the government intervenes in the tuition fees that
the colleges and universities are allowed to set. While the government gives some
discretion, the tuition fees show hardly any variation in practice. During the year
of our study, 2001, the tuition fees were essentially uniform at e 425 for colleges
and e 445 for universities. This shows that private contributions are extremely low,
only about 5% of public higher education spending (excluding research).
19 These revisions ￿t in a larger policy reform proposal in 2005, which aims to transform the input-
based subsidy system (based on the number of incoming students) to an output-based system (based
on the number of outcoming students). To prepare these reforms, the input-based subsidies were
frozen in 2000 and should become output-based in 2007. This development is not relevant for our
purposes here; we are mainly interested in describing the variable subsidies as our proxy for how
the goverment perceives the cost per student.
For a detailed description of the current (frozen) subsidy rates, see van Heffen and Lub (2003),
and of the proposed revised rates, see Vandenbroucke (2005).
20 The ￿rst ￿ow budget is the part of the budget that directly goes to teaching. The second ￿ow and
third ￿ow budget are devoted to research.
22The policy of high subsidies and low tuition fees may have adverse effects on
both the diversity and the quality of the supply. First, colleges and universities may
have incentives to offer too much diversity. The government therefore regulates the
supply of programs. There is an of￿cial list of subsidizable programs, but not all
institutions necessarily receive the authorization to offer all programs. The result is
a specialization, which we illustrated earlier in Table 1.1. Second, the institutions
may have limited incentives to provide suf￿cient quality. A system of quality as-
surance aims to provide suf￿cient incentives, through self-assessment and external
visiting committees. In principle, the government can take away the authorization
to offer a study program if quality is insuf￿cient, though this rarely happens in
practice.
1.2.2 Demand for higher education ￿ summary statistics
We now discuss the demand for higher education. This also introduces our data set
and subsequent econometric analysis of educational choice.
Every pupil with a high school degree is eligible to start with higher educa-
tion. This is true regardless of the type of high school degree that has been obtained.
There are three main types of high school degrees. A general high school degree
provides a broad theoretical training as a basis to continue with higher education. A
technical high school degree puts more emphasis on specialized technical-theoretic
training but at the same time aims to provide a suf￿ciently general background to
prepare for higher education. A professional high school degree focuses mostly on
practical training. Pupils with a professional high school degree can still start with
higher education provided that they have taken additional courses during a seventh
year of study (so we only include those in our data).
21 In contrast with the U.S.
and some other European countries, there is no direct rationing of participation
in higher education, whether through numerus clausus or through minimum course
21 There is also a fourth high school category, arts. This also offers a quite practical training. We
do not exclude them from our analysis, but since there are relatively few pupils here we include
them in our base category.
23requirements or grades obtained during high school.
22 Each pupil who ￿nishes high
school is therefore in the position to make both the participation decision (whether
to study) and the schooling decision (where and what to study) by selecting one
option out of the full set of all available study alternatives.
To analyze this educational choice process, we combined two basic data sets,
covering essentially the entire population of eligible pupils: a ￿pupils data set￿ of
all 55,905 last year high school pupils in the year 2001; and a ￿students data set￿
of the 37,481 participating students.
23 For each pupil we observe sex, nationality,
age, the high school institution, the high school degree (program), and the home
address. The Appendix provides more detailed information on the two basic data
sets, as well as on some additional auxiliary data sets, and how we combined them.
We constructed a number of relevant variables describing the pupils’ pro￿le,
and we organize them in three groups. The ￿rst group consists of general demo-
graphics: sex, nationality and the religious af￿liation of the high school. The sec-
ond group contains the scholastic ability variables: years of repetition, the type of
high school and the study program followed at high school. Years of repetition is
the age minus 18, and measures the number of failures during high school. The
type of high school (general, technical or professional) measures the intellectual
background, as we discussed above. The study programs at high school offer ad-
ditional information on ability and intellectual interests. For general high school,
we distinguish among the following ￿elds: classical languages, modern languages,
economics, sciences and mathematics. These can be combined so they are not mu-
tually exclusive. The brightest pupils often follow either classical languages or
mathematics (or both). In technical high schools, there is a very large number of
22 During the year of our study, some programs (e.g. engineering and medicine) indirectly lim-
ited the number of students through an entry examination. This does not function however as a
mechanism to directly limit the number of students per year.
23 These are the pupils who either enroll immediately after highschool in 2001 (36,111 students)
or with one year of delay (1,370 students). Because the number of students enrolling after one year
of delay is so small, we decided not to include the even smaller numbers of students entering with
further years of delay.
The total participation rate of eligible pupils is 67% ((36,111+1,370)/55,905). Note that the
actual participation rate in higher education is lower since only 79% obtain of the people obtain a
high school degree.
24programs. For simplicity, we only distinguish between programs that are ￿people
oriented￿ (e.g. beautician, interior design) and programs that are ￿product ori-
ented￿ (e.g. car mechanics, construction techniques). There is also a large number
of programs in professional high schools, but since there are relatively few pupils
graduating from professional schools (and even fewer that start with higher educa-
tion) we do not distinguish explicitly between programs for this category.
The third group of variables refers to transportation costs: distance travelled
to the campus (in km), and time travelled either by road or by train (in min). Time
travelled by road is the fastest calculated route from the pupil’s home postal code
to her chosen campus postal code. Time by train is equal to the travel time by road
to the nearest well-connected train station, plus the travel time on the train, plus
a ￿xed 10 minutes to incorporate the time to get from the destination station to
the campus. Based on these variables, we also constructed an annual travel cost
variable in monetary terms, for a student making 300 trips per year at a cost of e
0.25 per km and an opportunity cost of time of e 8 per hour
24. This variable will
enter our empirical model and it is further motivated at that point.
Table 1.3 shows the summary statistics: means for all the dummy variables
(interpreted as fractions of the population), and means and standard deviations (in
brackets) for the continuous variables. The ￿rst column shows the unconditional
statistics, i.e. for all pupils. The remaining columns show the statistics conditional
on the chosen alternative.
Demographics
Slightly fewer males than females graduated from a high school in 2001
(48%), and they are comparatively less likely to participate in higher education
(45%). More surprisingly, male pupils are less represented in catholic institutions.
This may be due to preferences, or to the different supply offered at catholic insti-
tutions; our subsequent empiral model distinguishes between these possibilities by
accounting for the combined choice of institution and program ￿elds. Similarly,
24 The kilometre cost is a commonly used measure of distance cost for tax purposes (Belgisch
Staatsblad (2006)). The opportunity cost of time is representative for the hourly wage of student
jobs (Jobdienst KU Leuven (2006)).
25pupils with a foreign nationality are less likely to participate (2% of the pupils is
foreign, but only 1% of the students), and those who do participate are less repre-
sented at catholic institutions.
The majority of the pupils (75%) attended a catholic high school, and they
are more likely to participate (78% of the students). Furthermore, students from a
catholic high school are much more likely to choose a catholic institution (87% of
the students at catholic institutions have a catholic high school background, com-
pared to 75% in general). This suggests there are still strong links between the
catholic high schools and the higher education institutions.
Ability
The average years of repetitions is 0.6 (with a large standard deviation of
1.06), but it is much lower for participating students (0.36) than for outsiders
(1.11).
25 Among the students, the average years of repetition is especially small
for students going to universities rather than colleges (0.16 versus 0.48).
Up to 48% of the pupils come from a general high school, slightly more
than one third from a technical high school, and only 17% from a professional
high school.
26 Pupils from a general high school are more likely to participate
(they make up 60% of the students, and only 48% of the pupils). Pupils with a
technical high school background are more or less proportionally represented in
higher education, but they mainly participate at colleges, and only form a small
minority at universities. Pupils from a professional high school (the base) are least
represented.
Pupils with a general high school background in mathematics or classical
languages have a particularly strong propensity to go to universities rather than to
colleges or staying out. Pupils from a ￿people oriented￿ technical high school have
a strong presence at colleges (over one third).
Mobility
25 As mentioned earlier, for the pupils of a professional highschool, there is one additional prepara-
tory year before becoming eligible to higher education. We include this in our de￿nition of repeti-
tions.
26 The total fraction of pupils in a professional highschools is much larger than 17%. However, a
substantial number does not complete their degree, and we are looking here at last year pupils only.
26Distance travelled is on average 35 kilometers, with a large standard devi-
ation. Car and train travel time are on average 31 minutes and 48 minutes. The
average annual travel costs (including transportation and time costs) is e 3,800.
The average travel distance is higher for students going to universities than for stu-
dents going to colleges (42 versus 31 km), re￿ecting the lower geographic coverage
of universities as shown earlier on the map in ￿gure 1.1. The rather high standard
deviations show there is a lot of variation in distance travelled across students.
Our earlier Figure 1.1 provides additional information on the role of prox-
imity to institutions in explaining participation. The different shadings shows the
different participation rates throughout the region. Part (a) suggests that the uni-
versity participation rates are related to proximity: high participation rates (above
25%) are especially found around the two main universities, whereas low partic-
ipation rates (below 15%) occur in the West and East corners of the region. Part
(b) also suggests that the college participation rates vary across the region accord-
ing to college proximity. Nevertheless, the pattern is less pronounced, probably
due to the high geographic coverage throughout the region. Note that the areas
with little university participation are often areas with a high college participation
(see for example the low university and the high college participation in the West).
This suggests that proximity may not matter that much for the decision whether to
study as for the decision where to study. Whether this is indeed the case, will be
addressed in our econometric model.
These summary statistics provide some preliminary suggestive ￿ndings on
the role of demographics, ability and mobility in participation and schooling de-
cisions. We are now ready to discuss how our econometric framework takes these
characteristics into account.
1.3 Empirical framework
We now specify the empirical model of the pupils’ participation and schooling de-
cisions, i.e. theirdecisionswhethertostartwithhighereducationstudies, and, ifso,
27where and what to study. We model their decision in a discrete choice framework
in which individuals choose the alternative that maximizes random utility among
the set of available alternatives. We adopt a version of the nested logit model (Mc-
Fadden (1978)). This model is well suited to deal in a reasonably ￿exible way
with the very large size of our data set: 55;905 pupils, 563 choice alternatives,
and a large set of observed variables describing pupils and choice alternatives. In
particular, the model allows for consistent estimation with a large set of choice al-
ternatives, by explicitly aggregating and/or sampling over the alternatives. At the
same time, the model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity since individuals may
have correlated preferences across alternatives belonging to the same nest. More
general models of unobserved heterogeneity, such as mixed or random coef￿cient
logit models (McFadden and Train (2000)) inhibit sampling over alternatives and
are therefore not feasible given the size of our choice set. Since we capture a lot
of observed individual characteristics anyway, the need for more general models of
unobserved heterogeneity is less than in other applications.
1.3.1 The choice model
Each individual i chooses one out of a large set of choice alternatives. The indi-
viduals are the pupils who have ￿nished high school and who are therefore eligible
to start with higher education studies. The choice alternatives are de￿ned by the
institution (the university or college) and the actual program (e.g. nursing, civil en-
gineering, etc.) There is also one no-study alternative. The total number of choice
alternatives is very large (563, including the no-study alternative), and it is typi-
cally not feasible to systematically incorporate observable choice-speci￿c variables
at this level of detail. Our framework therefore explicitly deals with the possibility
of aggregation and sampling over alternatives.
There are J study options, j = 1￿￿￿J. For each study option j there are Kj
variants or ￿elemental alternatives￿, k = 1￿￿￿Kj. Alternative 0 is the no-study
option. The total number of alternatives is
PJ
j=1 Kj + 1 = 563. The empirical
analysis aggregates the Kj variants to the level of the study option j. For example,
28the study option may be de￿ned at the level of the institution, or at the level of the
institution, program type (short vocational, long vocational or academic) and pro-
gram ￿eld (arts, social sciences, biomedical sciences or exact sciences). In both
cases, the variants per study option are de￿ned accordingly, i.e. as the actual pro-
grams offered under the de￿ned study option. Note that this framework also covers
the general case of no aggregation: simply de￿ne the study options as the institu-
tion and the actual program. Each study option then goes with a single variant, so
that Kj = 1 for all j.
An individual i’s utility for study option j and variant k, Uijk, is the sum of a
deterministic component Vijk and a random component "ijk, i.e. Uijk = Vijk+"ijk.
Assume that there is no choice-speci￿c information at the level of the variant k.
Hence, the deterministic component of utility is the same for each variant k of
study option j, Vijk = Vij for all k. Individual i’s utility for study option j and
variant k is then given by:
Uijk = Vij + "ijk:
Individual i’s utility for the no-study option is:
Ui0 = Vi0 + "i0:
The random component of utility follows the distributional assumptions of a
three-level nested logit model (McFadden (1978)). At the highest level, there are
two nests: the study nest S, which includes the study options and their variants; and
the no-study nest, which is a degenerate nest with only alternative 0. At the lower
level, the study nest S consists of the J different study option nests, j = 1￿￿￿J.
At the lowest level, each study option nest j consists of the Kj variants. The
distribution of the "ijk and "i0 has a sequential structure with two parameters, ￿ and
￿. The parameter ￿ roughly measures the extent to which the "ijk show correlation
between the J study option nests within the study nest S (i.e. correlation relative
to the no-study option 0). Similarly, the parameter ￿ measures the extent to which
the "ijk show additional correlation across the Kj variants within a given study
option nest j.
27 A parameter close to zero means that the correlation is weak,
27 There is no parameter for the no-study nest, since it is a degenerate nest. Furthermore, we
29while a parameter close to one means that the correlation is strong. To illustrate, if
￿ = ￿ = 0 the model reduces to a simple logit model with no correlation between
the "ijk. As another example, if ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, then there is no correlation of
the "ijk between the study option nests, while there is perfect correlation between
the variants within each study option nest.
Individuals choose the alternative that maximizes random utility Uijk. The
nested logit model is consistent with random utility maximization if 0 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ 1 (McFadden (1978)), i.e. correlation parameters are between zero and one,
with a weaker correlation between than within the study option nests. Because
the distribution of the "ijk and "i0 has a sequential structure, the nested logit model
yieldssimpleexpressionsfortheconditionalchoiceprobabilities: theprobabilityof
choosing a variant k within a study option nest Pijkjj, the probability of choosing a
study option j within the study nest PijjS, and the probability of choosing the study
nest PiS. We are not interested in the probability that individual i chooses variant
k of study option j, i.e. Pijk = PijkjjPijjSPiS, since there is no choice-speci￿c
variation at the level of the variant k, Vijk = Vij. Our interest is thus only in the
aggregate probability that individual i chooses any variant of study option j, i.e.
Pij = PijjSPiS. Applying the formulas for the three-level nested logit model, the
probability Pij for j = 1￿￿￿J is:
Pij =
￿PKj



























assume that the parameter ￿ is common for all J study option nests. It would be straightforward
to allow this parameter to vary across the study option nests, e.g. according to the institution or
program type or program ￿eld.
30Since the variants k within study option nest j have the same utility, Vijk = Vij for


















ij = Vij + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(Kj) can be interpreted as the aggregate utility of
a study option j. This shows that we can consider a simpli￿ed two-level nested
logit model at the level of the study option j, after simply including ln(Kj) as a
correction term to Vij; see also Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985). The correction term
captures the extent of unobserved heterogeneity within a study option. It drops out
if (1 ￿ ￿) is equal to zero: the utilities of the variants of the same study option
are perfectly correlated (homogeneous), so that additional variants do not lead to
a higher aggregate utility of that study option. Note that the correction term also
drops out in the general case of no aggregation, since in this case Kj = 1 for all j.
The probability that i chooses the no-study option Pi0 is simply:
Pi0 = 1 ￿ PiS =
exp(Vi0)
￿PJ




It is instructive to compare this model to Long (2004), who has been the only
other author to consider the study options at the level of the individual institution.
First, she does not include a correction term (1 ￿ ￿)ln(Kj) to the utility terms of
the study options. This is a special case of our model if ￿ = 1, i.e. homogeneity of
the variants within the institution. Second, Long estimates her model sequentially.
In a ￿rst step, she models the probability where to study, conditional on choosing
to study, i.e. Pij=S in our notation. In a second step, she models the probability
whether or not to study, i.e. PiS and Pi0, using the characteristics of the predicted
most preferred alternative as explanatory variables in the deterministic component
of utility. This may also be viewed as a special case of our model for ￿ = 1. Indeed,








so that PiS, as given by the second part of (1.1), reduces to Long’s binary choice
31model.
28 Equation (1.2) under the special case of ￿ = 1 is also essentially the
modeling approach followed by Rouse (1995) and Frenette (2003), since they con-
sider the participation decision as a function of the closest college in a binary logit
framework.
1.3.2 Indirect utility
We specify the deterministic component of utility Vij of individual i for alternative
j as a conditional indirect utility function. It depends on the expected bene￿ts,
including monetary returns in the form of increased future salaries, and on the
expected costs, i.e. the non-monetary costs of studying and the monetary costs in
the form of tuition fees and travel costs. In our application, tuition fees are low and
do not show any variation across alternatives. However, individuals pay an implicit
price in the form of travel costs: transportation costs and the opportunity cost of
time. We consider the following speci￿cation of Vij:
Vij = ￿j + w
0
i￿j + ￿i(yi ￿ tj ￿ g(xij)); (1.3)
where wi is avector ofindividual characteristics(sex, age, highschool background,
etc.), yi is individual i’ s annual income, tj is the tuition fee for study option j (cur-
rently uniform at about e 500 for all j 6= 0, but possibly differentiated across study
options after tuition fee reform), and g(xij) is the implicit price paid by individual
i for alternative j, which is a function of the annual travel costs xij.
The ￿rst and second terms in (1.3) refer to the intrinsic utility of each alterna-
tive j. In principle, one may include a full set of alternative-speci￿c intercepts ￿j
and slope vectors ￿j, which are interacted with the individual characteristics vector
wi. In practice, such ￿exibility would imply a very large number of parameters to
be estimated. We will therefore summarize the alternative-speci￿c effects ￿j and ￿j
by a more limited set of characteristics, i.e. the institution’s religious orientation,
the program type and the program ￿eld.
28 This comparison is not entirely accurate. Long’s speci￿cation includes variables such as dis-
tance in both steps of the estimation. For her approach to be exactly a special case of our random
utility framework, the coef￿cients of these common variables should have been restricted to be the
same.
32The third term in (1.3) refers to the utility derived from the consumption on
other goods (i.e. other than the educational choice), after spending the tuition fee
tj and an implicit price g(xij), which is an increasing function of the annual travel
costs xij. The parameter ￿i can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income of
individual i. It can be used to reinterpret the magnitudes of the other parameters
such as the ￿j in (1.3) in monetary terms (by simply dividing ￿j by ￿i), and to
conduct a more complete welfare analysis.
The annual travel costs xij of individual i for alternative j consist of two
components: transportation costs and the opportunity cost of time (McFadden and
Train (1978)). The transportation costs (in Euro) are proportional to the distance
pertripdij (inkm).Theopportunitycostoftime(alsoinEuro)isproportionaltothe
travel time per trip tij (in min). More precisely, specify the annual travel costs as
xij = 75dij+40tij.
29 Eachindividualhastwooptions: commuteorgoonresidence.
If she commutes, her implicit price for alternative j is simply g(xij) = xij. If she
goes on residence, she saves a fraction ￿ of the trips, but pays an extra annual cost
on rent rj. Her implicit price is correspondingly g(xij) = (1 ￿ ￿)xij + rj. A cost-
minimizing individual commutes if ￿xij ￿ rj, and goes on residence otherwise.
Intuitively, commuting is preferred if the annual travel costs are suf￿ciently small
relative to the annual cost of rent. The deterministic component of utility (1.3) for
a cost-minimizing individual can then be written as:
Vij = ￿j + w
0
i￿j + ￿i (yi ￿ tj ￿ xij) + ￿i(￿xij ￿ rj)I(￿xij ￿ rj); (1.4)
where I(￿) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the expression inside the brackets
is positive, and equal to 0 otherwise. Utility thus decreases in the travel costs xij
in a piecewise linear way: at a steeper rate ￿i for low values of xij (when the pupil
commutes), and at a ￿atter rate ￿i￿ for high values of xij (when the pupil goes on
residence).
29 This assumes that a commuter engages in 10 trips per week during 30 weeks of the year, at
a transportation cost of 0.25 Euro/km and an opportunity cost of time of 8 Euro/hour. The latter
amount corresponds to the typical wage for student jobs (Jobdienst KU Leuven, 2006) and was
subjected to a sensitivity analysis. The annual transportation cost per kilometer (in Euro) is then
10￿30￿0:25 = 75, and the annual opportunity cost of time per minute (in Euro) is 10￿30￿(8=60) =
40.
33The utility speci￿cation (1.4) holds for the J study options, j = 1￿￿￿J, as
well as for the no-study option 0. For the study options, xij has the clear interpreta-
tionofthetravelcostsofindividualitostudyoptionj.Thismayclearlyvaryacross
individuals and study options. For the no-study option, xi0 can be interpreted as the
travel costs to work. We assume this to be constant across individuals, xi0 = x0,
and to be suf￿ciently small so that the last term does not enter in Vi0.
30
It is again instructive to compare this speci￿cation to Long (2004). She al-
lows utility to vary quadratically with distance, and ￿nds that utility decreases with
distance at a decreasing rate. Our commuter/resident speci￿cation yields the same
degree of ￿exibility. In fact, a speci￿cation of Vij that is quadratic in xij indeed
gave a similar ￿t. The advantage of our approach in this context is that the coef￿-
cient of xij, i.e. ￿i, can also be interpreted as the marginal utility of income. This is
useful since unlike Long we cannot identify ￿i through direct price variation (since
tj is currently uniform across alternatives). In sum, our speci￿cation allows us to
capture the role of distance in the same ￿exible way as Long’s, while at the same
time enabling us to estimate a marginal utility of income coef￿cient in the absence
of any direct price variation.
31
1.3.3 Estimation
The choice probabilities (1.1) and (1.2) may be used to construct the likelihood
function and estimate the model. There are, however, practical dif￿culties due to
the size of our data set.
￿ There is a very large number of individuals (55;905).
￿ Each individual can choose from a very large number of alternatives (563,
including the no-study alternative).
30 The exact value of x0 is irrelevant and can be normalized since it is not separately identi￿ed
from ￿0.
31 Identi￿cation of the tuition fee effect is thus based on the assumption that individuals respond
in the same way to tuition fees as to travel costs. This approach has been frequently followed
in applications where prices are zero, or show little or no variation. See for example Hausman,
Leonard and McFadden (1995). In our application, this approach is reasonable to the extent that
capital constraints are not binding.
34￿ The associated choice-speci￿c variables need to be interacted with many
individual characteristics (the demographic and high school background
variables).
There are several ways to reduce the size of the data set: aggregation over
alternatives, sampling over alternatives, and sampling over individuals. We adopt
a combination of these approaches.
First, we aggregate over alternatives. Using the framework in section 1.3.1,
we aggregate the variants k to the level of the study option j by adding the correc-
tion term (1 ￿ ￿)ln(Kj) to Vij. We consider two de￿nitions of the study option
j. Our ￿aggregate￿ model de￿nes the study options as the 53 different campuses.
This model serves as a useful benchmark since it considers the same aggregation
level as in Long (2004). It discards, however, almost all of the information on the
study programs (except for including the correction term for the number of pro-
grams offered at the institution ln(Kj)). Since this is a main source of richness of
our data, which we want to exploit in our empirical analysis, we will focus on a
￿disaggregate￿ model. This model de￿nes the study options as the 154 different
campuses, program types, and program ￿elds (though it still aggregates over the
actual programs within a ￿eld, e.g. nursing which is one of the vocational social
sciences programs). Utility Vij can then be speci￿ed to depend on both the insti-
tutions’ characteristics and on the program characteristics down to the level of the
program ￿eld.
Second, we sample over alternatives; this is only necessary to estimate our
disaggregate model. In simple logit models one can randomly select a reduced
choice set for each individual, and de￿ne the choice probabilities as if the individ-
uals only faced this reduced choice set. Maximum likelihood estimation based on
these as-if choice probabilities yields consistent estimates (McFadden (1978)). We
extend this approach to the nested logit model by exploiting its sequential struc-
ture. We ￿rst consider the probability of choosing a study option j, conditional on
choosing to study, i.e. PijjS entering as the ￿rst term in (1.1). This is a simple logit
probability, so that it is possible to sample over alternatives and obtain consistent
35estimates. More precisely, for each student we construct a reduced choice set of 20
study options, i.e. the chosen study option and a random sample of 19 other study
options. This gives consistent estimates for the parameters entering the study op-
tion utilities Vij. We subsequently consider the probability whether to study, i.e.
PijS entering as the second term in (1.1). Provided that the utilities of all the study
options are now included, as computed from the parameter estimates of the ￿rst
stage, this yields consistent estimates of the parameters entering the no-study op-
tion Vi0 and of the distributional parameter ￿. Since this is a two-step estimation
procedure, the standard formulas for the standard errors of the parameters com-
puted in the second step (i.e. those for the no-study option and ￿) are not correct.
We follow the general procedure of Murphy and Topel (1985) to obtain the cor-
rected standard errors.
Finally, we sample over individuals. In general, there is a trade-off between
sampling over alternatives and sampling over individuals (doubling the size of the
sampled choice set implies halving the number of individuals to keep the size of
the data set ￿xed). Our experience showed that it is more ef￿cient to sample over
the alternatives than over the individuals, in particular to identify the utility ef-
fects of some relatively unpopular alternatives with few observations. We therefore
sampled much less heavily over individuals than over alternatives. For both the ag-
gregate and the disaggregate models we sampled about 20;000 out of the 55;905
individuals, as compared to a sampled choice set of 20 out of the 155 alternatives.
1.3.4 Alternative speci￿cations
We compare three different models.
￿ In the aggregate logit model the choice alternatives are at the level of the
institution. The choice set thus consists of 54 alternatives, i.e. 53 study
options and one no-study option.
￿ In the aggregate nested logit model the choice alternatives are again at the
level of the institution, but there is now a nesting parameter ￿ that may be
36different from 0. This allows for unobserved heterogeneity in that individuals
may have correlated preferences across the 53 study options, even after
conditioning on the observable characteristics.
￿ In the disaggregate nested logit model the choice set consists of 155
alternatives (including one no-study option), referring to the institutions, the
program types (long and short vocational, and academic) and the program
￿elds (exact sciences, biomedical sciences, social sciences and arts). There
is again a nesting parameter ￿ to allow for correlated preferences across the
154 study options.
The ￿rst two speci￿cations correspond to the previous literature, which also
lookedattheparticipationandschoolingdecisionsattheaggregateinstitutionlevel.
As mentioned earlier, there are still two important differences with the most com-
prehensive study to date, i.e. Long (2004): the inclusion of the correction term
ln(Kj) to account for the aggregation over the different programs within each in-
stitution; and the integrated consideration of the participation and schooling deci-
sions. The third speci￿cation is at the more detailed level of the institution and the
program ￿eld, which has not been considered in previous work. Since this third
speci￿cation is the most general, we will focus our discussion around it, and use
the results from the two aggregate models mainly as a point of comparison with
previous work.
It remains to specify the variables entering the indirect utility Vij as given by
(1.4), i.e. the individual characteristics entering wi and ￿i, and the choice char-
acteristics entering ￿j and ￿j. The vector of individual characteristics wi includes
the following 12 variables: sex, nationality, years of repetition during high school
(age ￿ 18), high school’s religious orientation (catholic or not), and 8 variables
referring to the type of high school education (i.e. various forms of general and
technical high school, relative to a professional high school education). Similarly,
we specify the marginal utility of income or the travel cost parameter ￿i to depend
on the full vector of individual characteristics wi. Hence, ￿i = w0
i￿, where ￿ is the
corresponding vector of parameters.
37The number of alternative-speci￿c intercepts ￿j and slope vectors ￿j is very
large. In particular, in the disaggregate model with 155 choice alternatives and 12
individual characteristics in wi, there are up to 154 + 154 ￿ 12 = 2002 parameters
to be estimated. To make estimation and interpretation feasible, we therefore put
some structure on ￿j and ￿j. The intercepts ￿j are speci￿ed to depend on a full
set of institution, program type and program ￿eld dummy variables. The slope ￿l
j
corresponding to each individual’s characteristic l depends on the following choice
characteristics: a dummy variable for the no-study option (￿l
0), and a set of dummy
variables characterizing the study options: the religious af￿liation of the institution
(catholic or not), the program type (short-term vocational, long-term vocational
or academic) and the program ￿eld (exact sciences, biomedical sciences, social
sciences, or arts). We take the following study option as the base: a non-catholic
institution offering a short-term vocational program in the ￿eld of arts. Hence, all
estimated slopes ￿l
j should be estimated relative to that base.
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Descriptive statistics on the individual characteristics entering wi and ￿i, un-
conditionalandconditionalonthechosenalternative, werepresentedanddiscussed
earlier in Table 1.3.
1.4 Empirical results
We begin with a discussion of the parameter estimates, to uncover the determinants
of the participation and schooling decisions. Next, we summarize our key results
through the cost elasticities implied by our estimates. Finally, we draw some im-
plications on the welfare effects of uniform and differentiated tuition fee increases.
32 In the two aggregate models with 54 alternatives, the number of alternative-speci￿c intercepts
￿j and the alternative-speci￿c slopes ￿j is lower, i.e. 53 + 53 ￿ 12 = 702, so that estimation of all
parameters would be easier. However, for ease of comparison and interpretation we adopt a more
parsimonious speci￿cation that is similar to the disaggregate model. The only difference is that the
￿j and ￿j obviously no longer include dummy variables referring to long-term vocational program
type and to the program ￿elds.
381.4.1 Parameter estimates
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the empirical results. Table 1.4 compares the estimates
of several parameters across the three different models (aggregate logit, aggregate
nested logit, and disaggregate nested logit): the nesting parameters ￿ and ￿, the
slope parameters entering the utility of the no-study option (￿0) and the travel cost
parameters (￿). Table 1.5 shows the slope parameters entering the utility of the
study options (￿j, j 6= 0). This table only shows the estimates for the disaggregate
nested logit model, since there are many of these parameters.
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We ￿rst discuss the observed and unobserved determinants of participation
(￿0 and ￿ in Table 1.4). Next, we highlight the role of mobility costs in both par-
ticipation and schooling (￿ in Table 1.4). Third, we discuss the determinants of
schooling (￿j, j 6= 0 in Table 1.5). Finally, we brie￿y discuss the aggregation
parameter (￿ in Table 1.4).
Observed and unobserved determinants of participation (￿0 and ￿)
ThetoppartofTable1.4showshowindividualsdifferintheirvaluationofthe
no-study option. We focus our discussion on the estimates of the most general dis-
aggregate nested logit model (third column). Males and especially foreigners have
a signi￿cantly higher utility from staying out of higher education. The same holds
true for older pupils, i.e. those who experienced repetitions during high school.
Pupils from a catholic high school have a signi￿cantly lower utility from staying
out than others. This is consistent with the reputation of the catholic high schools
in providing a strong preparation for a higher education.
The most important individual characteristics affecting the participation deci-
sion relate to the pupils’ type of high school. Pupils with a technical and especially
those with a general high school education have a substantially lower utility from
staying out relative to the pupils from a professional high school. This may be ei-
ther due to the acquired or due to the intrinsic skills of these pupils. So one should
be cautious and not conclude that promoting general high school education will
33 A comparison of the parameters in ￿j across models does not yield any main additional insights.
Many of the parameters do not enter in the aggregate models, and the ones that do (relating to the
institutions’ religious af￿liation and program type) were usually estimated to be similar.
39improve participation in higher education. What matters for our purposes, is only
that the type of high school background does play an important role, which will be
re￿ected in our estimated cost elasticities. Finally, while the type of high school
plays a crucial role, the speci￿c discipline followed at the high school does not mat-
ter much in the participation decision. None of the so-called more dif￿cult general
high school disciplines, such as mathematics or classical languages, matter in the
participation decision.
Most of the estimated ￿0 are of a similar order of magnitude in the more
restrictive aggregate models, but there are some important differences. For exam-
ple, the aggregate logit model estimates pupils with a catholic high school back-
ground to have a higher utility from staying out, in contrast with common wisdom.
This illustrates the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity affect-
ing the participation decision, as captured by the nesting parameter ￿. While the
logit model restricts ￿ to be equal to zero, the nested logit model estimates it as 0:90
and 0:95 in the aggregate and disaggregate versions. Hence, pupils have strongly
correlated preferences across all study options and view them as close substitutes
relative to the no-study option.
34
In sum, while several observed individual characteristics affect the utility of
the no-study option, there remains a lot of unobserved heterogeneity affecting the
participation decision.
The role of mobility costs in participation and schooling (￿)
The next question concerns the role of the annual travel costs, affecting the
valuations of the study options relative to the no-study option. Table 1.4 shows that
the annual travel costs have a negative and highly signi￿cant effect on utility (an
estimate of ￿6:46 and a t-statistic of ￿17:84 in the third speci￿cation). Further-
more, the parameter ￿ = 0:49 shows that the effect of travel costs is not linear
but decreasing. Students who live suf￿ciently far and go on residence save 49%
on the travel costs (to be traded off against their ￿xed renting costs). The effect
of the travel costs differs across individuals in some respects, for example pupils
34 The parameter is signi￿cantly different from one at the 5% level, so that perfect correlation can
be rejected.
40from a catholic high school are somewhat less cost sensitive. Pupils from a tech-
nical high school with a social orientation appear to be more cost sensitive than
others. Overall, however, mobility costs do not show much signi￿cant variation
across individuals.
Travel costs thus have a highly signi￿cant effect, but do they play a quantita-
tively important role in the pupils’ participation decision? Or are they more relevant
for the schooling decision, i.e. the decision where and what to study? Since the
travel costs enter the utility of the no-study option and the study options with a
common parameter ￿i, it would appear that they may have a similar effect on both
the participation and the schooling decisions. However, this is only the case in the
logit model. The nested logit models showed that pupils value the various study
options as close substitutes for each other, relative to the no-study option. Our es-
timate of ￿ = 0:95 implies that pupils are actually up to 1=(1 ￿ 0:95) = 20 times
moreresponsivetotravelcostsintheirschoolingdecisionthanintheirparticipation
decision (see (1.1)). An increase in the mobility costs of one of the study options
would thus generate substantial shifts in demand to other study options. But an
increase in the mobility costs of the no-study option would have much smaller ef-
fects. In this sense, the pupils’ mobility is a relative matter. Most pupils choose a
study option close to their homes because they have a lot of study options in their
neighborhood and they view these as close substitutes to more distant alternatives.
But those pupils who do not have nearby access to any study option, would be
willing to travel high amounts. These ￿ndings will be con￿rmed in our subsequent
analysis, where we report the cost elasticities implied by our estimates.
Determinants of schooling (￿j)
Table 1.5 shows how individuals differ in their valuations of the various study
options. The base study option is a non-catholic institution offering a short-term
vocational program, in the ￿eld of arts. To obtain an idea of the quantitative im-
portance of the parameter estimates, one may compute the additional willingness
to pay relative to the base study option in monetary terms (in e 10,000’s), by sim-
41ply dividing the coef￿cients by the marginal utility of income ￿i. Table 1.5 reveals
several interesting ￿ndings.
The ￿rst column shows how individuals value catholic institutions of higher
education. Few variables play a role, but the one exception is the religious orienta-
tion of the pupil’s former high school. The coef￿cient of 1:05 is highly signi￿cant
and it is also quantitatively important. It amounts to an additional willingness to
pay for a catholic institution by pupils from a catholic high school of e 10,000
￿ 1.05 / (6.46-0.45) = e 1,750. This indicates that there are still strong linkages
between the religious networks.
The next two columns show the valuations for the program type, i.e. acad-
emic or long term-term vocational programs (relative to short-term vocational). In-
terestingly, males and foreigners have a higher valuation for academic or long-term
vocational programs. Hence, while they have a lower utility from participation (as
we saw before), they do have a stronger preference for the long-term programs con-
ditional on participating. Pupils who experienced years of repetition during high
school have a lower utility from participating in the long-term programs, whether
vocational or academic. The type of high school plays a signi￿cant role: pupils
with the intellectually more demanding general high school background are not
only more likely to participate, but they also choose the more demanding voca-
tional long and especially academic program types. Their additional willingness to
pay for academic programs at universities than for short-term vocational programs
at colleges amounts to e10,000 ￿ 2.71 / (6.46-0.36) = e 4,440. Furthermore, while
we earlier found that the speci￿c discipline taken at a general high school does not
matter for participation, it does matter for the type of higher education program.
Pupils with a general high school background in science, mathematics and classi-
cal languages have a substantially higher valuation for the academic or long-term
vocational programs than for the short-term programs. Most notably, pupils who
took classical languages would be willing to pay an additional e 10,000 ￿ 1.88
/ (6.46-0.53) = e 3,170 to follow an academic rather than a short-term vocational
program, relative to comparable other general high school pupils.
42The ￿nal three columns show the valuations for the speci￿c program ￿elds.
The type of high school and the speci￿c discipline followed at high school play the
quantitatively most important roles. Generally speaking, pupils prefer the program
￿elds that closely match the discipline they followed at high school. For exam-
ple, pupils who followed science or mathematics at a general high school prefer
sciences, whereas pupils who followed classical languages prefer arts. These ￿nd-
ings stress the central importance of the high school background in the subsequent
higher education decision, in contrast to some claims that the general high school
leaves the options open for all study options at the higher education level.
It is interesting to point out that the gender effect also comes out strong in
explaining differences in valuations across the study ￿elds. Females have a strong
preference for arts and especially biomedical sciences, and the weakest preference
for exact sciences, as compared to males. While this seems to simply con￿rm com-
mon wisdom, it is important to stress that these gender effects are found even after
having controlled for gender differences in the high school education background.
For example, females have a lower willingness to pay for exact sciences than arts
of e 2,400 relative to males, even if they both have the same science high school
background.
Aggregation (￿)
Finally, consider the aggregation parameter ￿, which is interacted with the
log of the number of variants Kj available at aggregate study option j. It measures
the degree to which preferences are correlated across the Kj variants over which
we aggregated. In the two aggregate models, ￿ < ￿, which is inconsistent with
the restrictions of the nested logit model.
35 In the third, ￿disaggregate￿ model,
￿ = 0:950 > ￿, but it is still quite close to ￿. This means that preferences only show
weak additional correlation over the variants available at each study option. This
￿nding suggests the need for even more detailed disaggregate analysis, to study
educational choices at even more disaggregate levels. We leave this as a topic for
further research.
35 T-statistics also showed that the difference is signi￿cant.
431.4.2 Cost elasticities
Many of our empirical ￿ndings can be summarized by the own- and cross-cost
elasticities of demand. We focus on the semi-elasticities, de￿ned as the percentage
change in the number of students in response to an absolute increase in the mone-
tary costs xij of a given study option or subset of study options. We consider here
an absolute cost increase by e 1,000 (or equivalently, given our de￿nition of xij,
an increase in the daily commuting distance by 9km for a pupil traveling at a speed
of 60km/h).
36
The estimated cost elasticities provide information as to how participation
and schooling would change in response to uniform or differentiated tuition fee in-
creases. They may also give a ￿rst impression on the possible effects of a reduction
of supply, which is essentially a very large cost increase for a subset of study op-
tions. Finally, the cost elasticities are informative in interpreting the results of a
more complete welfare analysis of reform.
We compute the cost elasticities at three different levels: the level of the
market, the program type (colleges versus universities), and the program ￿elds.
Uniform cost increase
Table 1.6 considers the effects of a uniform cost increase by e 1,000 on col-
leges (￿rst column), universities (second column), and overall participation (third
column). The ￿rst panel compares the elasticities as implied by the aggregate logit,
the aggregate nested logit and the disaggregate nested logit. The results differ dra-
matically. While the logit model would predict overall participation to drop by a
substantial 13:79%, the aggregate nested logit model predicts a drop of only 1:62%,
and the disaggregate nested logit model a drop of an even lower 0:91%. These large
differences across models follow from our ￿nding that pupils have quite strongly
36 More formally, denote the predicted probability that individual i chooses study option j by
b Pij(xi), where xi = (xi1 ￿￿￿xiJ) is the J ￿1 vector of individual i’s monetary costs for the various
study options. Let ￿ be a J ￿1 vector of ones and zeros, where the ones denote the study options for
which there is a cost increase by e 1000: The semi-elasticity of demand for all study options j 2 A












j2A b Pij(xi). For example, suppose that the set A consists of all study options and all el-
ements in ￿ are equal to 1. The semi-elasticity then refers to the percentage change in the total
number of students in response to a uniform cost increase by e 1000.
44correlated preferences across study options, i.e. they perceive the various study op-
tions as close substitutes (￿ = 0:95). Hence, while mobility costs matter in their
schooling decisions, they play only a limited role in their participation decisions.
In all models the relative drop in students is larger at colleges than at universities,
e.g. ￿1:09% versus ￿0:51% in the disaggregate nested logit model; the absolute
drop at colleges is even higher since colleges have a larger market share.
The second panel shows how the elasticities differ among pupils. Males and
foreigners are more likely to drop out than others. For example, male students
would drop their overall participation by 1:07% compared to a drop of 0:78% for
female students.
37 Students with no repetitions are less likely to drop out than
students with one or two years of repetition (￿0:65% versus ￿1:41% and ￿2:14%).
The most important differences are found between students from different high
school background: students with a general high school background would reduce
participation by only 0:5%, whereas students from technical and professional high
schools would drop participation by, respectively, 1:35% and 2:58%. In sum,
the empirical results show that the overall demand for higher education is highly
inelastic, although there are some clear differences between individuals.
Cost increases by program type: colleges versus universities
Additional insights are obtained by considering the cost elasticities at lower
levels of aggregation. Table 1.7 presents the semi-elasticities at the level of the pro-
gram type: vocational programs at colleges versus academic programs at universi-
ties. Cost increases by colleges only or by universities evidently have even smaller
effects on total participation (last column). However, underlying these small total
effects, there are large shifts in demand. A e 1,000 cost increase to all colleges re-
ducescollegedemandbyalmost13%, andae1,000costincreasetoalluniversities
reduces university demand by an even larger 24%. These ￿ndings are consistent
with our earlier discussion on the role of mobility costs. Since pupils have strongly
correlated preferences across study options, they are quite willing to substitute be-
37 The ratio of these changes is similar to the odds ratio, which is equal to exp(￿l
0) for the l-th
individual characteristic.
45tween colleges and universities in response to a differentiated cost increase, even
though they are unlikely to refrain from participation altogether.
We can use these results to assess the government’s historic efforts to pro-
mote participation by investing in a large college network with a broad geographic
coverage. Our estimated cost elasticities suggest that these efforts only have a neg-
ligible effect on total participation. The investment efforts thus mainly lead to a
substitution from universities to colleges. In this sense, we may conclude that the
government’s policy has essentially not lead to more democratization, but rather to
a diversion away from universities. This relates to Rouse’s (1995) ￿ndings on the
impact of U.S. community colleges on educational attainment. She also found that
colleges did not increase the likelihood of attendance (though they may have led
to an increase in the number of years of schooling). However, even if the promo-
tion of colleges did not have an effect on democratization, this does not mean it is
undesirable. The diversion to colleges may be ef￿cient or inef￿cient depending on
the bene￿ts to pupils and the different costs of supplying education at colleges and
universities. We will turn to that question in our welfare analysis below.
Cost increases by program ￿eld
Cost elasticities at the lower level of the program ￿eld provide interesting ad-
ditional information. For example, they are relevant in assessing regulatory policies
to promote certain study programs. They are also of interest in assessing the effects
of introducing differentiated tuition fees. To our knowledge, there are no previous
estimates of elasticities in higher education at the level of the program ￿eld.
Table 1.8 shows the estimated semi-elasticities for eight disciplines (arts, so-
cial sciences, biomedical sciences, and exact sciences; of either the vocational or
the academic type). The own-cost elasticities on the diagonals show that pupils
are quite cost-sensitive for all disciplines. The elasticities tend to be lower for the
disciplines with the higher market share. For example, vocational biomedical sci-
ences have by far the highest market share and also the lowest own-cost elasticity.
However, market share is not the only relevant factor. For example, academic so-
46cial sciences and vocational exact sciences have a similar market share, but pupils
are much more cost sensitive for the former.
The cross-cost elasticities reveal several additional interesting patterns. It is
best to read the cross-elasticities by row. Notice ￿rst that the cross-cost elasticities
would be the same for all ￿elds on the same row if all individuals were identical
(no observed or unobserved heterogeneity). This follows from the IIA property of
the logit model, saying that identical pupils shift proportionally to other alterna-
tives. We earlier found however that pupil heterogeneity does matter in explaining
educational choices. This is indeed re￿ected in the pattern of cross-cost elasticities,
which vary widely within each row of the table. For example, the last row shows
that a rise in the costs of academic exact sciences would generate much more sub-
stitution to other academic sciences than to vocational sciences; and among the
vocational sciences the gains would mainly go to the vocational exact sciences.
This example illustrates a more general pattern for the cross-cost elastici-
ties: pupils tend to mainly substitute within the academic or within the vocational
program types, and to the extent that they substitute across types they would es-
pecially choose the ￿twin￿ program ￿eld of the other type. There is thus generally
a dominance of the program type dimension over the program ￿eld dimension. In
a few cases this dominance is somewhat weak: vocational exact sciences loose a
comparatively high amount to academic sciences (fourth row), and academic arts
loose relatively much to vocational arts (￿fth row). In one case the dominance of
the program type over the program ￿eld is actually reversed: vocational arts loose
more to academic arts than to any other vocational program (￿rst row). This is con-
sistent with the high quality reputation of the vocational arts programs relative to
academic arts (e.g. the language interpreter programs).
As a ￿nal remark, note that exact sciences and biomedical sciences are the
closest neighbors, and so are social sciences and arts: in almost all cases, substi-
tution mainly occurs to these neighbors. The only exception occurs on the second
and third columns, where it appears that vocational biomedical and vocational so-
cial sciences are closest neighbors. This can be explained by the nature of many of
these vocational programs (e.g. nursing).
47Concluding remarks
The estimated elasticities show that uniform cost increases have little overall
effects on the demand for higher education, though they can somewhat change the
composition of demand. In contrast, cost increases by program type and program
￿eld lead to large shifts in the composition. One may use these ￿ndings to draw
some tentative conclusions on policy reform. On the one hand, the low market-
level elasticities suggest that a uniform tuition fee may generate large distributional
effects, and comparatively lower total welfare improvements. On the other hand,
the large elasticities at the level of the program type and program ￿eld, suggest
that differentiated tuition fee increases may involve additional distributional and
welfare effects. To obtain more insights, we turn to an illustrative welfare analysis
next.
1.4.3 Implications for policy reform
To illustrate how our empirical results can be useful in assessing policy reform, we
focus on the effects of raising tuition fees within a centralized public system, i.e.
keeping other things such as the quality and the diversity of supply constant. Such
an analysis is highly relevant since, as we have seen in section 2, fees are currently
far from suf￿cient to cover even the variable cost per student, let alone the ￿xed
costs. An analysis of more drastic reforms, such as decentralizing decision making
to the institutions, is beyond the scope of this paper, since it would require a better
empirical understanding on how the institutions of higher education compete.
Framework
We make the following assumptions.
￿ Pupils can borrow at a competitive interest rate to ￿nance their educational
expenses. This ensures that increases in tuition fees do not cause pupils
to drop out because of capital constraints. Barr (2004) and others have
discussed how this can be accomplished through appropriately designed
income-contingent student loans.
48￿ Pupils can deduct their educational expenses from their (future) taxable
income. This ensures that a progressive income tax system does not distort
the incentives to invest in higher education; see Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2005) and Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2005).
38
￿ The private (Mincer) returns to higher education are equal to the social
returns, i.e. there are no spillovers to others from investing in higher
education. Based on a discussion of the available micro and macro empirical
evidence, Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2005) conclude that this is a realistic
assumption. It allows us to directly use the estimates of our random utility
discrete choice model to compute the changes in consumer surplus after a
change in tuition fees.
￿ The government can regulate the colleges and universities, so that they do
not change the quality or diversity of supply in response to an increase in
tuition fees. Variable subsidies are granted on a cost basis. This allows us to
treat the government and the higher education institutions as an integrated
entity, and use the government’s net revenues (tuition fee revenues minus the
subsidy costs) as a measure of producer surplus.
￿ Progressive income taxes ensure the socially desirable income distribution.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) provide conditions under which this is the case.
This allows us to abstract from equity considerations.
Based on these assumptions we can assess the welfare effects of tuition fee
increases in terms of consumer and producer surplus. Write the indirect utility
V ￿
ij = Vij + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(Kj), where Vij is given by (1.4), as a function of the J ￿ 1
tuition fee vector t = (t1 ￿￿￿tJ) , i.e. V ￿
ij = V ￿
ij(t) for j 6= 0. The nested logit model
gives the following expression for pupil i’s expected surplus as a function of t (see
38 The result that educational expenses should be tax deductable, or equivalently that the
educational subsidy rate should be equal to the marginal income tax, closely relates to Diamond











The average consumer surplus per pupil is CS =
PI
i=1 CSi=I, where I is the
number of pupils. The variable part of producer surplus per pupil (or government’s
variable net revenue) for a speci￿c study option j, as a function of t, is equal to
PSj(t) = (tj ￿ cj)
X
i Pij(t);
where Pij(t) is the probability that individual i chooses program j as a function of
t, and cj is the constant variable cost per student of program j. Average producer
surplus per pupil is PS(t) =
PJ
j=1 PSj(t)=I.
Direct estimates of the variable cost per student cj are not available. As an
indirect measure we use the government’s variable subsidy per student, since these
are granted on a cost basis as discussed in section 2. Table 1.2 summarized how the
variable subsidies, and hence the estimated variable costs, tend to be higher for the
biomedical and exact sciences, especially at the universities. We will present the
results from the estimated variable costs of the second panel of Table 1.2, but the
results are very similar when the alternative estimates in the ￿rst panel were used.
The most simple welfare analysis would simply look at the sum of consumer
and producer surplus. However, this would ignore that the social costs of public
funds ￿ may be greater than zero, i.e. that the government may need to levy dis-
tortionary taxes elsewhere to ￿nance a higher education de￿cit. Estimates of the
social costs of public funds vary widely, from e 0.17 to over e 1.65 per Euro of
public funds raised as discussed in Bird (2005). Diewert, Lawrence and Thompson
(1998) suggest using a number of at least e 0.23. We take a conservative approach
and compute total welfare as CS(t) + (1 + ￿)PS(t), where ￿ is either equal to 0,
or equal to Diewert et al.’ s 0.23.
Findings
Table 1.9 shows the effects of both uniform and differentiated tuition fee
increases. The ￿rst two columns show the size of the considered fee increases. The
next four columns show the effects on per pupil consumer surplus, net revenues
50and total welfare assuming the cost of public funds ￿ is either zero or e 0.23. The
￿nal two columns show the associated effects on participation.
The ￿rst row shows the effects of a ￿small￿ uniform tuition fee increase of
e 1,000. This is small in the sense that it is still insuf￿cient to cover the variable
costs per student (see Table 1.2). Consumer surplus drops by e 657 per pupil.
39
Producer surplus increases by an amount of e 670 per pupil. Hence, there are
large distributional effects from students to the government (tax payers). The total
welfare increase depends on how one values the increase in producer surplus: it
increases by a small e 13 per pupil if the social costs of public funds are zero
(￿ = 1), but by a much higher amount of e 167 if ￿ = 0:23.
The second row compares the e 1,000 uniform increase with a differentiated
fee increase that yields an equivalent increase in producer surplus: we take a fee
increase of e 750 at colleges, which requires a fee increase of e 1,579 at univer-
sities to keep producer surplus constant. This differentiated fee increase implies
that welfare increases by an additional e 12 per pupil relative to the uniform fee
increase. This increase is due to a shift in demand from the universities to the col-
leges, which operate at a lower variable cost (Table 1.2). This shows that the earlier
discussed diversion effects to colleges are not necessarily bad from a total welfare
point of view. Nevertheless, it is also striking that differentiating fees between col-
leges and universities only improves total welfare by a small amount: we attribute
this to the fact that the shift to the colleges does not only imply a lower variable
cost of supply, but also a lower bene￿t to the pupils.
To gain further insights we subsequently consider the effects of more drastic
cost-based fee increases, i.e. fee increases that are suf￿cient to exactly cover the
variable part of producer surplus. The third row of Table 1.9 considers the effect
of a uniform cost-based fee increase, which amounts to a required fee increase by
e 2,810. Since the variable costs per student vary across program types and ￿elds,
such a fee increase implies some cross-subsidization from colleges to universities,
and from arts and social sciences to biomedical sciences and exact sciences. By
39 This is roughly proportional to the fraction of eligible pupils that choose to study, as expected
from a discrete choice model.
51construction, (variable) producer surplus becomes zero, an increase by e 1,852
per pupil relative to the status quo. There is therefore a large shift in distribution
from students to producers (the government). Total welfare increases by the small
amount of e 22 per pupil if ￿ = 0, and by the much larger amount of e 448 if
￿ = 0:23.
The fourth row shows how welfare further improves after a differentiated
cost-based fee increase, i.e. such that the variable costs of each individual program
are covered (implying no longer a cross-subsidization). If ￿ = 0, these tuition fees
are also the ￿rst-best levels. Total welfare now increases by an additional e 100
relative to the uniform cost-based fee increase. This shows that fee differentiation
has some modest effect on total welfare, but the effect should not be exaggerated.
The ￿nal row of Table 1.9 considers the welfare effects of adding a uniform
markup over the cost-based levels. To illustrate, we consider a uniform markup of
e 5,000, which is roughly suf￿cient to cover the ￿xed costs of higher education (in
addition to the variable costs). If ￿ = 0, such a uniform markup lowers welfare
relative to the ￿rst-best cost-based fees (by about e 80 per pupil), but it still raises
welfare relative to the status quo (by the small amount of e 36 per pupil). In con-
trast, if ￿ = 0:23 total welfare per pupil further increases by e 1,150 relative to
the status quo.
40 Note that we also considered the welfare effects from introducing
non-uniform markups over marginal costs (i.e. Ramsey pricing), to exploit differ-
ences in the elasticities; we found that the additional gains are negligible, which is
due to the fact that the estimated program ￿eld-level cost elasticities are quite large
and similar to each other (see Table 1.8).
This discussion focused on the effect of tuition fee increases on total welfare.
To gain additional intuition, the last two columns of Table 1.9 show how partici-
pation changes in response to the tuition fee increases. Consistent with our earlier
discussed cost elasticities, overall participation generally does not drop by very
much for the small fee increases (drop by less than 1%) but also not for the more
40 We also computed the optimal uniform markup under ￿ = 0:23. This amount to a markup over
costs of e 15,200. This very high number is due to the very low cost elasticity with respect to the
overall participation decision.
52drastic cost-based fee increases (drop of slightly more than 2%). Only if fees in-
crease to have a e 5,000 markup, participation drops considerably (￿7%). As a
￿nal point, the differentiated fee increases are accompanied by substantial student
shifts from the universities to the colleges. This again emphasizes that a diver-
sion of students from university to colleges is not necessarily harmful from a total
welfare perspective, due to the associated variable cost savings.
Concluding remarks
We can summarize this discussion as follows. First, uniform cost-based tu-
ition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from
fee differentiation are relatively unimportant. The welfare increases are relatively
large even under conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds. If
one ignores the social cost of public funds, the welfare gains are relatively small,
but there is still a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders.
1.5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the determinants of participation and schooling in a public sys-
tem of higher education, using a unique data set on pupils’ study choices. One of
our central ￿ndings is that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs
as close substitutes, implying an ambiguous role for travel costs: they hardly affect
the participation decisions, but have a strong impact on the schooling decisions. In
addition, high school background plays an important role in both participation and
schooling. Our empirical analysis generalizes previous work, which has focused
on the participation rather than the schooling decision (where and what to study).
Based on information of travel costs, we can indirectly infer the effects from raising
costs including tuition fees at a high level of detail.
Our empirical results can contribute to informing the debate on reforming
public systems of higher education. As an illustration, we have assessed the effects
of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of
the welfare gains. The additional gains from fee differentiation are relatively unim-
53portant. The welfare gains are quite large if one makes conservative assumptions
on the social cost of public funds, and there is a substantial redistribution from
students to outsiders. Our empirical framework may be used to assess the effects
of additional policy reforms of public systems. For example, in several countries
governments aim to rationalize the supply by reducing the number of institutions
through associations and/or reducing the number of duplicated programs. In future
research, it would be of strong interest to evaluate the ef￿ciency and distributional
effects of these and other, more drastic reforms, such as decentralizing decision-
making to the universities and colleges.







Figure 1.1: Participation in higher education, by postal code
54Table 1.1: Supply of Higher Education in Flanders (2001)
Colleges Universities
(vocational education) (academic education)
Non-catholic Catholic Non-catholic Catholic
Number of campuses
Total 16 28 5 4
offering degrees in
Arts 5 7 2 4
Social Sciences 12 21 3 4
Biomedical Sciences 10 17 5 2
Exact Sciences 14 15 5 2
Number of students
Total 9,899 15,283 6,658 5,641
enrolled for a degree in
Arts 1,016 791 943 933
Social Sciences 5,538 9,952 2,996 3,116
Biomedical Sciences 839 1,709 1,312 798
Exact Sciences 2,506 2,831 1,407 794
Note: Own calculations based on our dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education.





Social Sciences 2,772 2,601
Biomedical Sciences 3,671 5,186




Social Sciences 2,865 2,807
Biomedical Sciences 3,683 5,000
Exact Sciences 3,448 5,290
Note: The top panel is based on the variable subsidy scheme for higher education in vigor
until 2001 (Universiteitendecreet, 1991; Hogescholendecreet, 1994). The bottom panel is
based on the proposed new subsidy scheme (Vandenbroucke, 2005). We report student-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































56Table 1.4: Participation and schooling decisions - Comparison of alternative mod-
els
Aggregate logit Aggregate nested Disaggregate nested
model logit model logit model
Parameter Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Outside option (￿0)
intercept 4.10* (26.52) 1.51* (12.39) 1.18* (14.60)
male 0.22* (3.85) 0.27* (5.61) 0.31* (7.55)
foreign 1.17* (6.23) 1.00* (6.15) 0.77* (6.59)
catholic high school 0.20* (3.28) -0.33* (-6.20) -0.35* (-7.90)
years of repetition 0.47* (13.04) 0.45* (15.57) 0.47* (20.61)
general high school
1 -1.81* (-13.70) -2.19* (-20.44) -2.14* (-21.00)
classical languages 0.82* (6.21) -0.34* (-3.01) -0.14 (-1.55)
modern languages 0.03 (0.24) 0.10 (1.02) 0.05 (0.63)
economics -0.36* (-2.94) -0.17 (-1.62) 0.08 (0.89)
sciences 0.29 (2.46) -0.07 (-0.67) 0.02 (0.17)
mathematics 0.34* (3.08) -0.08 (-0.80) 0.00 (-0.05)
technical high school
1 -1.73* (-17.41) -1.38* (-18.55) -1.19* (-16.88)
·product’-focused 0.57* (6.37) 0.21* (2.94) 0.24* (3.85)
Travel cost (￿i)
intercept 5.44* (18.14) 6.34* (19.44) 6.46* (17.84)
’ -0.41* (-2.20) -0.42* (-2.09) -0.49* (-2.12)
male -0.10 (-0.86) -0.06 (-0.53) 0.24 (1.83)
foreign -0.63 (-1.24) -0.22 (-0.38) 0.63 (1.30)
catholic high school -0.30* (-2.13) -0.62* (-3.96) -0.45* (-2.68)
years of repetition -0.01 (-0.18) 0.04 (0.49) 0.07 (0.74)
general high school
1 0.28 (1.02) 0.06 (0.21) -0.36 (-1.09)
classical languages -0.58* (-2.93) -0.75* (-3.59) -0.53* (-2.36)
modern languages -0.01 (-0.07) 0.07 (0.33) 0.42 (1.89)
economics 0.29 (1.38) 0.25 (1.11) 0.50* (2.06)
sciences -0.57* (-2.89) -0.62* (-2.96) 0.01 (0.06)
mathematics -0.20 (-1.06) -0.17 (-0.84) -0.17 (-0.77)
technical high school
1 1.42* (6.13) 1.67* (6.58) 1.41* (4.80)
·product’-focused -1.05* (-5.50) -1.30* (-6.32) -1.41* (-6.33)
Nesting parameters
￿ 0 (not estimated) 0.898* (33.90) 0.946* (42.80)
￿ -0.048* (2.01) 0.888* (30.42) 0.950* (46.60)
Slope parameters (￿j, j 6= 0)
Catholic Institution
2 included included included, see table 1.5
Academic program
3 included included included, see table 1.5
Vocational long program
3 not included not included included, see table 1.5
Study ￿eld characteristics
4 not included not included included, see table 1.5
Fixed effects (￿j) included included included, see table 1.5
Observations 778,464 778,464 2,981,735
individuals 14,416 14,416 19,237
alternatives 54 54 155
Mean log likelihood -0.0383068 -0.037747 -0.0032785
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * statistical signi￿cance at 5% level
1 base category = professional/arts high school
2 base category = non-catholic study option
3 base category = vocational study option (aggregate models), vocational short study option (disaggregate model)
4 base category = arts study option




Type of Higher Education
2 Study Field
3
Parameter (￿j;j 6= 0) Catholic Vocational
long
Academic Social Biomedical Exact
intercept -0.74* -0.52* -2.99* -1.70* -3.12* -2.33*
(-4.48) (-2.12) (-9.88) (-6.13) (-8.55) (-8.59)
male -0.03 0.52* 0.23* 0.31* -0.62* 1.43*
(-0.49) (6.38) (3.12) (3.29) (-5.41) (13.85)
foreign -0.16 0.50 1.07* 0.03 0.08 -0.40
(-0.67) (1.41) (3.44) (0.08) (0.17) (-0.95)
catholic high school 1.05* 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.20 0.33*
(15.27) (1.79) (1.49) (0.64) (1.36) (2.53)
years of repetition -0.10* -0.28* -0.22* -0.02 -0.14 -0.14
(-2.50) (-4.30) (-3.68) (-0.25) (-1.56) (-1.79)
general high school
4 0.10 0.23 2.71* 2.40* 2.65* 0.71*
(0.78) (0.96) (10.16) (9.64) (7.86) (2.67)
classical languages 0.08 0.92* 1.88* -0.52* -0.48* -0.81*
(0.88) (5.82) (14.83) (-3.83) (-2.92) (-5.12)
modern languages -0.08 0.41* -0.03 -0.53* -0.73** -0.65*
(-0.94) (3.03) (-0.32) (-4.08) (-4.43) (-4.07)
economics 0.11 0.84* 0.11 1.35* 0.67* 0.43*
(1.19) (5.85) (0.96) (8.90) (3.48) (2.36)
sciences -0.06 0.89* 1.01* 0.57* 1.73* 1.39*
(-0.67) (6.34) (8.80) (3.98) (10.37) (8.87)
mathematics -0.19* 1.60* 1.37* 0.91* 1.22* 1.98*
(-2.13) (12.09) (12.81) (7.02) (7.53) (12.61)
technical high school
4 -0.14 -0.42 0.32 2.86* 3.45* 1.12*
(-1.23) (-1.87) (1.17) (10.84) (10.13) (4.26)
’product’-focused -0.11 0.81* -0.17 -0.09 1.31* 2.94*
(-1.19) (5.26) (-0.91) (-0.34) (4.66) (10.77)
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. * statistical signi￿cance at 5% level
1 base category = non-catholic study option
2 base category = vocational short study option
3 base category = arts study option
4 base category = professional/arts high school





Logit -16.43 -0.91 -13.79
(0.29) (0.24) (0.25)
Aggregate nested -1.95 -0.87 -1.62
(0.51) (0.23) (0.43)
Disaggregate nested -1.09 -0.51 -0.91
(0.45) (0.21) (0.38)
Pupils by pro￿le (disaggregated nested logit model only)
male -1.28 -0.60 -1.07
female -0.94 -0.44 -0.78
Belgian -1.08 -0.50 -0.90
foreign -2.11 -1.24 -1.80
no repetition -0.78 -0.44 -0.65
1 year repetition -1.51 -0.91 -1.41
2 years repetition -2.20 -1.54 -2.14
catholic high school -1.00 -0.47 -0.83
non-catholic high school -1.49 -0.74 -1.29
general high school -0.54 -0.46 -0.50
technical high school -1.36 -1.33 -1.35
professional/arts high school -2.58 -2.54 -2.58
Current market share 45.05 22.00 67.04
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
1Reported as semi-elasticities: % change in market share given a uniform cost increase of e
1,000.




Increase for colleges -12.88 26.30 -0.72
(0.44) (0.54) (0.30)
Increase for universities 10.61 -24.03 -0.13
(0.21) (0.40) (0.06)
Current market share 45.53 20.47 66.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































601.A Appendix: The Data
We combine two main data sets: ￿pupils￿ and ￿students￿. Both are made available
by the Flemish Ministry of Education. In addition to these data sets, we constructed
a number of auxiliary data sets, describing additional choice and/or demographic
characteristics.
￿ Pupils
The pupils data set contains information on all 55,905 pupils who
attended the last year of secondary school in the year 2001. For each pupil
there is information on ￿ve variables, de￿ning the pupil’s pro￿le: secondary
school institution, study program during last year of secondary school,
postal code, age (birth year), sex and nationality.
￿ Students
The students data set contains information on all students who ￿rst
registered for a higher education program in either 2001 or in 2002.
Information is available on each student’s pro￿le, according to the same ￿ve
variables as in the pupils data set. In addition, the data set contains each
student’s choice of higher education institution, campus and study program.
Finally, there is information on the year of graduation from secondary
school. We use this last variable to extract the subset of students who
graduated from a secondary school in the year 2001. This amounts to a total
number of 35,562 ￿rst registering students, out of which the large majority
(34,395 students) immediately registered after secondary school graduation
in 2001, and a small group registered with one year of delay in 2002 (1,167
students). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the fraction of 2001 pupils
that ￿rst registers to a higher education institution after 2002 is negligible.
Our task is to distinguish between pupils who become students and pupils
who remain ￿outsiders￿, i.e. who do not register at a higher education institution
in 2001 or 2002. In principle, this can be done by combining the pupils and the
students data sets, based on their pro￿les as de￿ned by the ￿ve common variables:
61a pupil for which there is a successful match with a student can be identi￿ed as a
student, while a pupil for which there is no successful match with a student can be
identi￿ed as an outsider. In practice, we also found a small number of students for
which there is no successful match with a pupil. Based on correspondence with
the ministry of education, we attribute this to some inconsistencies in the de￿nition
of the pupils’ pro￿les rather than in the de￿nition of the students’ pro￿les. We
therefore adopt the following approach when matching the pupils and students data
sets. We identify as students all individuals in the students data set (even if no
successful match with a pupil was found). We then identify as outsiders all pupils
for which there is no successful match with a student. This will generate a data
set with slightly too many individuals that are identi￿ed as outsiders: this excess
number is equal to the number of students for which no successful match with a
pupil was found. We then randomly drop this excess number of individuals from
the outsiders. Our combined data set then contains information on 55,905 pupils:
35,562 students and 20,343 outsiders.
In addition to the two main data sets, we constructed a number of auxiliary
data sets. First, we have information on various characteristics of the secondary
school institution and the study program during the last year of high school. The
information on the secondary school institution includes the postal code of the sec-
ondary school and the network af￿liation (free subsidized, of￿cial subsidized, or
community). The information on the study program during the last year of sec-
ondary school includes the main category (i.e. general, technical, arts or profes-
sional high school program), as well as more speci￿c information (focus on lan-
guages, math, science, etc.). Second, we have information on the analogue char-
acteristics of the higher education institution and study program. Third, we have
information on the distribution of several demographic variables: average income
by postal code, and average commuting distance and commuting time of the ac-
tive labor force by postal code. Fourth, we make use of Microsoft’s route planning
software to compute the distance and car travel time between each individual’s
postal code address and each higher education institution’s postal code address.
The distance and travel time between an individual’s postal code and the no-study
62alternative is set equal to the average distance travelled to work, by postal code.
Finally, we use information provided by the Belgian railroad company to compute
train travel times, i.e. train travel time between each individual’s closest train sta-
tion and each higher education institution’s closest train station, plus car travel time
to and from the respective stations.
63Chapter 2: Reducing Supply Diversity in
Higher Education
Abstract
Publicly ￿nanced systems of higher education have recently attempted to reduce
the diversity of supply in various ways. We
41 study the pro￿t and welfare effects
of reducing supply diversity, against the background of a funding system reform in
Flanders (Belgium). We ￿nd that the social desirability of cutting programs at insti-
tutions is limited to less than 10% of the cases, due to the students’ low willingness
to travel and relatively limited variable and ￿xed cost savings. Furthermore, the
originally proposed version of the new funding system would often miss its pur-
pose. In general, it gives an incentive to cut the smaller programs. However, we
￿nd that for the programs where cuts are undesirable, the system nevertheless en-
courages to cut 30-60% of the cases. Furthermore, for the minority of cases where
program cuts are actually desirable, we ￿nd it provides the wrong incentive for up
to half of the cases. These ￿ndings emphasize the complexities in regulating the di-
versity of supply in higher education, and serve as a word of caution towards the
various other measures to cut supply diversity that have recently been introduced.
2.1 Introduction
The publicly ￿nanced systems of higher education in Europe have recently come
under increased scrutiny to increase their economic ef￿ciency (Nadeau & McNi-
coll, 2006; European Commission, 2006). While most European governments (ex-
cept the U.K.) still show a reluctance to raise private contributions through tuition
fees, several measures have been introduced to promote reductions in the variety of
supply. Universities and colleges have been encouraged to form associations, and
41 This chapter is joint work with Frank Verboven.
64new public funding systems have been designed to encourage institutions to elimi-
nate some of their study programs. There appears to be a common belief that such
measures can save on (duplicated) ￿xed costs, without generating too much losses
to consumers (students) from the reduced supply diversity.
This paper considers the effects of reducing supply diversity, against the
background of a recent funding system reform in Flanders (Belgium). According
to the original proposal in 2005, institutions would receive public funding based on
their achieved concentration index, i.e. the average number of students per study
program
42 (Vandenbroucke, 2005). It therefore provides incentives to eliminate the
smaller programs. We address two main questions. First, does reducing supply
diversity make sense from a welfare perspective? Second, does the concentration
index provide the proper incentives to cut supply diversity, i.e. if and only if it is
socially desirable?
To address these questions we estimate a model of (undergraduate) educa-
tional choice, accounting for the determinants of the students’ decisions where and
what to study. The welfare effects from cutting programs at institutions consist of
consumer surplus losses, variable cost savings (or losses) due to an output realloca-
tion effect, and ￿xed cost savings. The pro￿t effects consist of tuition fee revenue
losses, ￿xed cost savings, and the incentive provided by the concentration index
funding system.
Our ￿rst main ￿nding is that the social desirability of cutting programs at in-
stitutions is limited to less than 10% of the cases. This follows from the students’
low willingness to travel to other institutions. Reducing supply diversity therefore
results in consumer surplus losses that typically outweigh any possible variable or
￿xed cost savings. Our second main ￿nding is that a funding system that would
make use of a concentration index often misses its purpose. It creates incentives to
cut programs in about half of the cases where this would be socially undesirable.
Furthermore, for the minority of cases where program cuts are actually desirable,
42 A more elaborate discussion of the ￿nal version of the new funding system, which does no
longer include the originally proposed concentration index, is deferred to section 2.2.2.
65the system does often not provide the proper incentives to do so.
43 Our ￿ndings em-
phasize the complexities in regulating the diversity of supply in publicly ￿nanced
systems of higher education, and serve as a word of caution towards the various
other measures that have recently been proposed. Policy makers often appear to be
too pre-occupied with the ￿xed cost savings following program cuts: these may be
too limited compared with the implied consumer surplus losses.
Ourpaperrelatestotheempiricalindustrialorganizationliteratureonproduct
diversity. Several studies have estimated demand models to measure the effects of
product introductions or eliminations. They typically focus on consumer surplus or
gross producer surplus effects, excluding the dif￿cult to observe ￿xed costs.
44 A
few studies have accounted for the role of ￿xed costs, by adding an entry model
to the demand side. In particular, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) infer ￿xed costs
from a model of free entry, where entry occurs if and only if this is pro￿table.
45
This approach is not possible in our application, since the decision to supply study
programs is subject to an untransparant government approval process. We therefore
make the weaker assumption that institutions offer programs if (but not only if)
this is pro￿table. This provides simple bounds on the ￿xed costs per program, and
actually brings us quite far in drawing unambiguous conclusions about the total
welfare effects and pro￿t incentives of the concentration index funding system.
Similar approaches may therefore be useful in other applications where there is no
simple free entry process.
In the education economics literature there has been a long-standing concern
with the ef￿cienct use of of resources.
46 Several empirical papers identi￿ed the
43 As we will see, programs cuts are mainly desirable for programs with a high variable cost per
student, since this involves an output reallocation effect towards programs with lower variable costs.
However, the funding scheme does not guarantee stronger incentives to cut these programs.
44 Petrin (2002), Hausman and Leonard (2002) and Nevo (2003) look at the consumer effects of
new product introduction. Perloff and Ward (2003) also look at product eliminations and consider
both consumer surplus and gross pro￿ts, using assumptions about pricing behavior.
45 For the large theoretical literature on free entry and optimal product diversity, see for example
Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
46 For example, Bergstrom et al. (1988) devised an empirical test to determine whether govern-
ments spend too much on public education.
66importance of economies of scale in the provision of education,
47 thereby provid-
ing arguments in favour of reducing supply variety. However, the demand side of
(higher) education remains underexplored. A notable exception is Long (2004).
She conducts a thorough long-term analysis for the U.S. on the determinants of
higher educational choice, including the role of distance and college characteris-
tics. She does not, however, use these results to draw implications about reducing
supply variety (an issue that may be of stronger relevance in the more regulated
European systems).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the
relevant aspects of the higher education system in Flanders (Belgium), in particular
the current supply diversity and the proposed funding scheme reform. Section 2.3
outlines the economic framework to analyze supply diversity. Section 2.4 presents
the empirical model of educational choice and the empirical estimates. Section 2.5
uses the framework and empirical results to assess the pro￿t and welfare effects.
Finally, section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Higher education in the region of Flanders
Our analysis is based on the case of Flanders (Belgium), and is representative for
several other European countries. We focus our discussion on the current supply
diversity and on the recent government policies aimed at reducing this diversity.
For a more detailed background discussion of the supply and demand of higher
education in Flanders, we refer to Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) and Van
Heffen and Lub’s (2003) country report.
2.2.1 Institutions and study programs
There are two types of institutions offering higher education: colleges and universi-
ties. Colleges largely focus on teaching and offer vocational (or professional) study
47 Riew (1966) and Cohn et al. (1989) found evidence of scale economies at the secondary school
and higher education level, respectively. These ￿ndings suggest that education institutions could
reduce their unit costs of operation by growing relative to their current size.
67programs. Many of the colleges exclusively offer one-cycle (bachelor) study pro-
grams, but some offer two-cycle (bachelor + master) programs. Universities are
active in both research and teaching and offer academic programs. These are typ-
ically two-cycle (bachelor + master) programs. In recent years, there has been a
trend towards convergence between colleges and universities, especially regarding
the two-cycle programs.
48 Several institutions have multiple campuses across the
region.
There are ten main study ￿elds: architecture, engineering, sciences, eco-
nomics & business, education sciences, other social sciences (including law, polit-
ical sciences, sociology, psychology, and their vocational counterparts), medicine
& paramedics, bio-engineering, languages and cultural studies. These ￿elds apply
to both colleges and universities, except for sciences which are only offered at uni-
versities. Each ￿eld may consist of more than one ￿elemental￿ study program. For
example, hotel management and marketing are study programs in the vocational
economics & business ￿eld, while dentistry and medical sciences are programs in
the academic medicine/paramedics ￿eld.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the diversity of supply in the year 2001-
2002. For each of the ten study ￿elds, the table shows the number of campuses,
the number of study programs, the number of incoming students (freshmen), and
the average number of students per study program. The upper panel shows this in-
formation for colleges, and the lower panel for universities. There are 44 college
campuses and 9 university campuses, which amounts to the high density of one
campusper250km2 throughouttheregionofFlanders. Thetotalnumberofincom-
ing students is larger at colleges than at universities (25,182 versus 12,299), but the
average scale is lower (61 incoming students per study program for colleges versus
83 for universities). All ￿elds are broadly available at many campuses through-
out the region. This ￿duplication￿ of supply is especially large for vocational study
48 This trend has been stimulated by the government. Already in 1991, a Decree stipulated the
same rules for two-cycle vocational programs at colleges as for academic programs at universi-
ties. Colleges offering these two-cycle programs also became entitled to do applied research by
means of co-operation agreements with universities. More recently, the Bologna Declaration and
the subsequent Bachelor￿Master reforms have strengthened these developments.
68￿elds at colleges, in particular for engineering, economics & business, education
sciences and medicine & paramedics, which are all available at more than 20 dif-
ferent college campuses. The average scale per study program is relatively low,
notably for cultural studies at colleges or for science programs at universities (on
average 19 and 35 incoming students per program, respectively).
In sum, Table 2.1 illustrates the high diversity of the supply of higher edu-
cation in Flanders. There is a broad geographical coverage and a correspondingly
small average scale, especially for the college campuses. Geographical coverage
remains broad when considering the separate study ￿elds. These observations will
be useful when interpreting and evaluating the effects of the government policy
towards the diversity of supply.
2.2.2 Government intervention
As in most European countries the Flemish undergraduate higher education system
is entirely public. In this section we discuss the role of the government in the
provision of subsidies, the regulation of tuition fees, and the control of the diversity
and quality of supply.
The main role of the government consists in giving subsidies to institutions.
Since it profoundly alters the way these subsidies are allocated to institutions, we
give an overview of the evolution of the proposed new funding scheme for Flemish
higher education since its conception in 2004 to the current ￿￿nal draft￿ stage (July
2007). Our analysis in later sections will focus on the effects of one the incentives
for reducing supply diversity that was proposed during the development of the new
funding system.
The newly elected Flemish government taking of￿ce in 2004 announced the
development of a new funding scheme for higher education. An important trig-
ger for this initiative was the government’s opinion that the number of institutions
and study programs offered in higher education was too high and that a new fund-
ing scheme should contain explicit incentives to reduce supply diversity. More
generally, it was argued that the new system should have the following properties:
69transparency, predictability, fairness, ef￿ciency and encouraging diversity and ￿ex-
ibility. The new system is to accomplish a series of objectives, such as increased
participation, higher attainment, equal opportunities and a ￿more effective and ra-
tional supply￿ (Vlaamse Regering, 2007).
The ￿rst proposal for a new funding scheme was released for discussion with
the higher education sector at the end of 2005. This proposal contained a number
of ￿nancial incentives aiming to reduce the number of institutions and study pro-
grams. We focus on these incentives, ignoring those targeting, for example, higher
attainment. First, institutions were required to reach a minimum size to be eligi-
ble for funding. Furthermore, phase out funding was provided for programs that an
institution decided to cut and institutions could earn additional funding by jointly
offering study programs. For very small programs an institution could obtain guar-
anteed minimum funding, provided it was the only institution in Flanders offering
the program. A ￿nal incentive in the ￿rst proposal was the concentration index,
de￿ned as the institution’s average program size, i.e. the average number of stu-
dents per program. The higher this concentration index, the higher the subsidy of
an institution would be. This incentive was put forward by the government as a key
instrument to counter the fragmentation in Flemish higher education.
During the consultation process with the higher education sector, the fund-
ing scheme as originally proposed by the government was scrutinized and re￿ned,
resulting in the ￿nal proposal of 19 July 2007.
49 With respect to incentives for
reducing supply diversity, the core of the original proposal remains intact. The ￿-
nal proposal retains the ￿minimum size￿ requirement and the bonus for eliminated
study programs.
50 It additionally speci￿ed that this bonus may be increased if the
institution draws up a reorganization plan that provides for a ￿sensible reorienta-
tion￿ of material assets and personnel. After consultation of the institutions, the
concentration index incentive did not make it into the ￿nal proposal since it was
considered too crude a measure. For example, it was argued by universities that it
49 The ￿nal decree will undergo at most minor changes compared to the ￿nal proposal, if any,
before becoming law. The new funding scheme for higher education in Flanders will enter in vigor
on 1 January 2008.
50 A similar bonus is given in the case of mergers of study programs.
70is common to pool students and ￿share￿ them across study programs so that critical
mass is achieved whilst the concentration index is not able to capture such initia-
tives. Overall, the impact of the concentration index was considered dif￿cult to
evaluate and therefore the institutions suggested dropping the measure as part of
the funding scheme. So despite the fact that the government in the ￿nal proposal
reaf￿rms its position that ￿current higher education supply is too fragmented￿, the
key incentive for reducing supply diversity has been dropped after consulting the
institutions. As an alternative, the Decree leaves the initiative to the higher ed-
ucation sector and requires all institutions active in a certain study ￿eld to come
up with a joint ￿rationalization plan￿ by 1 January 2009. This plan must specify
how many study programs the institutions wish to keep, the process and timing
for carrying out the plan and how the study programs will connect to available re-
search capacity. The proposed plans will be subjected to a panel of international
experts and require approval by the Flemish government. The criteria that must
be used for judging the rationalisation plans are listed in the proposal of the De-
cree (Vlaamse Regering, 2007b, art. 51). These criteria relate to the quality of
programs, economies of scale and the available teaching and research capacity in
terms of personnel and infrastructure. Absent from these criteria is the demand
side i.e. the impact of reduced supply diversity on students or general welfare.
This paper does provide that perspective and determines the impact of reduc-
tions in supply diversity on overall welfare. Furthermore, it is interesting to evalu-
atetheeffectsofafundingschemeusingaconcentrationindexincentiveasameans
to reduce supply diversity. In particular, it is illuminating to see how students’ sub-
stitution behavior resulting from a program cut affects the average program size
at the institution and hence how a funding system incorporating such an incentive
would in￿uence institutions’ decisions. After all, institutions opposed against the
use of the concentration index in the funding scheme pointing to measurement is-
sues, but without a clear understanding of the role of the demand side. Therefore,
in the remainder of the text we analyze a funding scheme that incorporates a con-
centration index as the main incentive to reduce supply diversity. We will refer to it
as the ￿CI funding system￿. It contains two main changes in the way it assigns sub-
71sidies to institutions compared to the former funding system (before 2004). In the
old system, subsidies consisted of both a ￿xed and a variable component. The vari-
able component represented a constant subsidy per student, varying across study
programs on cost-based principles. The ￿xed component was independent of the
number of enrolling students and varied between institutions on historical grounds.
In the CI funding system the constant subsidy per student has been made
conform to the recent and more accurate estimates of the variable cost per student,
obtained by Deen et al. (2005). Table 2.2 shows the current subsidy per student for
the ten study ￿elds (i.e. averaged across the study programs within each ￿eld). The
subsidies tend to be lower for vocational programs at colleges than for academic
programs at universities. They also show a wide variation across ￿elds: the lowest
levels are for humanities and social sciences and the highest levels for medical
and exact sciences. These differences in subsidies per student clearly re￿ect the
differences in the (estimated) variable costs per student.
Second, the CI funding system replaces the ￿xed subsidy by another vari-
able subsidy, intended to promote institutions to reduce supply diversity. Each
institution k receives a subsidy r per unit of its achieved concentration index Ck.
As mentioned earlier, this index is essentially the average number of students per





where Qk is the total number of students and Jk is the total number of study pro-
grams at institution k.
51 In the next section we will show how this new variable
subsidy may provide incentives to the institutions to reduce their supply diversity,
as well as under which conditions this is desirable from a welfare perspective.
In addition to the subsidies, the government regulates the tuition fees. While
the institutions have some discretion, in practice the tuition fees are very low and
51 In practice, the index is slighlty more complicated (Vandenbroucke, 2005). It is normalized
by the average index over all institutions. This normalized concentration index has to stay within
bounds of 0:5 and 1:5. We account for this in our empirical analysis, but not in our discussion since
it complicates the exposition and it only matters for a minority of the institutions. The lower bound
is obtained for 5 and the upper bound for 4 out of the 53 institutions.
The subsidy r per 0.01 units of the (normalized) concentration index is e 16,000.
72hardly show any variation. During the year of our study, the tuition fees were es-
sentially uniform at e 425 for colleges and e 445 for universities. These low and
uniform tuition fees are in sharp contrast with the high and widely varying subsi-
dies or variable costs per student, shown earlier in Table 2.2.
Finally, the government excercises some direct control over the diversity and
the quality of supply. The diversity is regulated since institutions are not automati-
cally eligible to offer all possible study programs. In practice, the institutions form
a continuous pressure to be entitled to supply additional subsidized programs. The
CI funding system based on the concentration index may therefore be seen as an at-
tempt to reduce this pressure. The quality of supply is controlled through a system
of self-assessments and external visiting committees. While the government may
in principle withdraw the authorization to offer a subsidized program if quality is
insuf￿cient, this rarely happens in practice.
2.3 Economic framework
We now provide an economic framework for analyzing both the demand, pro￿t and
welfare effects of reducing the supply diversity in higher education. This frame-
work will serve as the basis for our empirical analysis in the next sections.
2.3.1 Demand, pro￿ts and welfare
There are K institutions. Each institution k = 1￿￿￿K offers Jk study programs,
j = 1￿￿￿Jk, so the total number of study alternatives is J =
PK
k=1 Jk. There are
I students, i = 1￿￿￿I. Their demands are speci￿ed in section 2.4.1 and follow
a discrete choice model: all students choose exactly one of the study alternatives
and there is no outside good. The demand or number of students for program j at
institution k is qjk(p), where p denotes the J ￿ 1 price vector p of all study al-
ternatives (programs and institutions). The total demand or the number of students
for institution k is the sum of the demands for all programs at institution k, i.e.
Qk(p) =
PJk
j=1 qjk(p). Since all students choose exactly one of the study alterna-




j=1 qjk(p) = I
and hence is perfectly inelastic.
52
The program-related pro￿ts of institution k consist of tuition fee revenues
plus subsidies minus variable and ￿xed costs over all programs it offers.
53 Each
program j has a constant variable cost per student cj (common across institutions
k) and a ￿xed cost Fjk. The subsidies consist of two parts. First, there is a constant
and program-speci￿c variable subsidy per student sj. As discussed in the previous
section this variable subsidy is cost-based, so that sj = cj. Second, there is an addi-
tional subsidy at the level of the institution k. As discussed in section 2, this used to
be a ￿xed amount independent of the number of students. In the CI funding system,
this ￿xed amount has been replaced by a variable subsidy r per unit of institution
k’s achieved concentration index Ck(p). This index equals the institution’s average




















or simply the tuition fee revenues plus the revenues from the achieved concentra-
tion index minus the ￿xed costs.
Consumer surplus at a given price vector p is the sum of each student i’s
individual consumer surplus, CS(p) =
PI
i=1 CSi(p). Producer surplus is the sum
of all institutions’ program-related pro￿ts minus government subsidies. Since the
subsidies are simply transfers from the government to the institutions, they cancel
out, so that producer surplus reduces to tuition fee revenues minus variable costs
52 This is consistent with our earlier work (Kelchtermans and Verboven, 2006), where we found
very limited substitution to the outside good in response to price or cost increases.
53 Institutions may also obtain other bene￿ts, such as bene￿ts from research or from raising the
students’ productivity (as modeled by Del Rey, 2001), or ￿prestige￿ (De Fraja and Iossa, 2001).














Total welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, W(p) = CS(p) +
PS(p).
2.3.2 The effects of reducing supply diversity
Itisconvenienttode￿netheeliminationofstudyalternatives(programs/institutions)
in terms of prohibitive tuition fee increases. The initial price vector is p0, and con-
sists of identical tuition fees p0 for all study alternatives. After the elimination of
one or more study alternatives there is a new price vector p1, where the prices for
the eliminated alternatives are replaced by in￿nitely high prices (so that their de-
mands effectively become zero). We focus the exposition here on the elimination
of one program j at one institution k, and denote this new price vector by p1
jk (with
the price for program j at institution k equal to in￿nity and the other prices equal
to the initial level p0). In our empirical analysis, we will also consider the elimina-
tion of one study program j at all institutions, as denoted by a price vector p1
j (with
in￿nite prices for program j at all institutions).
First, consider the effects of eliminating program j at institution k on the total
demand (number of students) of institution k. A common measure is the diversion











This ratio is between zero and one, and measures the fraction of the students lost
from the eliminated program j that ￿ows back to other programs offered by the
same institution k.
54 A high diversion ratio means that students have a strong pref-
erence for the institution rather than for the speci￿c program. This may re￿ect
54 The diversion ratio is often used in merger analysis (e.g. Shapiro, 1995), where it refers to the
fraction of sales lost by brand A (due to a price increase) that is captured by brand B, as a ￿rst
indicator of the competitive effects of a merger of brands A and B. It also frequently appears in the
theory of access price regulation, where it is known as the displacement ratio.
75high mobility costs, or simply the possibility that students perceive different study
programs at the same institution as close substitutes.
Now consider the pro￿t incentives for eliminating program j at institution k.






















According to (2.1), the pro￿t incentive from a variety reduction consists of three
terms. The ￿rst term is the tuition fee revenue loss, and is clearly negative. The loss
is smaller than the initial fee revenues from the eliminated alternative p0qjk(p0),
since it accounts for the fact that some of the lost students may remain within the
same institution (DRjk > 0). The third term is positive and refers to the ￿xed cost
savings associated with eliminating study program j. The second term captures the
change in the concentration index, and may be positive or negative. One can easily
verify that the concentration index increases, i.e. Ck(p1







Hence, the CI funding scheme provides a positive incentive for eliminating pro-
gram j at institution k if it has a suf￿ciently low number of students. If the di-
version ratio is zero, it provides a positive incentive if the number of students is
below the current concentration index Ck(p0). If the diversion ratio is positive, the
system may provide a positive incentive even if the number of students is above
the concentration index. The general message is that the system creates positive
incentives to drop a program with a suf￿ciently small number of students, and es-
pecially if students have good substitution possibilities to other programs within
that institution.
Finally, consider the welfare effects of eliminating program j at institution k.





76which is clearly negative since the program drop involves a (prohibitive) tuition
fee increase for the eliminated program. Note that one can interpret ￿￿CSjk as
the students’ net willingness to pay for program j at institution k, i.e. the stu-
dents’ willingness to pay on top of the current tuition fees.
55 The effect of dropping






































where the second equality follows from the fact that total demand is inelastic. The
￿rst term is the variable cost saving from an output reallocation effect following
the program drop. It may be positive or negative depending on whether the other
programs to which the students substitute have a lower or a higher variable cost
than the eliminated program. The second term is a positive ￿xed cost saving.
The effect of a program cut on total welfare then consists of the following
components:
























Eliminating program j thus involves a negative effect on consumers, a positive or
negative variable cost saving from output reallocation, and a positive ￿xed cost
saving.
2.3.3 Drawing policy conclusions
A comparison of (2.1) and (2.2) clearly shows that the pro￿t incentives and welfare
effects of a program cut are not necessarily well-alligned. Our empirical analysis
aims to assess this but faces the following main challenge. While it is possible to
measure most pro￿t and welfare components from our demand parameter estimates
55 In the empirical analysis we will compare this with the willingness to pay for program j across
all institutions (by considering the new price vector p1
j).
77and our variable cost proxy, we do not observe the ￿xed cost savings involved in a
program cut. We therefore proceed as follows.
￿ In a ￿rst step, we focus on the observable components of the pro￿t
and welfare effects, i.e. tuition fee revenue losses, the change in the
concentration index, consumer losses, and the output reallocation effect.
￿ In the second step, we obtain reasonable lower and upper bounds on the
￿xed cost savings, and thereby provide at least suf￿cient conditions under
which unilateral program cuts raise or lower total pro￿ts or welfare. It turns
out that, in our application, this approach gives us conclusive anwsers on
the pro￿t and welfare effects of the CI funding system for a large number of
cases.
More speci￿cally, in the second step we make the following assumptions
about the ￿xed costs of any program j at any institution k. First, we assume that
￿xed costs are positive, i.e. Fjk > 0 for all j;k. Second, we assume that institutions
did not ￿nd it pro￿table to cut any of the offered programs under the old funding
system, where the concentration index was not yet at work.
56 Inspecting (2.1),
but without the term for the change in the concentration index, this amounts to
assuming that Fjk < (1 ￿ DRjk)p0qjk(p0) for any program j at any institution
k. Intuitively, the ￿xed costs at any program and any institution are assumed to be
less than the tuition fee revenue losses that would result from a program cut in the
old funding system. These revenue losses are simply the actual revenues p0qjk(p0),
adjusted for the diversion ratio.
Taken together, we thus bound the ￿xed costs of program j at institution k
between two levels:
0 < Fjk < (1 ￿ DRjk)p
0qjk(p
0): (2.3)
56 This is in the spirit of the empirical IO literature on entry. From observing a certain program
we can infer that it is pro￿table to supply it, implying an an upper bound on the ￿xed cost level.
The empirical IO literature on free entry would often however go a step further. Under free entry,
one could also infer that supplying additional programs would be unpro￿table. This inference is
not reasonable in our setting, since entry of addional programs is regulated, so institutions cannot
simple add more programs to their portfolio as long as that is pro￿table.
78Note that as the diversion ratio increases (becomes closer to 1), the upper bound on
the ￿xed cost becomes tighter.
Wecannowcombinethe￿xedcostbounds(2.3)with(2.1)and(2.2)toobtain
the following suf￿cient conditions for the sign of the pro￿t and welfare effects of
unilateral program cuts, regardless of the level of ￿xed cost savings Fjk:
Proposition 1 (i) The CI funding system does not provide a pro￿t incentive to cut program j at institu-


















(ii) A program cut j at institution k is socially undesirable if (1 ￿ DRjk)p
0qjk(p

























The effects of the CI funding system can therefore be classi￿ed in four nat-
ural cases, as summarized in Table 2.3. The top left cell shows the ￿desirable status
quo￿ cases, under which a unilateral program cut is neither pro￿table nor socially
desirable under the CI funding system. The top right cell shows the ￿undesirable
status quo￿ cases, under which a unilateral program cut is not pro￿table under the
CI funding system although it would be socially desirable. The bottom left cell
shows the ￿undesirable reform￿ cases, under which a program cut is pro￿table al-
thoughitisnotsociallydesirable.Finally, thebottomrightcellshowsthe￿desirable
reform￿ cases, under a unilateral program cut is both pro￿table and socially desir-
able. Our empirical analysis will show that it is possible to unambiguously classify
many of the unilateral program cuts into one these categories, even without observ-
ing the actual ￿xed cost savings Fjk.
2.4 Empirical framework
To estimate the various components of the pro￿t and welfare effects, we adopt a
logit demand model for the various study programs at the different institutions. The
logit model is well-suited to deal with our large data set, which consists of 37;481
students choosing one out of the 562 study alternatives (programs/institutions). A
main computational advantage is that it enables us to obtain consistent maximum
likelihood estimates of the demand parameters by sampling over the large number
79of study alternatives. This is considerably more ef￿cient than sampling over the
individuals.
57
Our logit model does not include an outside good (a ￿no-study alternative￿),
so that total demand is perfectly inelastic with respect to price or with respect to
eliminating an alternative. Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) include an outside
good in a nested logit framework. While their analysis encovers some interesting
determinants on the decision whether or not to start with higher education, they
￿nd that students are extremely price inelastic. We therefore chose to adopt the
computationally simpler logit model without an outside good. This is especially
convenient since we analyze the study alternatives at a much more disaggregate
level than Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006).
2.4.1 Indirect utility
A student i’s conditional indirect utility for study program j at institution k consists
of a deterministic component Vijk and a random component "ijk. The deterministic
component Vijk depends on the expected bene￿ts from studying, including mon-
etary returns in the form of increased future salaries and non-monetary bene￿ts
from education, and on the expected costs, i.e. the monetary costs in the form of
tuition fees and travel costs, and the non-monetary costs of studying. We take the
following speci￿cation:




i￿(yi ￿ pjk ￿ g(xik)); (2.4)
where wi is avector ofindividual characteristics(sex, age, highschool background,
etc.), yi is student i’ s annual income, pjk is the tuition fee for study program j at
57 Sampling over alternatives in non-logit models does not generally give consistent maximum
likelihood estimates. Bierlaire et al. (2006) show that it is still possible to obtain consistent max-
imum likelihood estimates in ￿block additive generalized extreme value models￿, which includes
the logit but not the nested logit model. Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) show how to sample
over alternatives in a nested logit model using a sequential procedure. Most recently, Fox (2007)
has proposed a maximum score estimator to obtain consistent estimates based on a subset of al-
ternatives for a general class of discrete choice models including random coef￿cients (or mixed)
logit models. However, given the richness of our data set, the need for controlling for additional
unobserved student heterogeneity appears to be lower here than in other applications.
80institution k, and g(xik) is an implicit price because of the annual travel costs xik
of student i to institution k.
The ￿rst two terms in (2.4) may in principle include a full set of alternative-
speci￿c intercepts ￿jk and slope vectors ￿jk. In practice, such ￿exibility would
imply a very large number of parameters to be estimated because of the large num-
ber of alternatives, to be interacted with the individual characteristics in the vector
wi. We will therefore specify alternative-speci￿c effects ￿jk and ￿jk to depend on
a more limited but still rich set of alternative characteristics (e.g. program type or
￿eld, institution’s religious af￿liation, etc.).
The third term in (2.4) refers to the utility from the consumption on goods
other than the study alternative, after spending the tuition fee pjk and an implicit
price g(xik), which is an increasing function of the annual travel costs xik of stu-
dent i to institution k. The parameter vector ￿ captures the determinants of the
marginal utility of income and is important to convert utility in monetary terms
and conduct our welfare analysis. Each student either commutes or goes on resi-
dence. If she commutes, her implicit price for alternative j is simply the annual
travel cost g(xik) = xik. If she goes on residence, she saves a fraction ￿ of the
trips, but pays an extra annual cost on rent rk, so that her implicit price becomes
g(xik) = (1￿￿)xik +rk. A cost-minimizing student thus commutes if and only if
she is located suf￿ciently closely to institution k, i.e. ￿xik ￿ rk. The deterministic
component of utility (2.4) can then be written as:




i￿(yi ￿ pjk ￿ xik) + w
0
i￿(￿xik ￿ rk)I(￿xik ￿rk); (2.5)
where I(￿) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the expression inside the brackets is
positive, and equal to 0 otherwise. Utility therefore decreases in the annual travel
costs xik in a piecewise linear way: at a steeper rate w0
i￿ for low values of xik (when
the student commutes), and at a ￿atter rate w0
i￿￿ for high values of xik (when the
student goes on residence).
812.4.2 Estimation and data set
Each student i chooses the study program j at institution k that maximizes random
utility Vijk+"ijk, where "ijk takes the extreme value distribution. This results in the
familiar logit choice probabilities for each student i for each progam j at institution
k. It also gives the standard expressions for expected consumer surplus for each
student i; see for example Train (2003) for details.
The logit choice probabilities can be used to construct the likelihood function
and estimate the parameters. There are, however, practical dif￿culties due to the
size of our data set.
￿ We observe a very large number of students (37;481), i.e. all incoming
￿rst-year students in Flanders in 2001.
￿ Each student can choose from a very large number of study alternatives
(562), i.e. the various programs offered across 53 different campuses.
￿ We observe a very large set of study characteristics, to be interacted with
many student characteristics.
The logit model can overcome these dif￿culties and generate consistent max-
imum likelihood estimates by sampling over the study alternatives. Speci￿cally, for
eachstudentwesampleachoicesetof20alternatives, includingthechosenalterna-
tive plus a random sample of 19 other study alternatives. This sampling approach is
considerably more ef￿cient than sampling over individuals, in particular to identify
the utility determinants of some relatively unpopular alternatives with few observa-
tions. It also provides considerably richer substitution parameters than aggregating
over groups of study alternatives.
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58 Furthermore, since we do not exploit observable variation across elemental alternatives (e.g.
nursing) within a study ￿eld (e.g. biomedical vocational), we can aggregate the 562 elemental pro-
gram/institution alternatives up to 226 ￿eld/type/institution alternatives. In the logit model this can
be done by simply including the log of the number of elemental alternatives within each aggregate
alternative as an additional variable in the utility speci￿cation. This approach follows Ben-Akiva
and Lerman (1985), as applied by Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) for a much more aggregate
version of the model.
82Our data set comes from the Flemish Ministry of Education, and has infor-
mation on:
￿ Student characteristics (wi). This consists of demographic information, i.e.
sex, nationality and religious af￿liation of the high school; and information
on scholastic ability, i.e. years of repetition in high school, the type of high
school (general, technical or professional) and the study program followed
at high school (e.g. mathematics, languages).
￿ Travel costs (xik). From information on students’ and institutions’ locations,
we compute the distance per trip dik (in km) and the travel time per trip tik
(in min) for every student i to every institution k. We then set the annual
travel costs xik (in Euro) to xik = 75dik + 40tik.
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￿ Study alternative characteristics (entering ￿jk and ￿jk). This consists of
the following variables: the institution’s religious orientation, the study
program type (one-cycle and two-cycle vocational programs at colleges,
and academic programs at universities) and the ten study ￿elds discussed in
section 2 (architecture, engineering, etc.).
Following the utility speci￿cation (2.5), we interact the student characteris-
tics (wi) with both the travel costs (xik) and the study alternative characteristics
(in ￿jk). Table 2.4 provides summary statistics on the student characteristics and
travel costs (rows), by a few main study characteristics (columns). We refer to
Kelchtermans & Verboven (2006) for a more extensive discussion of the data set.
2.4.3 Parameter estimates
Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 present the maximum likelihood estimates of the logit
model. We brie￿y discuss these estimates to give an idea of the determinants un-
59 This follows Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) and assumes that a commuter engages in
10 trips per week during 30 weeks of the year, at a transportation cost of 0.25 Euro/km and an
opportunity cost of time of 8 Euro/hour. The latter amount corresponds to the typical wage for
student jobs.
83derlying the study choice process. It is however possible to directly move to section
2.5.1, where we discuss the demand, pro￿t and welfare effects from reducing sup-
ply based on our parameter estimates.
Table 2.5 gives a general overview of the estimated speci￿cation and high-
lights the role of travel costs in the study choice process (w0
i￿ and ￿). Travel costs
have a negative and highly signi￿cant effect on utility (an estimated intercept in ￿
of ￿6:19 and a t-statistic of ￿28:54). There are differences across individuals. For
example, students from a catholic high school or with a classical languages back-
ground are less cost sensitive and consequently travel further. In contrast, students
with several repetitions at high school or with a technical (non-product focused)
high school background are more cost sensitive and therefore study more nearby
their homes. Furthermore, the parameter ￿ = 0:49 shows that the effect of travel
costs decreases signi￿cantly in distance: distant student go on residence and save
49% on the travel costs (to be traded off against their ￿xed renting costs). Finally,
the size factor parameter is close to 1, indicating that the study programs within a
program ￿eld are relatively heterogeneous (i.e. controlling for observed choice de-
terminants, preferences are not much stronger correlated for programs of the same
￿eld than for programs of different ￿elds).
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show how individuals value the various characteristics of
the study alternatives (w0
i￿jk).
60 The ￿rst column of Table 2.6 shows the prefer-
ences for catholic institutions. Most notably, students from a catholic high school
still tend to value catholic colleges and universities higher than other students, sug-
gesting continuing strong links between the catholic networks at high school and
higher education level. The second and third columns of Table 2.6 show the impact
of nationality and the speci￿c high school background on the utility for academic
or two-cycle vocational programs. For example, foreign students tend to prefer the
academic and two-cycle vocational programs over the one-cycle vocational pro-
grams. This is also true for students with a general high school background in
60 These results extend Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) by (1) considering more detailed study
￿elds (Table 2.6), and (2) adding richer interaction terms between the study ￿elds/types and the
student characteristics (Table 2.7). Nevertheless, several parameters are imposed to zero because of
a too low number of observations on some of the interactions.
84classical languages and/or mathematics. The remaining columns of Table 2.6 show
the impact of nationality and high school background on the utility for the speci￿c
study ￿elds (cultural studies being the base category). Foreigners are more likely
to opt for engineering or economics & business. Furthermore, the speci￿c general
high school background is closely related to the valuation for the study ￿elds at
higher education institutions. For example, students with a science of mathematics
general high school background have a strong preference for science or engineer-
ing programs and not for programs in languages or culture (the base category).
The reverse is true for students with a general high school background in classical
languages.
Table 2.7 presents the role of the other student characteristics (sex, years of
repetition and type of high school) on the study ￿elds, broken down by the pro-
gram type (one-cycle and two-cycle vocational, and academic). For example, male
students have a higher preference for engineering and economics & business pro-
grams, regardless of the type of higher education. At the same time, they have a
lower preference for medicine & paramedics but only if this is of the one-cycle
vocational type (which primarily consists of nursing programs). As another ex-
ample, students who experienced a year of repetition in high school have a lower
utility from participating in architecture and engineering but only if this is of the
academic type. Such students also prefer economics & business or medicine &
paramedics of the one-cycle vocational type, rather than of the two-cycle voca-
tional or academic types. Students with an intellectually more demanding general
high school background tend to prefer the academic and two-cycle program ￿elds
over the counterparts of the one-cycle program ￿elds.
2.5 The effects of reducing supply diversity
Based on our parameter estimates, section 2.5.1 presents the demand, pro￿t and
welfare effects from reducing supply diversity, without considering the ￿xed cost
savings. Section 2.5.2 then assesses the total pro￿t and welfare effects, based on
our obtained bounds for the ￿xed cost savings (2.3). This enables us to draw con-
85clusions regarding the pro￿t incentives and social desirability of reducing supply
diversity in the CI funding system.
2.5.1 Demand, pro￿t and welfare effects
We ￿rst present the demand effects from unilateral program cuts at individual insti-
tutions. We use our parameter estimates to calculate diversion ratios. As discussed
earlier, the diversion ratio measures the fraction of students that are retained by
other programs of the same institution when a speci￿c program is eliminated. Ta-
ble 2.8 lists the average diversion ratios resulting from unilateral program cuts,
shown by study ￿eld
61. The diversion ratios tend to be clearly higher at univer-
sities than at colleges (average across all ￿elds of 28% versus 19%). Universities
would thus loose comparatively fewer students after individual program cuts. This
is due to their larger size and less competition. There are some interesting differ-
ences in the diversion ratios between the ￿elds. For example, the diversion ratio is
particularly low for language programs at colleges (8%), indicating that students
do not perceive other programs offered at the same institution as good substitutes.
At the other extreme, the diversion ratio is over 30% for architecture, engineer-
ing, medicine and education sciences at universities. Students thus ￿nd fairly good
substitution possibilities within the same university for programs from these ￿elds.
Table 2.9 shows how these substitution effects from the program cuts trans-
late into two of the pro￿t components: tuition fee revenues and revenues from
the CI funding scheme. (The third pro￿t component, i.e. ￿xed cost savings, is ad-
dressed in the next subsection.) The tuition fee revenues decrease in all ￿elds (third
and fourth columns of Table 2.9), but by less than the current tuition fee revenues
(￿rst and second columns). This follows directly from the diversion ratios, i.e. the
fact that students may substitute to other programs within the university after a
program cut. The revenue changes from the concentration index based funding
scheme may or may not compensate for these tuition fee revenue losses (￿fth and
sixth columns). Program cuts from large ￿elds such as educational sciences would
61 For example, the ￿rst row shows the average fraction of students that is retained when a college
or university drops one of its architecture programs.
86result in a lower concentration index and hence create additional revenue losses. In
contrast, program cuts from the smaller ￿elds, such as bio-engineering at colleges
or sciences and medicine at universities, result in large increases in the concentra-
tion index, generating revenue gains that actually outweigh the tuition fee revenue
losses. For those cases, the funding system provides incentives to cut programs
even without any ￿xed cost savings.
Table 2.10 shows the effects of unilateral program cuts on two of the welfare
components: consumer surplus and variable costs. (The third component is again
￿xed costs and addressed in the next subsection.) The consumer surplus effects are
evidently always negative (￿rst two columns). This is especially so for the larger
programs at colleges and universities. Recall that the absolute value of these con-
sumer surplus effects may also be interpreted as the students’ net willingness to
pay for the eliminated program, i.e. their willingness to pay on top of the paid tu-
ition fees. This willingness to pay is usually quite large, for some ￿elds it is three
to four times larger than the students’ actual tuition fee expenditures (shown in Ta-
ble 2.9).
62 This is due to a low student mobility and willingness to travel to other
institutions, as found earlier in our empirical analysis. The variable cost savings,
stemming from output reallocation, may also be negative (third and fourth column
ofTable2.10). Thisisthecaseforcuttingprogramswithlowvariablecosts, suchas
economics&business or cultural programs, which both cause substitution towards
more expensive programs. The variable cost savings may, however, also be posi-
tive, most notably for the high variable cost programs such as science and medicine
at universities. In these cases the variable cost savings even outweigh the consumer
surplus losses so that the total gross welfare changes are positive (last two columns
of Table 2.10). Hence, eliminating these programs would result in a total welfare
gain even without any ￿xed cost savings. Program cuts from other ￿elds, however,
usually involve negative gross welfare effects, even when variable cost savings are
62 For example, the net willingness to pay for a study program in engineering at universities is on
average 522,386 e, which is about 3.5 times higher than the actual tuition fee expenditures (148,479
e). For bio-engineering at colleges, the net willingness to pay is only about double than the actual
tuition fee expenditures (39,502 e versus 20,252 e). For language programs at universities, the net
willingness to pay is less than what students currently already pay in fees (69,663 e versus 75,208
e).
87positive. They would therefore require suf￿cient ￿xed cost savings for total wel-
fare to increase. Whether this is indeed the case, will be addressed separately in the
next subsection, based on our estimated bounds on the ￿xed cost savings.
To put the above welfare discussion in perspective, Table 2.11 presents the
analogue welfare effects from joint program cuts, i.e. program cuts common for all
institutions offering the same program. We focus our discussion on the consumer
surplus losses (￿rst two columns). As expected when many programs are elimi-
nated at the same time, the consumer surplus losses are considerably larger than
those from the unilateral program cuts in Table 2.10. What is more interesting,
however, is that the consumer surplus losses from joint program cuts are dispro-
portionally larger than those from unilateral program cuts. Consider, for exam-
ple, engineering programs at colleges. These are available at 25 college campuses
(Table 2.1), but the consumer surplus loss is more than 40 times larger under a
joint program cut than under a unilateral program cut (loss of 4,977,878 e versus
116,347 e ). This motivates our focus on unilateral program cuts which may re-
duce inef￿cient duplication of ￿xed costs across multiple campuses, rather than on
joint program cuts which cause disproportionate consumer surplus losses.
2.5.2 Evaluation of the funding system reform
To assess the total pro￿t and welfare effects of the CI funding system, we now in-
troduce the ￿xed cost bounds derived in (2.3). Based on these bounds, Proposition
1 showed that the CI funding system provides no incentive to cut a program if this
reduces the concentration index, while it does provide such an incentive if the ad-
ditional revenues from an increase in the concentration index outweigh the tuition
fee losses. Similarly, Proposition 1 showed that a program cut is socially desirable
if the sum of the consumer surplus losses and the variable cost savings from output
reallocation is positive; a program cut is undesirable if the sum of consumer sur-
plus losses, variable cost savings and tuition fee revenue losses is negative. Table
2.3 provided the corresponding classi￿cation of program cuts in desirable status
quo, undesirable status quo, desirable reform and undesirable reform cases.
88Table 2.12 applies this classi￿cation. It counts how many out of the 225 pos-
sible program cuts can be unambiguously classi￿ed into one of these four cases,
using our estimated ￿xed cost bounds and the pro￿t and welfare components of the
previous subsection. We begin with the left column. This shows that for the large
majority of cases (206 out of 225, or over 90%) it is socially undesirable to cut
programs at individual institutions. This striking result follows from the low stu-
dent mobility and the correspondingly large total willingness to pay for programs
at individual institutions. The large consumer surplus losses from program cuts are
typically not compensated by suf￿cient variable of ￿xed cost savings. The indi-
vidual cells show the pro￿t incentives for these undesirable program cuts. We can
unambiguously classify at least 85 out of the 225 programs as desirable status quo
cases, i.e. the CI funding system rightly does not give a pro￿t incentive to cut the
program. However, there is also a quite large number of 63 undesirable reform
cases, where the system actually does provide the wrong pro￿t incentive to cut the
program.
63 In sum, for about 30% (63 cases) to possibly 60% (63+58 cases) of the
206 cases where it is undesirable to reduce supply diversity, the CI funding system
wrongly provides an incentive to do so.
The right column of Table 2.12 shows that it would be socially desirable to
cut supply diversity in a small minority of 16 cases (less than 10%). But the CI
funding system actually provides the good pro￿t incentives to cut supply for only
8 of these 16 cases. It fails to provide the proper incentives in 1 out of 16 cases. It
fails to provide the proper incentives for at least 1 and up to 8 of the 16 cases.
64
The overall conclusion is rather pessimistic about a funding system based
on a concentration index. Its main motivation was to provide incentives to reduce
supply diversity in a decentralized way. However, it fails to improve total welfare in
two respects. First, for the majority of cases (206) reducing supply diversity is not
63 The middle cell of the left column shows the remaining 58 cases for which we can unambigu-
ously conclude that a program cut is socially undesirable, but for which we cannot determine the
sign of the pro￿t incentive without further information on ￿xed costs.
64 For the remaining 7 cases the sign of the pro￿t incentive cannot be determined unambiguously
without further ￿xed cost information. Furthermore, the middle column shows the cases for which
the sign of the total welfare effects cannot be determined without further information on ￿xed costs.
Fortunately, the number of cases in this column is small, showing that our bounds approach is quite
informative on the total welfare effects.
89actually socially desirable, but the incentives are nevertheless given for about half
of these cases. Second, while for a minority of cases (16) reducing supply diversity
would be socially desirable, the proper incentives are only given in half of these
cases. From a methodological perspective, our approach to bound the ￿xed costs
shows that it is possible to draw unambiguous total welfare conclusions in quite
a large number of cases (85+63+1+8=157 out of 225), even without knowing the
actual level of the realized ￿xed cost savings.
2.6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the pro￿t and welfare effects of reducing supply diversity in
higher education. The background was a funding system reform proposed by te
Flemish government, where universities and colleges would obtain part of their
subsidies based on their achieved concentration index (i.e. average number of stu-
dents per program). A ￿rst main lesson from our analysis is that the social desir-
ability of reducing supply diversity is considerably more limited than commonly
thought. Social welfare increases in only a small minority of cases (less than 10%
of the possible program cuts). The large majority of hypothetical program cuts
(more than 90%) involves a reduction in social welfare. While there may be ￿xed
cost savings as well as variable cost savings from cutting the relatively expensive
programs, these typically do not outweigh the large consumer losses because of
a relatively low student mobility. Put differently, while there is frequent duplica-
tion of ￿xed costs because programs are available at multiple campuses, this is not
inef￿cient because of the students’ limited willingness to travel to other campuses.
The second main lesson is that a funding system based on the institution’s
concentration index often misses its purpose. There tends to be a severe mismatch
between the social desirability to reduce supply diversity and the actual incentives
provided. The idea behind the suggested system was to encourage institutions to
cut the relatively small programs (since this would raise the institutions’ concentra-
tion index, i.e. average number of students per program). However, we ￿nd that in
about half of the cases were program cuts are not desirable, the system nevertheless
90creates the incentives to do so. Furthermore, for the minority of cases where pro-
gram cuts are actually desirable, the proper incentives are often not given. These
￿ndings emphasize the complex task of governments in regulating the supply of
higher education. They also serve as a word of caution towards the various other
initiatives that have recently been taken in public systems of higher education, e.g.
other funding systems (designed to jointly operate certain study programs between
institutions), incentives to form mergers or associations between institutions, etc.
Our analysis is based on a simple economic framework, illuminating the role
of consumer surplus losses, variable cost savings and ￿xed cost savings, and the
funding system. From a methodological perspective, it shows how it is possible
to reach unambiguous conclusions about pro￿t incentives and welfare by deriving
bounds on the ￿xed costs, without requiring information on the actual ￿xed costs.
At the same time, our analysis is based on a number of assumptions. First, we do
not take into account income effects. It is possible that some program cuts hurt low
income groups more than others, which may affect the relative social desirability
of certain program cuts. Second, we do not take into account the social cost of pub-
lic funds. To the extent that these are important, the social desirability to cut supply
diversity would be higher. Third, we have looked at undergraduate education. It
is possible that the desirability for variety reduction is greater in graduate educa-
tion where student willingness to travel may be considerably greater. Finally, we
have assumed that the private gains from higher education (consumer surplus) co-
incides with the social gains. In practice, the social gains may exceed the private
gains because of positive spillovers (non-appropriability of the returns to educa-
tion). To the extent that such spillovers exist and apply to all study programs, this
would strengthen the conclusions regarding the relative undesirability of reduc-
ing program diversity. However, to the extent that spillovers are program-speci￿c,
our conclusions may need modi￿cation. For example, if students from sciences
programs provide strong spillovers (for example to sectors employing low-skilled
labour), then it may no longer be desirable to cut some of these programs based on
the argument that the variable cost savings outweigh the consumer surplus losses.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to integrate this formally in our analysis since the
91evidence on the extent of spill-overs is limited and mixed, especially at the level of
the individual study programs (see Jacobs and van der Ploeg’s review paper, 2005).
2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Supply of Higher Education in Flanders (2001)
Colleges
Campuses Study programs Students Students/
study program
Total 44 414 25,182 61
by study ￿eld
Architecture 9 11 912 83
Engineering 25 76 4,425 58
Science n/a n/a n/a n/a
Economics & Business 22 105 7,853 75
Education Science 26 67 6,065 91
Other Social Sciences 13 15 1,572 105
Medicine & Paramedics 23 54 1,904 35
Bio-engineering 15 26 644 25
Languages 5 5 738 148
Cultural Studies 10 55 1,069 19
Universities
Campuses Study programs Students Students/
study program
Total 9 148 12,299 83
by study ￿eld
Architecture 3 3 198 66
Engineering 3 3 834 278
Science 7 33 1,169 35
Economics & Business 7 12 1,700 142
Education Science 3 6 711 119
Other Social Sciences 6 19 3,701 195
Medicine & Paramedics 6 19 933 49
Bio-engineering 6 13 1,177 91
Languages 6 17 842 50
Cultural Studies 6 23 1,034 45
Own calculations based on a dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education






Economics & Business 2,333 2,921
Education Science 3,633 3,767
Other Social Sciences 3,220 2,785
Medicine & Paramedics 3,711 5,444
Bio-engineering 3,721 4,527
Languages 2,760 2,719
Cultural Studies 2,331 2,713
The base subsidy for a study program is 2,300 Euro. Weighting factors are applied depending on the
resource-intensiveness of the program as indicated in the new funding scheme for higher education.
We report student-weighted averages of subsidies per study ￿eld for colleges and universities
Table 2.3: Possible pro￿t incentives and welfare effects of unilateral program cuts
Welfare Effect



























< 0 desirable status quo undesirable status quo







Table 2.4: Summary statistics of 2001 eligible pupils
All students College University Non-catholic Catholic
Demographic (wi)
male 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.43
foreign 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
catholic high school 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.67 0.87
Ability (wi)
years of repetition 0.36 0.46 0.16 0.40 0.34
(0.95) (0.99) (0.83) (1.05) (0.87)
general high school 0.60 0.44 0.94 0.63 0.58
classical languages 0.14 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.13
modern languages 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.24
economics 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.20
sciences 0.20 0.11 0.40 0.24 0.18
mathematics 0.30 0.15 0.60 0.34 0.27
technical high school 0.33 0.47 0.04 0.29 0.35
‘product’-focused 0.12 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.12
Mobility (xik)
Distance (kms) by road to campus 34.71 30.96 42.38 35.73 33.90
(28.17) (25.65) (31.37) (28.19) (28.13)
Time (mins) by road to campus 30.74 28.33 35.67 32.13 29.64
(17.33) (16.2) (18.47) (17.59) (17.03)
Travel cost to campus (x10,000e) 0.38 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.37
(0.28) (0.25) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28)
Number of observations 37,481 25,182 12,299 16,557 20,924
Standard errors for the continuous variables are in parentheses. Demographic and ability data are based on the
dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education; mobility statistics are based on own calculations using postal
code information.







catholic high school 0.43* (4.62)
years of repetition -0.2* (-3.33)
general high school1 0.13 (0.67)
classical languages 0.49* (4.00)




technical high school1 -1.72* (-9.69)
‘product’-focused 1.38* (9.98)
Size factor 0.91* (49.63)
Slope parameters (￿j)
Catholic Institution2 included, see table 2.6
Academic program3 included, see table 2.6
Vocational long program3 included, see table 2.6
Study ￿eld4 included, see table 2.6
Academic program x Study ￿eld5 included, see table 2.7
Vocational long program x Study ￿eld5 included, see table 2.7
Fixed effects (￿j) included, see table 2.6
Observations 732,040
number of individuals 36,602
number of sampled alternatives 20
Log likelihood -51,816
t-statistics in parentheses. * statistical signi￿cance at 5% level
1 base category = professional/arts secondary high school
2 base category = non-catholic study option
3 base category = vocational short study option
4 base category = cultural studies




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































65;66 contributes to the debate on cumulative advantage effects in aca-
demic research, by examining top performance in research productivity and its
persistence over time, using a panel dataset comprising the publications of bio-
medical and exact scientists at the KU Leuven in the period 1992-2001. The data
set allows taking into account factors like gender, age, cohort, rank, promotion,
seniority, teaching load and access to research funding. About one quarter of the
scientists in the sample achieve top performance at least once in the observation
period, with six out of a hundred scientists being persistently top. Analyzing the
selection and hazard to ￿rst and subsequent top performance, shows support for an
accumulative process with rank, hierarchical position, access to funding and past
performance as highly signi￿cant explanatory factors. Also gender is a consistent
factor in explaining both top performance and its persistency.
3.1 Introduction
The use of publication- and citation counts as instruments for evaluation of individ-
ual scientists within research institutes as well as for funding decisions for research
labs and universities as a whole is becoming more widespread. Moreover, the al-
location of research funding is increasingly being driven by criteria of scienti￿c
65 This chapter is joint work with Reinhilde Veugelers.
66 This paper bene￿ted from the comments of Paula Stephan during her fellowship at the KU
Leuven in the spring of 2005. We also gratefully acknowledge comments from participants at
the Conference in Tribute to Jean-Jacques Laffont at IDEI/Toulouse, PAI meeting in Mons, EXtra
Workshop in Lausanne, St Anna School in Pisa, and more particularly J. Mairesse, B. van Ark, M.
Dewatripont, F. Verboven, G. Friebel, B. Sampat, B. Hall, F. Murray, G. Dosi, M. Baguºs and B.
Bijnens.
100excellence, concentrating more funds in fewer hands. Yet, there are few academic
studies on what drives top research productivity. A body of empirical research
has recently emerged that attempts to pin down the determinants of scienti￿c pro-
ductivity, both at the level of the individual researcher and the more aggregate,
institutional level. However, few studies have addressed the skewed distribution of
research productivity, explaining top research productivity and its persistency over
time. What makes someone a top researcher? Why do (some) top performers man-
age to sustain their high productivity level while others peak in scienti￿c output
only sporadically or never? Do exogenous factors, like gender and age explain top
performance and its persistence over time? Or does the research system promote
persistence of productivity differences by favoring/funding the better researchers?
This paper studies top research performance and its persistency over time,
using a recent panel data set from the KU Leuven, comprising ten years of publica-
tion data 1992-2001. We ￿rst identify the selection of researchers into productivity
categories (top, medium, low), using a clustering analysis and controlling for sci-
enti￿c discipline and time effects. This allows us to identify top researchers and
persistent top researchers, viz. those who show up in the top productivity cluster in
every period. We check whether top research performance displays persistency by
constructing mobility matrices showing the moves to and from the top performance
category between periods.
Next, we analyze the determinants of top research performance and its per-
sistence in more detail. We employ a duration model to study the factors that in￿u-
ence the hazard for a researcher to achieve a ￿rst and subsequent top performance
level, taking into account time-varying and invariant covariates and checking for
the in￿uence of past (top) performance. In particular, we address the following
questions:
￿ What determines whether a researcher will ever achieve a ￿rst top
performance, and what does the path towards this ￿rst peak in performance
look like (gradual versus sudden)?
101￿ Once a top performance level has been achieved for the ￿rst time, do
the same determinants stay at the forefront to explain subsequent top
performances?
￿ To what extent does a next top performance depend on previous top
performance, controlling for individual heterogeneity?
Finally we check the robustness of our hazard analysis on the factors driving
top performance and persistence in top performance using logit analysis.
The data set allows taking into account the standard factors in scienti￿c pro-
ductivity analysis, like gender, age, seniority, cohort, scienti￿c discipline. In ad-
dition, the record of each researcher contains department af￿liation, promotion,
hierarchical position, awards of research funding, teaching load and administrative
duties. The panel structure of our data set allows separating age and cohort effects,
including ￿xed effects. In our search for driving forces, we are particularly inter-
ested in the ￿system￿ factors, that can create persistency of top performance, like
rank, hierarchical position and funding.
Theremainderofthispaperisorganizedasfollows. Thenextsectionpresents
abriefliteraturesurvey. Section3.3providesinformationonthedata. Insection3.4
we identify top research productivity and its persistence, while in section 3.5 we
analyze the characteristics determining the process towards top performance and
its persistency. In section 3.6 we conclude and touch upon directions for further
research.
3.2 Literature Survey
Most existing studies concentrate on the effects of individual determinants of aca-
demic productivity. The aspect of individual productivity that has received most
attention is research productivity over the life cycle of the researcher. The earlier
studies on US data (e.g. Bernier et al. (1975) and Cole (1979)), ￿nd a curvilinear
relationship between age and both quality and quantity of scienti￿c productivity.
102A limitation of these earlier studies is their use of cross-sectional data, which does
not allow to disentangle age from experience and cohort effects (Stephan, 1996).
Levin and Stephan (1991), using longitudinal data of American scientists, ￿nd that
life cycles effects are present in ￿ve of the six areas of physics and earth sciences
studied, with publishing activity initially increasing and then declining somewhere
in mid-career.
Gender differences in scienti￿c productivity are another line of attention.
Several studies have found that female scientists publish at lower rates than male
scientists. Using a sample of American biochemists, Long (1993) ￿nds that sex
differences in the number of publications and citations are bigger during the ￿rst
decade of the career but are reversed later. He attributes the lower productivity of
females to their overrepresentation among non-publishers and their under repre-
sentation among the extremely productive.
In a more recent study of French condensed matter physicists, Mairesse and
Turner (2002) analyze the impact of age, gender and education on research pro-
ductivity. They con￿rm a quadratic relation between the age of the scientists and
the number of publications. They also ￿nd signi￿cant positive effects for males
and graduates from the French Grande Ecoles. Their results also indicate a positive
time trend, suggesting that there has been a wider and faster access to publication.
In view of the signi￿cance of team effort in science, it is important to assess
collective effects on individual productivity as also Stephan (1996) argues. Early
research in the USA found researchers at prestigious departments to be more pro-
ductive and cited than their colleagues in lower-ranked universities (Cole and Cole,
1973). Also Turner and Mairesse (2004) provide evidence that the quality of other
researchers belonging to the laboratory is a crucial variable for explaining individ-
ual productivity.
To summarize, existing studies assessing individual research productivity
haveindicatedtheimportanceofindividualcharacteristicslikeage, cohortandgen-
der as well as collective characteristics of the laboratory or department to which the
researcher belongs, whilst controlling for scienti￿c discipline idiosyncrasies.
103Most of the studies to date aim at explaining average productivity pro￿les,
ignoring the often skewed distribution of research productivity. This skewed distri-
bution was ￿rst evidenced by Lotka (1926), with many researchers non-active and
a few researchers accounting for the bulk of the publications. Furthermore, exist-
ing studies analyze publications in a cross section or a short period of time, not
allowing to properly account for time persistence of productivity patterns. This is-
sue of persistence of research productivity pro￿les remains largely unexplored in
the literature.
Whywouldweexpectresearchproductivitytobeskewedandthisskewedness
to persist? First, talent is important in determining research productivity. Top re-
search may require a ￿magic gland￿ (Stephan and Levin, 1992), a special edge, an
innate ability. Those pre-determined differences are unevenly spread in the pop-
ulation. Those who have it, are always productive, those without, never see their
careers take off and ￿ourish. Hence, a differential distribution of talent within the
scienti￿c community will lead to research productivity differences which persist
over time. Of course, luck also enters the picture, especially when explaining the
occurrence of ￿hits￿ following a scienti￿c discovery. Although luck enters in a
variety of forms and is often accompanied by serendipity, it nevertheless predicts
a more random and non-persistent top research productivity for the individual re-
searcher.
But next to talent and luck, effort is a particularly important factor explain-
ing scienti￿c output. When researchers decide on the level of effort to exert, they
trade costs and bene￿ts. Costs of effort will be lower for the more talented re-
searchers, resulting in an interaction between talent and effort driving (persistency
of) top performance. Furthermore, in line with research on ￿rm growth (e.g. Jo-
vanovic (1982), Pakes and Ericson (1998)), one can argue that the effect of talent
is not a ￿xed effect over time, particularly when interacted with effort in a learning
perspective. Initially researchers may be uncertain about their talent when they en-
ter the ￿eld, but gradually discover their capabilities from being active in the ￿eld
(as in the passive learning models of e.g. Jovanovic (1982)), and/or from making
ef￿ciency enhancing investment (as in the active learning models of e.g. Pakes and
104Ericson (1998)). Both directions predict that younger and ￿smaller￿ researchers
will have a higher potential for learning and hence variance in performance over
time, while older researchers will have a higher persistence in performance as they
are more con￿dent about their talents. Once a researcher learns she is good at it,
she will be more motivated to put effort into the process.
Several bene￿ts may motivate scientists to exert effort, as argued by Stephan
& Levin (1992), Dasgupta & David (1994): monetary rewards, recognition and
the ￿puzzle￿ joy. These motivational forces may explain persistency in research
productivity through a process of accumulative advantage where motivation to ex-
ert effort depends on past performance. The Matthew effect described by Mer-
ton (1968) states that the recognition and monetary value awarded to a scientist’s
accomplishments depends on his status in the scienti￿c community. Highly pro-
ductive researchers maintain or increase their productivity because they receive
recognition and resources, while those scientists who do not, become less produc-
tive. Successful scientists get their work more easily published, get easier cita-
tions, research funding, quicker tenure and promotion, higher wages, jobs in more
prestigious institutions, better infrastructure, better and more PhD and post-doc
students... Early evidence for the Matthew Effect using citation data on US physi-
cists was found by Cole (1970) who found it may result in temporarily ignoring
scienti￿c discoveries. In sum, being more recognized and having access to more
and better resources, more productive researchers will devote more effort to scien-
ti￿c output, leading to persistency in research performance. They may even escape
the typically observed non-linear age pro￿le, being less likely to relocate efforts
at mid-life. Zuckerman & Merton (1971) argue that this tenacity occurs not only
because the successful have accumulated advantage and have become addicted to
recognition, but also because they see this as a process to validate the judgments of
the scienti￿c community that their capacities have been correctly assessed.
There is a lot of anecdotal empirical evidence on accumulative advantage
(see e.g. Stephan & Levin (1992)), but little recent systematic empirical analysis.
In one of the earliest studies, Cole & Cole (1967) investigate the nature of the
scienti￿c reward system using a sample 120 US physicists. They ￿nd a stronger
105link between quality of research and recognition than between research quantity
and recognition. They conclude that the reward system primarily induces the more
creative scientists to be more productive while it diverts the energy of the less
creative scientists to other activities, leading to a high correlation between quantity
and quality of research, especially at top departments. Allison and Stewart (1974)
present an empirical analysis on productivity dynamics using a cross-section of
chemists, physicists, and mathematicians in the US, and ￿nd that the highly skewed
distributions of productivity among researchers can be explained by a process of
accumulative advantage. This inequality becomes increasingly unequal as career
ageincreases. Inanextensionofthisstudy, Allisonetal. (1982)examinecohortsof
biochemists and chemists, and they con￿rm that increasing inequality is observed
forcountsofpublicationsbutnotforcountsofcitationstoallpreviouspublications.
3.3 The Data
The data set we use to assess top research productivity and its persistency is a
unique panel of 1,036 scientists within the ￿elds of biomedical and exact sciences,
in the period 1992-2001, employed at the KU Leuven, the largest and oldest univer-
sity in Belgium. In terms of research, the KU Leuven has the ambition to establish
atoppositionin￿polesofexcellence￿, andhaveagoodperformanceintheotherar-
eas
67. To this end it allocates research funding to research proposals on the basis of
(international) peer review of excellence in research. Recruitment and promotion
decisions also carry a strong research quality requirement. In addition, research
output (quantity and quality) of its entire academic staff is regularly monitored.
We pooled different sources of data sets, combining information from the
personnel administration of the KU Leuven with bibliometric data
68. The dataset
contains the following information:
67 For background on institutional features of the KU Leuven, see appendix 2 of this chapter .
68 Appendix 1 of this chapter contains details on how the database was constructed.
106￿ Scienti￿c output (per researcher per year
69) i.e. publications in ISI journals
classi￿ed by scienti￿c discipline
70;71;
￿ Individual and career-related variables (per researcher per year) i.e. gender,
age, cohort (year of entry at KU Leuven), career age, rank (assistant
professor, associate professor, professor and full professor), seniority in
rank, full-time versus part time position;
￿ Organizational membership at group- (exact versus biomedical sciences),
faculty- (e.g. medicine) and department (e.g. microbiology and
immunology) level;
￿ Other information relevant for examining scienti￿c performance, viz. actual
teaching load, other administrative duties within KU Leuven, being head of
a research unit, and involvement as a promoter or co-promoter of research
projects awarded on a competitive basis. Two major types of funding can be
identi￿ed: the larger Type I (excellence) and the smaller Type II funding.
See Appendix 2 in this chapter for a description of the KUL research strategy
and the type of funding it awards.
Most researchers in the sample were not employed for the full 10 years: some
of them retired or left the university before 2001, others joined after 1992. These
69 ￿Year￿ always refers to a ￿database year￿ i.e. the year in which the publication was taken up in
the ISI records.
70 A key characteristic of the dataset is that it allows controlling for scienti￿c discipline-speci￿c
effects: the KU Leuven Centre for R&D Statistics classi￿ed every journal covered by the SCI into
one or more twelve high-level disciplines, all within the ￿eld of exact or biomedical sciences.
This allowed us to assign to each scientist the disciplines in which she published a paper in that
year. About 21% of all researchers could not be assigned to a main discipline because they did
not publish in the period 1992-2001. For all others, we determined a ’main discipline’ for each
researcher, which is de￿ned as the discipline, taken from the twelve high-level disciplines, in
which the researcher has the most publications in the period 1992-2001. For 58 researchers there
was a tie i.e. they published an equal amount of papers in at least two disciplines. For them we
randomly assigned a main discipline from the tie disciplines. Table 3.2 shows the ￿nal distribution
of the researchers in the sample over the disciplines.
71 There is also scienti￿c output that does not fall under the scope of the Science Citation Index
of the ISI. For instance, the ISI database does not include proceedings, which in some disciplines,
like engineering, are an important publication outlet.
107entries and exits yield an unbalanced panel and allow examining cohort effects.
The data set holds on average 778 researchers per year in an unbalanced panel
72.
Table 3.1 and table 3.2 present the distribution of scientists over the respec-
tivefacultiesanddisciplineswithintheBiomedicalandExactSciencegroupsofthe
KU Leuven. Both groups, each comprising three faculties, are comparable in size.
Within the group of Exact Sciences, the faculty of Science (192 professors) and
the one of Engineering (214) are the largest. In the group of Biomedical Sciences,
the faculty of Medicine (460 professors) clearly dominates in terms of size. The
vast majority of all researchers in the panel (94%) is professor and hence combines
research and teaching activities. Considering both scienti￿c discipline and organi-
zational membership allows disentangling scienti￿c discipline-speci￿c in￿uences
from organizational and managerial effects.
The ￿rst column in table 3.3 reports year averages for the individual and
career-related characteristics of the researchers in the whole sample. About 89%
of them are male with an average age of 47.7 years. On average, the youngest age
cohort (professors less than 40 years old) constitutes one quarter of all researchers.
38% of the researchers entered as a professor in or after 1992. With respect to
tenure (not shown in the table), 76% of the researchers in the sample have tenure
in every year that we observe them, 15% never have tenure and 9% switch from
a temporary contract to a ￿xed appointment. We distinguish between four main
ranks, with rank 1 the entry level (￿assistant professor￿) and rank 4 the highest
possible rank (￿full professor￿). One quarter of researchers have the most junior
rank, whilst about the same quantity have reached the top of the career ladder.
80% of the scientists have a full-time position at the university either in one single
contract or in a combination of several positions. The average teaching load for
a professor amounts to 4.18 year-hours
73 and increases monotonously with rank.
On average 9% of the sample is involved in a type I project as a promoter or co-
72 Given our focus on persistence, we restricted the dataset to researchers whom we observe for
at least 2 periods. For 97 researchers there was only one observation in the dataset; these were
dropped, leaving 1,036 researchers.
73 A year-hour gives the average weekly teaching load in an academic year. One year-hour corre-
sponds to 30 teaching hours.
108promoter, while11%(co-)promotesatypeIIproject(seeAppendix2inthischapter
for a description of the nature of these research projects).
As shown in the ￿rst column of table 3.6, on average a researcher publishes
3.3 articles per year
74. But this average has a high standard deviation (5.1). The
propensity to publish varies greatly among disciplines: the average number of pub-
lications per year ranges from 1.8 for mathematics to 7.5 for biosciences
75 (see
table 3.4). All this re￿ects the importance of scienti￿c discipline speci￿c effects
when examining research productivity. In terms of output quality as measured by a
3-year forward citation window, the KU Leuven researchers score above the world
average in six of the twelve disciplines. Finally, publication activity has increased
over time in all disciplines as shown in ￿gure 3.1, indicating the importance of
correcting for time-effects.
3.4 Descriptive Analysis
3.4.1 Performance Pro￿les: Identifying Top Performance
In order to identify top performance we carried out a clustering of the researchers’
publication records into three ￿productivity categories￿ (top, medium, low). We
focus our output analysis on the number of publications only, see infra. In par-
ticular, we compared for each year the scientist’s performance within each of the
twelve disciplines with colleagues who are active in that discipline, using k-means
clustering. This allows to correct for the discipline-speci￿c publication patterns
documented above, as well as for time trends. Every researcher is judged not only
by his or her main discipline but, given the degree of multidisciplinarity, for each
of the twelve disciplines. Subsequently, we aggregate across disciplines. The re-
searcherisconsideredas￿top￿inaparticularyearifshebelongstothe￿topcluster￿
74 A publication gets on average 3 citations and has an impact measure of 3.2. A scientist collab-
orates on a paper on average with 4.7 co-authors. She acts as as (co-)promoter of 0.3 PhD’s per
year.
75 This high degree of heterogeneity across scienti￿c disciplines also holds for other output mea-
sures such as citations, impact factors and co-authorship, as shown in Table 3.4.
109in at least one of the twelve disciplines
76. Similarly, she is classi￿ed as ￿low￿ in
a particular year if she belongs to the ￿low cluster￿ for each discipline. Because
the publication process not necessarily adheres to a year-by-year logic, the yearly
performance measures are used to construct a performance indicator based on a
two-year moving window
77. This avoids that we label generally very productive
researchers as non-persistent in top-level output in case they happen to face a year
with many projects in the pipeline but with relatively few actual publications.
On average 16% of observations are classi￿ed as a top performance whereas
32% vs 52% end up in the medium respectively the low productivity categories.
This top 16% of observations accounts for 42.95% of all publications in the sample,
while the 52% observations representing low performance jointly supply 7.11% of
all output, con￿rming the skewness in the distribution of publications.
3.4.2 Establishing persistence: Once Top, Always Top?
In order to establish whether persistence in top performance exists, we look at
the mobility of researchers between the productivity clusters. Scientists who ￿get
trapped￿ in the low research productivity category may spend their time on other
things such as teaching or internal management duties, may not have the intrinsic
ability for doing research, or may face a system geared at stimulating the past
performers. The latter interpretation attributes persistent low scienti￿c output to a
cumulative advantage mechanism that disadvantages researchers with a low initial
output. The same cumulative advantage will generate persistency at the top.
To capture researchers’ mobility across productivity clusters, we constructed
aseriesoftransitionmatrices. Table3.5showsthemobilitymatrixforthetransition
of 1992/1993 to 1993/1994, relating the three productivity clusters (low / medium
76 In total 12x3x10 clusters are created (12 disciplines, 10 years). Comparing the mean number of
publications for the clusters within a discipline using a ranksum test, in 10 cases the null hypothesis
of identical means cannot be rejected.
77 This entails the loss of one observation per researcher. The reported results are not sensitive to a
yearly versus two-year moving window. For some types of research projects with long set-up times,
two years may not be enough to cover temporary output gaps. Longer time frames were not used
however, due to the limited time dimension of the panel (10 years). Future updates of the dataset
resulting in longer panels will offer more freedom in this respect.
110/ top) of 1992/1993 to those of the subsequent 2-year interval. If previous output
were irrelevant for explaining current performance, we would see the same distri-
bution of researchers within a subgroup as in the whole sample. The data shows
that previous performance is a strong indicator of future performance: 76.1% of
the high performers in 1992/1993 repeat their high output in the next year, a higher
than expected percentage (17.4%)
78. We may conclude that researchers tend to be
rather immobile in their scienti￿c output. All this evidence goes against a ￿luck￿
theory for explaining top performance, favoring more the intrinsic qualities, the
gradual accumulation and Matthew effect as explanatory factors.
Havingestablishedthephenomenonofpersistencyintopperformance, anext
step is to identify the persistent top performers. We measure the persistence of each
researcher by counting the number of years in a cluster relative to the years of her
employment. In particular, we classify a researcher as persistent top if she belongs
to the top performance category in every two-year window in 1992-2001 during
the period in which she was employed by the university. Analogously, the non-
persistent top-group contains those who belong to the top category at least once
but not in every two-year window of their employment. The scientists that do
publish but never make it to the top group are labeled average whilst the remaining
researchers are inactive. This yields an exhaustive classi￿cation of researchers into
4 ￿persistence categories￿, as shown in table 3.6.
Only 61 researchers (about 6% of the sample
79) are part of the top productiv-
ity category for every two-year window of their employment in 1992-2001. These
6% persistent top researchers account for 24% of total publications in the sample,
con￿rming again the very skewed productivity distribution. About 21% of the sam-
ple belong to the top category at least once but not persistently. Slightly more than
78 The ‘low’-category is the most immobile category with a lower than expected probability to
switch to the middle category and almost no one leaping to the high category. The Pearson Chi2-
statistic (635.14) con￿rms that performance levels across these two periods are not independent.
Similar results are obtained for transition matrices covering the other two-year intervals.
79 If we had used a one-year window to assess persistence, we would have ended with only 20
individuals, or 2% of the sample, in the persistent top category.
111half of all researchers (52%) may be classi￿ed as ￿average￿ whilst about 21% of
the sample have a blank publication record throughout the observed periods
80.
Pairwise comparisons using the Wilcoxon ranksum test show that the av-
erage number of publications differs signi￿cantly for the persistence categories,
indicating that we can meaningfully distinguish between them. But the different
categories do not only differ signi￿cantly in terms of number of publications, but
also with respect to the quality of publications. Although we focus our output di-
mension for identifying top performers on quantity of publications only, we ￿nd, in
line with other studies, that quantity and quality of publications are correlated. All
research output measures for quality (citations, impact measures) decline monoto-
nously when moving from the persistent top researchers to the inactive category.
Nevertheless, the decline is less outspoken with respect to quality measures than
with respect to number of publications.
A concern with respect to the classi￿cation procedure is that the people we
identify as (persistent or non-persistent) top researchers may not be such eminent
scientists if we compare them to the overall distribution i.e. including non-KU
Leuven researchers. For instance, the best researchers may leave the institution to
accept a position at a top university abroad. Outbound mobility of top researchers
turns out to be very limited however: only 2 of the 61 persistent top researchers
leave the university before the age of 40, and none of the non-persistent top re-
searchers
81. As an additional check, Table 3.7 shows that the 61 KU Leuven re-
searchers we identify as persistent top are also excellent scientists when comparing
them to the overall distribution of scientists. Speci￿cally, the persistent top group
greatly outperforms the world average research quality as measured by the average
number of citations per publication. In addition, 8 out of the 61 persistent top re-
searchers appear in the ISI Highly Cited database (ISI, 2007). Given the selectivity
80 Inspection of the data reveals that we can attribute this apparent ‘inactivity’ (at least partially)
to the involvement of staff as practitioners in their ￿eld of expertise. In other words, some staff
members may have a full-time position at the university but are nevertheless not expected to carry
out research. In particular, there are four departments where more than one third of full-time staff
doesn’t show up in the ISI publication records. It concerns the departments of architecture, public
health (where general physicians are trained), sports & motion sciences and kinesiology.
81 Only 6 out of the 279 top researchers leave the university before the age of 50, viz. 4 persistent
toppers and 2 non-persistent toppers.
112of this database
82, we take this as another indication that we do not rank researchers
on purely internal benchmarks and thus rightfully measure scienti￿c excellence.
Splitting the individual and career-related variables by persistence category
(see table 3.3), yields some initial hints with respect to different researcher pro-
￿les. For example, we see that women are underrepresented in the top performance
categories but overrepresented in the persistent non-active and in the average cat-
egory, as in Turner & Mairesse (2003). Furthermore, we do not ￿nd the older age
cohorts to be underrepresented among the most productive researchers. This con-
￿rms that the most productive researchers do not display the life cycle effect found
in other studies. This is not the case for the unproductive researchers where the
age categories above 50 and especially above 60 are overrepresented, pointing at
segregation on the basis of age at the bottom of the productivity distribution.
Related to the age results are the ones with respect to rank. There is strong
overrepresentation of full professors among the persistent top. In addition, as
shownbyaveragerankseniority, topresearcherstendtospendlesstimethroughthe
three ranks preceding full professor than average and inactive researchers, while in-
active researchers tend to stay longer in the less-than-full-professor rank. All this
suggests that the promotion procedures in place at the KU Leuven seem to select
the more proli￿c faculty.
The table reveals that it is important to correct for the type of contract: while
almost all persistent toppers are full-time, less than half of the researchers who
don’t publish have a full-time position at the university. Also, inactive and aver-
age productive scientists are more likely to have entered professorship recently i.e.
after 1992. Recent hires might suffer a disadvantage since they are less likely to
have made it already to the top cluster given their shorter employment history in a
cumulative process.
As far as the research-teaching trade-off is concerned, persistent and non-
persistent top researchers tend to have a similar teaching load than the average re-
82 The ISI Highly Cited database includes the publication and achievement records of just 250
preeminent researchers in 21 categories including life sciences, medicine, physical sciences, engi-
neering, and social sciences.
113searchers. The results on research funding shows marked differences for persistent
toppers. 22% of persistent top researchers are involved in type I projects compared
to 20% for the non-persistent top researchers (with researchers in the latter cate-
gory acting more often as co-promoters than as promoters). The average category
is seldom involved in these research projects. Type II funding shows a comparable
pattern with the more productive categories participating more frequently although
the ￿less exclusive￿ character of type II funding is re￿ected by the average category
taking part more in these than in type I projects (11% versus 7%).
3.5 Multivariate Analysis of Top Research Performance
and its Persistence
In this section, we take a multivariate look at the process to top performance and its
persistence. We use various approaches. In section 3.5.1 we use a duration analysis
to study the determinants of top research productivity, both ￿rst and subsequent top
performance. To check robustness of results, we present in section 3.5.2 a logistic
model for top performance and persistence in top performance.
3.5.1 Hazard Analysis of First and Repeated Top
In this section, we use a duration model approach to determine which indepen-
dent variables are signi￿cantly correlated with the ￿survival time￿ in the non-top
research productivity category. This allows discussing which characteristics in￿u-
ence the probability of becoming a top researcher at some point in time.




to be top for the j-th individual as the product of a baseline hazard h0(t), i.e. the
83 More speci￿cally, we use the two-year intervals discussed in section 3.4.1.
114hazard when all covariates are equal to zero, and the exponential function of the
parameters ￿x and regressors xj:
h(tjxj) = h0(t)exp(xj￿x)
The baseline hazard is left unspeci￿ed, meaning that the model makes no
assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time. We opt for this approach
since theory does not provide us with a reasonable assumption about the shape of
the hazard. The cost of this semi-parametric approach is a loss in ef￿ciency.
We use two types of hazard models. The ￿rst one analyses the hazard to ￿rst
top performance. In this case, once a top performance is reached, the researcher is
removed from the sample. Hence, for this analysis, the sample consists of all ob-
servations prior to (and including) a researcher’s ￿rst top performance. This allows
concentrating on the process towards ￿rst top performance, but ignores subsequent
observations on performance. Nevertheless, given the skewed distribution of top
performance in the sample, the overwhelming majority of observations are main-
tained in this analysis.
Using all information in the data, we also estimate a repeated events model,
where we model not only the hazard to ￿rst top performance, but to all top per-
formances. We impose a sequential ordering of events: a researcher can only be
￿at risk￿ for her k-th top performance if she achieved k ￿ 1 top performances in
the past. A key element in our approach is that we allow the risk process underly-
ing top performance to change with the occurrence of previous top performances.
The main model estimates a common baseline hazard across event ranks as in the
Andersen-Gill counting process model
84 (1982) but with the inclusion of a previ-
ous events counter which allows the hazard to differ proportionally between top
performances
85.
84 The counting process de￿nition of the duration variable uses the time of the (k ￿ 1)th top
performanceasthestartingtimeforeachriskinterval. Thisset-upispreferablewhenthesubstantive
interest is in the evolution of the risk to be top as a function of time since the onset of risk.
85 As a robustness check we also estimate the model with a restricted or ‘strati￿ed’ risk set i.e.
with different baseline hazards per top performance, commonly known as the Prentice-Williams-
Peterson model (1981). This latter model may be estimated using either a counting process or gap
time formulation of time, allowing us to check which view of the risk process ￿ts the data best. The
115Given that we work with multiple failure-time data, the failure times pertain-
ing to a single researcher will be correlated, violating the independence of failure
times assumption required in traditional survival analysis. This problem is avoided
in the ￿rst top performance analysis, but taking into account repeated events in-
troduces dependence between failure times pertaining to a single researcher. We
account for this by adjusting the covariance matrix of the estimators. In general
however, this approach does not fully address the problem since an individual’s top
performances may be correlated due to a characteristic not being measured, such
as ability, instead of being brought about by an accumulative advantage process.
Therefore, as an additional robustness check we estimate a model where a la-
tent random effect, or ￿frailty￿, enters multiplicatively on the hazard function:
hij(t) = h0(t)￿i exp(xij￿). The frailties ￿i are unobservable and are assumed
to follow a gamma distribution with mean one and variance to be estimated from
the data. If the variance differs signi￿cantly from zero, then the null hypothesis of
no unobserved heterogeneity cannot be maintained.
Censoring and truncation
We de￿ne the starting time for the duration variable as the moment when the
individual enters as assistant professor at KU Leuven. Our observation window
ranges from 1992 to 2001. This implies that the majority of researchers in the
sample are ￿at risk￿ prior to 1992 and that their performance data are left censored
to the extent that we do not know whether or how many times these scientists
achieved top performance i.e. the censoring value is not known. Analogously, 86%
of researchers is last observed at censoring time 2001 but continues to be at risk and
we are ignorant of their performance beyond this point. While this right censoring
is not likely to affect our results, the left censoring is a more important issue.
We will consider all individuals who became a member of the faculty prior to
1992 as cases of ￿late entry￿ in the risk set i.e. we treat these individuals as not ob-
gap time approach ‘resets the clock’ to zero after each top performance. This de￿nition of time is
preferable when the risk process varies as a function of time since the occurrence of the previous
top performance.
116servationallyatriskofbeingtop, ignoringtopperformancebefore1992. Weusethe
same approach for the right-censored observations, thereby making the assumption
that durations are independent of observed entry and exit times. Stated differently,
we assume that the censoring is non-informative (Cox and Oakes, 1994). We never-
theless include an entry cohort dummy for those individuals having entered before
1992. We will also perform the analysis on the sample excluding the faculty which
have entered before 1992.
Finally, thedatasetcontainsobservationsthatareterminatedbeforecensoring
time. It concerns individuals who left the university or who retired before 2001
(14% of researchers). The precise reason of termination may be important for
the same non-informative censoring requirement as above, a condition which is
violated if termination is in some way related to survival time. This could be the
case if individuals tend to self-select out of the university once they gain experience




either as a ￿rst or repeated event. The categorization of top performance, as de￿ned
in section 3.4.1, is time and discipline speci￿c. This takes care of discipline and
time speci￿c effects that may drive the de￿nition of what constitutes a top perfor-
mance in terms of number of publications required for such top performance.
Which independent variables do we consider to in￿uence this hazard to top
performance? The existing studies assessing individual research productivity re-
viewed in section 3.2 have indicated the importance of individual characteristics
like age, cohort and gender. Also collective characteristics of the laboratory or de-
partment to which the researcher belongs have been indicated as important. In line
86 In support of the argument that the data displays non-informative random censoring, we see that
the majority of terminations happens at relatively advanced age (more than 60% of leaving scientists
is older than sixty, on a pre-retirement scheme). Furthermore, for the terminations before retirement
time it is likely that these people leave because they, for example, got a good outside offer and not
because they consider themselves inadequate researchers: there are no signi￿cant differences in
research performance between the researchers leaving the university before the age of 50 and those
of comparable age, rank and discipline, staying. Moreover, the university has not yet a history of
￿ring people for low research performance.
117with the existing literature we include the same characteristics, this time to check
whether they play a role in explaining the hazard to (￿rst and repeated) top research
performance.
Following earlier studies, we include gender to check whether females are
less likely to deliver (repeated) top performance. Second, we include age and age
squared, with the squared term to check for non-linear age effects, as in previous
analyses on research productivity. We expect age to be bene￿cial for generating
top performance, given that it takes time and experience to build an advantage.
Furthermore, if there is accumulative advantage, we expect no concavity for age
in the repeated top performance analysis, with top performers being able to beat
the age decline. To disentangle age from cohort effects, we also include dummies
for entry into the sample. The most important cohort effect seems to be a marked
increase in hiring by the KU Leuven in 1992
87. There were no other cohort shocks
that could be identi￿ed
88. The dummy for entry after 1992 also allows at the same
time to correct for left censoring.
All existing studies indicate the importance of controlling for scienti￿c dis-
cipline idiosyncrasies. Although our top performance classi￿cation is already dis-
cipline and time speci￿c, we nevertheless include scienti￿c discipline dummies to
check whether discipline-speci￿c aspects remain important in the process towards
top performance.
Beyond the traditionally considered variables like age, gender, cohort and
scienti￿c discipline, the KU Leuven personnel data set also allows to include a
number of other determining variables. A ￿rst set of variables re￿ects the in￿uence
of the personnel strategy of the university to reward and provide incentives to its
researchers: rank and seniority in rank
89. With respect to rank, we would expect, all
else equal, that those researchers up for promotion will have a higher motivation
to provide inputs into the research process. Once promotion is acquired there is
less motivation for delivering star performance. In lower ranks, researchers should
87 This peak in hiring corresponds mainly to a growing number of retiring faculty that needed to
be replaced.
88 When including a full set of cohort dummies, no signi￿cant effects could be detected.
89 Rank correlates with tenure: all researchers of rank 2 and above always have tenure.
118have more incentives to put in effort to get promotion. On the other hand, the
higher ranks also have more incentives to put in effort to ￿prove their rank￿. Since
past research performance is taken into account when hiring and promoting, it is
likely that top performance will increase the probability of getting a higher rank.
To take this endogeneity (at least partly) into account, we include the rank variables
with one period lagged relative to top performance. The variable seniority in rank
should capture increasing pressure to provide effort, the longer a researcher is in
his current rank (since the more likely she is to be up for promotion). But again we
might expect a non-linearity: once a researcher is far beyond the expected seniority
(typically two years), this might re￿ect a structurally reduced probability to get
promotion. Also, the more senior, the higher is the wage and thus the smaller is the
marginal bene￿t from increasing wage with rank. Especially in the end rank (full
professor) seniority in rank looses its speci￿c function and will correlate with age.
Beyond the seniority in rank, we also include seniority as professor (fre-
quently referred to as career age). This variable might be important beyond the
seniority in rank, since wages received by professors in Belgium are not only de-
termined by rank, but also, and strongly, by seniority as professor.
We also include the organizational unit to which the researcher belongs at
the KU Leuven. This allows capturing the in￿uence of organizational structure
and strategy to promote and provide incentives for research, to the extent that these
units are responsible for developing a good research environment. It also allows
correcting for the impact of spillovers from the quality or prestige of the group
to which the researcher belongs. We include ￿faculty￿ dummies, since this is the
most authoritative organization level at KU Leuven in terms of recruitment and
promotion decisions. But we also perform analyses with ￿department￿ dummies.
Also important is to correct for fulltime or part time appointment at the uni-
versities, since part time appointments, in our sample mostly occurring at the engi-
neering faculty, are typically for people from industry who are hired and evaluated
on teaching rather than research.
119The inclusion of actual teaching load should be able to correct for the lost
opportunity time for research when having to teach students. Hence, we expect a
negative effect on the hazard for top performance.
We also have information on whether a researcher heads a research unit. A
head of a unit has access to resources for research (infrastructure and researchers),
which allows him to be more associated with research output in the form of publi-
cations in his own name or from his team, as last author. Given that top performers
are more likely to become heads of unit, there is an issue of endogeneity, so we lag
this variable by one period.
Finally, (co-)promotership of research projects implies additional resources
to do research and therefore is expected to contribute positively to performance.
Especially the Type I projects involve serious amounts of research funding. Since
research performance is typically taken up as a criterion to judge research propos-
als, we lag this variable by one period.
Results
a) First top performance
We start with discussing the results from the Cox models on ￿rst top perfor-
mance only, reported in table 3.8. Estimates are presented in terms of their effect
on the odds to be a top performer: a coef￿cient smaller (larger) than one, re￿ects a
negative (positive) effect.
Being male almost doubles the odds of displaying ￿rst top performance (haz-
ard multiplied by 1.86, see ￿rst model in Table 3.8). Rank is highly signi￿cant and
the size of the coef￿cients indicates that lower ranks have a signi￿cantly lower
hazard for ￿rst top performance as compared to rank 4 (full professor). This may
be picking up the accumulative advantage effect that higher ranked professors get
more resources, have more incentives to put in effort and have more experience,
all of which increase their probability of realizing a top performance. On top op
the rank effect, being a head of unit also considerably and signi￿cantly increases
the hazard of ￿rst top performance (by a factor of 1.52). With heads of unit hav-
ing available the research resources in their unit, they are more likely to be proli￿c,
120again supporting the accumulative advantage hypothesis. Once corrected for rank,
age has a small and non-signi￿cant effect on the hazard and there is no sign of
non-linearity in the age effect. Also seniority as a professor and seniority in rank
have no signi￿cant effect
90. Convincing evidence for a substitutive effect between
research and teaching cannot be found as the teaching load coef￿cient, although
negative, is small and only marginally signi￿cant. The correction for entry in or af-
ter 1992 shows a signi￿cantly higher hazard of ￿rst top for late entrants, suggesting
that the researchers hired before 1992 are not at higher risk for top performance,
on the contrary
91. Even if we correct for the main discipline of the researcher
in the model
92, the membership of the different faculties
93 matters for agriculture,
medicine and pharmacy. Looking at the more detailed department membership (es-
timates not reported) reveals that organizational differences also continue to play
a role within faculties. Additional research funding under the form of the type I
projects, i.e. large ￿excelllence funding￿, contributes signi￿cantly to the hazard
of becoming top (hazard multiplied by 1.77), as expected. The smaller type II re-
search grants do not make a signi￿cant difference for attaining top performance.
When we split the analysis by group (biomedical, engineering and sciences;
results not shown) the importance of rank holds for the biomedical and science
groups but looses its signi￿cance for engineering. The gender effect is driven by
the biomedical observations as well as the impact of heading a research unit, while
the engineering and, to a lesser extent, the science faculties show a signi￿cant
and negative teaching effect (insigni￿cant for the biomedical group). The positive
impact of type I funding comes out signi￿cantly for the engineering and science
faculties.
90 Dropping the seniority variables from the analysis does not improve the signi￿cance of the age
coef￿cients.
91 A robustness check including only fulltimers con￿rms the results, except for the dummy con-
trolling for entry in/after 1992 which looses signi￿cance. Also for the subsample with entrants after
1992, the direction and magnitude of most effects are maintained, but the signi￿cance for many
parameters disappears due to a limited number of observations.
92 All discipline dummies are relative to the ‘agriculture and environment’ category. The multidis-
ciplinary category was dropped from the regression (10 researchers).
93 The faculty of physical education and kinesiology serves as the reference category.
121Finally, to examine whether the path to ￿rst top performance is a gradual
process requiring a steady build-up of publications rather than being characterized
by a sudden burst in publication output, we include a speci￿cation that models
the hazard of ￿rst top performance as a function of previous research performance
(see second model in Table 3.8). In particular, we include a dummy which takes
the value of one when the researcher belonged to the middle performance cate-
gory in the previous period, the base category being the low performance category.
This coef￿cient turns out to be highly signi￿cant and suggests a large effect: re-
searchers in the middle performance category are about six times more likely to
reach their ￿rst top performance in the next period, as compared to researchers
in the low performance category, all else equal. This result strongly supports the
gradual build-up of top performance, as was also found in the mobility matrices re-
ported in section 3.4.2. An additional check shows that this effect holds for both
male and female researchers (not reported). Women are less likely to jump from
the low to the top productivity category, but the difference is not signi￿cant. Con-
clusions with respect to the other coef￿cients remain largely unchanged relative to
the ￿rst speci￿cation
94.
b) Repeated top performance
Table 3.9 again looks at the hazard to be a top performer, but this time in-
cludes all top performances using a repeated events model. This is a further step in
assessing the ￿repeatability￿ of top performance. Again, when we compare these
results with the models for ￿rst top performance, we can single out whether the
risk process underlying ￿rst versus subsequent top performance is different
95. But
in addition and most interestingly, the repeated events model has the advantage that
it allows more explicitly analyzing dependence on prior top performance and the
role of individual heterogeneity
96.
94 An exception is the gender effect which looses signi￿cance. Also, the type I funding dummy
looses signi￿cance while type II funding shows up with a negative effect. We attribute this to
correlation between these variables and the medium performance lag.
95 Given that most of the observations in our sample (79%) pertain to ￿rst top performance, it will
be dif￿cult to ￿nd strong differences.
96 These ￿ndings are con￿rmed when estimating the strati￿ed Cox model with separate baseline
122The results in terms of which characteristics are signi￿cant are very similar
to the results for ￿rst top performance (see ￿rst speci￿cation in table 3.9), such as
the gender effect, which remains important and very signi￿cant
97. The head-of-
unit result is less strong in the repeated events analysis. The correction for fulltime
position becomes more important once we take into account subsequent top perfor-
mances. Teaching load has a small but signi￿cant negative impact, suggesting that
teaching load becomes more a constraint for repeated top performance, although
the effect is not robust in later regressions (see infra). The rank effect remains
highly signi￿cant with all ranks below the most senior rank less likely to perform
top. Both type I and type II funding have a positive effect on showing top perfor-
mance, but these results are not robust in later regressions (see infra).
To further examine the persistence in research performance, we include in
the repeated events analysis the number of previous top performances (the second
model in table 3.9). If top performance is an accumulative process, we expect this
variable to signi￿cantly affect the hazard for repeated top performance, contribut-
ing to the persistence in top performance. Indeed the results indicate a signi￿cant
and substantial higher hazard for next top performance, the more previous top per-
formances a researcher has acquired (52% increase in the hazard to be top). Note
that the other parameters are little affected by the inclusion of the variable, with
the exception of the control dummy for the most recent entry cohort that becomes
signi￿cant. The small and positive career age effect becomes signi￿cant at the 5%
level. Including the number of previous top performances takes away the effect of
research funding, which is presumably due to correlation between these variables.
In the third speci￿cation we test to which extent there is a gradual accumu-
lation of top performance experience, by allowing a different effect of ￿rst, sec-
hazards per event rank, as explained in section 1. With respect to the appropriate view on the risk
process, we compared the estimates of the strati￿ed Cox model using both a gap time and a counting
process formulation of time. The counting process formulation ￿ts the data best. This implies that
the baseline hazard to be top is a function of the total time path since entry as a professor, rather
than being determined by the time since last top performance only.
97 An important ￿nding with respect to the gender effect is that the coef￿cient looses signi￿cance
in a model where we look at second or higher order top performance, conditional on ￿rst top perfor-
mance(notreported). Thisindicatesthatthegenderdifferentialrelatestoachievingtopperformance
for the ￿rst time, after which its importance disappears.
123ond, third, etc. top performance on the next top performance. Although initially
not monotonously increasing, the coef￿cients indicate an upward trend, suggesting
that the more previous top performances the researcher has acquired, the higher
the hazard for a next top performance, con￿rming the accumulative nature of the
process towards top performance.
As discussed in section 1, if there exists within-individual correlation, the
model above is misspeci￿ed. Table 3.10 reports the results using a Cox shared
frailty model
98, with the ￿rst speci￿cation showing the repeated events model with
the previous events counter from the previous paragraph, for reference. The frailty
model allows checking whether the accumulative advantage effect coming out of
the model is robust when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, for instance
the individual’s talent. The main parameter of interest is the variance of the frailty
terms (theta). The likelihood ratio test for the second model in the table shows that
we can reject the hypothesis of no individual heterogeneity. When correcting for
individual ￿xed effects in this way, all supra reported results remain. More partic-
ularly, the effect of previous top performance, although smaller than before (1.29
versus 1.52 as shown in the table), remains sizeable and very signi￿cant. All this
suggests that on top of a accumulated advantage story, individual heterogeneity
(talent) remains an important factor in determining ￿rst and subsequent top perfor-
mance.
The third model in the table reveals that men and women show a different
sensitivity to past top performance with respect to the odds of repeating top per-
formance. For a female researcher, each top performance more than doubles the
odds to be top again (2.33). For male researchers, the effect of a previous top per-
formance is only about half compared to women (0.56). Note that we control for
individual heterogeneity, so the different impact of past top performance for men
and women cannot be attributed to a systematic difference in, say, unobserved abil-
ity. The estimates would suggest that female scientists are more sensitive to the
cumulative advantage effect than men. Intuitively, this may be explained as top
98 The frailty is shared by all observations pertaining to a single individual and hence captures
within-individual correlation.
124performance having an even stronger status effect if achieved by researchers oper-
ating in an underdog position, which arguably holds for women in science.
Finally, when plotting the baseline hazard
99 (see ￿gure 3.2), visualizing the
shape of the residual risk over time after controlling for all the observable factors,
we see that the more time elapses since entry in professorship the less likely it is
the researcher will ever reach top performance.
In sum, the duration models yield interesting ￿ndings with respect to ￿rst and
subsequent top performance. In all the models used, the scienti￿c discipline of re-
searchers as well as their mode of employment at the university (fulltime versus
part time) turned out to be very important control variables. Further, and in line
with previous research, we found a strong gender effect against top performance
for women. But the evidence suggests that once women break through to their
￿rst top performance, no gender bias hinders them in further top performances
100.
Having access to large research funding speeds up the process towards top perfor-
mance. In contrast, no convincing evidence was found of any age effect nor of
any signi￿cant or sizeable impact of seniority on top productivity. Nevertheless,
career incentives do matter: the likelihood of being a top performing researcher in-
creases with rank. In this respect, heading a research lab also has a positive effect
albeit marginally signi￿cant in the repeated events regressions. Teaching was not
foundto havea signi￿cantsubstitutive effecton researchoutput. Wealso character-
ized the path towards top performance as gradual rather than abrupt, going against
the ￿lucky strike￿ story for top performance. An important ￿nding is the signi￿-
cant and accumulative impact of previous top output on the probability to repeat
such an accomplishment, especially for women. Access to research funding is an
important factor in this accumulative process. Finally, correcting for unobserved
individual heterogeneity (talent) is important.
99 This is the baseline hazard corresponding to the repeated top performance model with a previous
events counter. Other speci￿cations show a similar pattern.
100 When looking at second or higher order top performance, conditional on having achieved a ￿rst
top performance, the gender effect disappears (results not reported).
1253.5.2 Logit Analysis of Top and Persistent Top
In the previous section we used a hazard analysis to look at the process to ￿rst and
repeated top research performance. To check the robustness of our ￿ndings, we
complete our analysis by analyzing the determinants of top performance and its
persistency, using a logit model. The logit analysis examines which characteris-
tics explain the probability to be selected into the top productivity category (using
a two-year moving window) or the persistent top category (across the whole obser-
vation period).
Explaining selection into the top performance category
We start with an analysis of the probability to be in the top performance
category. The estimated standard errors account for the fact that we have repeated
observations for the individuals. The results are shown in table 3.11. The estimates
are reported as risk ratios, relative to the middle and low output category.
The results con￿rm the hazard analysis of section 4. The relative ￿risk￿ of
being in the top category versus an average or low output is signi￿cantly higher for
males than for females. While age and seniority again have no signi￿cant impact,
higher ranks are signi￿cantly more likely to be associated with top research per-
formance, as well as being a head of unit and having access to research funding.
For the funding effect, especially the big funds (type I) matter, again supporting the
Matthew effect. Also the corrections for discipline, faculty and full-time position,
as well the negative teaching load effect are recon￿rmed.
Explaining selection into the persistent top performance category
In the logit analysis for persistent top, we collapse the time dimension in
the data. For the rank, head of unit and project funding dummies we take for
each researcher the ￿rst observed value within the window 1992-2001 in order to
reduce endogeneity issues with respect to productivity during this period. For the
age, seniority and teaching load variables, we take the average across observations.
126Only researchers working fulltime at the university are retained as no part-timers
enter the persistent top category
101.
The logit analysis runs into the problem of a more limited set of observations
and a very skewed distribution, with only a limited number of non-zeros i.e. per-
sistent top performers (57 versus 753 non-persistent top performers), which makes
it hard to ￿nd signi￿cant effects and a good predictive model overall. The results,
although less signi￿cant, nevertheless con￿rm the hazard analysis results.
The initial observed rank is signi￿cant for explaining persistency at the top:
all ranks have a signi￿cant and strong negative probability of being top in every
period of observation compared to the most senior rank. The scientists receiving
project funding the ￿rst time we observe them have a leg up on those not receiv-
ing funding. More speci￿cally, the large type I funding increases the odds of being
a persistent top performer, although signi￿cant only at 10%. Teaching load shows
up marginally signi￿cant, with a small negative effect on persistency of top per-
formance. Although the gender effect showed up as sizeable and very signi￿cant
in our hazard analysis for ￿rst top performance, it was less strong in repeated top
performance. In line with this ￿nding, the gender differential fades out in the logit
analysis for persistent top performance. Also head of unit status in the ￿rst obser-
vation is no longer signi￿cant, which is consistent with the earlier observation that
heading a research unit was found to contribute primarily to ￿rst top performance
but is of lesser importance to explain subsequent top performances. Age does not
matter for explaining persistency (nor for ￿rst or repeated top performance). The
corrections for scienti￿c discipline, faculty membership and entry cohort are less
important for explaining persistency.
101 In fact, two part-timers do enter the persistent top category. We found indications (based on
additional checks on the web) that they are also af￿liated to another university, presumably leading
to a full-time academic position. To be safe, we exclude them from the analysis. Note that even if
we didn’t exclude them, being parttime would still be an almost perfect predictor of not being in
the persistent top category, suggesting that parttime and fulltime researchers have a very different
pro￿le.
1273.6 Conclusions and Further Research
The paper uses a panel dataset comprising the publications of biomedical and exact
scientists at the KU Leuven in the period 1992-2001, to study the process towards
and selection in the top scienti￿c performance category. We study both ￿rst and
subsequent top performances. Analysing the characteristics explaining the process
towards top performance and its persistency, using hazard and logit analysis, we
contribute to the debate on cumulative advantage effects in academic research.
About one quarter of the scientists in the sample achieves top performance
at least once in the observation period, with six out of a hundred scientists being
persistently top. Using mobility matrices, we ￿nd that top productivity generally is
persistent over time: previous top performers are more likely to reach top status in
next periods.
A hazard model predicting the time towards ￿rst top performance con￿rms
the importance of gender, with females being signi￿cantly less likely to reach top
performance. Ageandseniorityeffectsarenotsigni￿cant, butrankandhierarchical
position, as well as access to excellence funding are important for explaining the
hazard to ￿rst top performance. There is only limited evidence with respect to the
substitution effect of teaching load on top research performance. Correction for
scienti￿c discipline, full time position and organizational membership is important.
Low previous performers are less likely to reach top status, con￿rming that ￿rst top
performance is a gradual, accumulative process, as the Matthew effect or a learning
perspective would predict.
When analyzing subsequent top performances, we ￿nd strong support for
the accumulative process, with the hazard to next top performance being signi￿-
cantly and increasingly positively affected by previous top performance. Rank is
important not only in predicting ￿rst top performance, but also for persistency in
top performance, supporting the accumulative effect. Also the gender bias remains
signi￿cant in explaining subsequent top performance, but this time with the depen-
dence on previous top performance in favor of females, suggesting that the gender
effect is mainly a selection problem into ￿rst top. While funding and head of unit
128position are important for selecting into ￿rst top performance, they are less predic-
tive for subsequent top performance. And ￿nally, the correction for unobservable
individual heterogeneity, like ability, is signi￿cant, suggesting that talent remains
an integral part of the story of top performance and its persistence.
Although the current analysis provides interesting results with respect to
top performance and its persistence, it also suggests exciting avenues for further
analysis. A ￿rst important extension, suggested by the signi￿cance of organiza-
tional af￿liation dummies of the current analysis, is to examine the collective ef-
fects in more detail, by specifying characteristics of the research teams and net-
works to which the researcher is af￿liated, and with whom she cooperates in re-
search through co-publications, within KU Leuven but also beyond. Further analy-
sis should also properly take into account the substitution - or complementarity
- among the various output dimensions for researchers: basic research, teaching
but also applied research and own commercialization (patents and spin-offs). Also
the trade-off between quantity and quality of research output can be investigated
in more detail. While the current analysis has focused on establishing top perfor-
mance and its persistence in terms of quantity of publications, we can extend and
compare the analysis taking on board the quality of publications dimension, using
citation information. Furthermore, by examining whether publications that yield
more peer recognition, through citations, are more likely to establish persistence in
performance we can study the processes governing the Matthew effect more care-
fully. And this brings us to perhaps the most important extension suggested by
the current analysis, namely to further characterize the accumulative process of
persistent top performance. Besides promotion, access to infrastructure and team
membership, another important component of the accumulative advantage story is
research funding, as the results presented here have indicated. To characterize the
roleoffundingfurther, awiderarrayoffundingsources(externalfundingorganiza-
tions at regional, national and European level as well as contract research) should
be added. In addition, when including funding and other accumulation compo-
nents in the performance analysis, the endogeneity needs to be properly taken into
account by including an instruments or systems approach.
129Finally, an important limitation of this work is the scope of the data since we
consider the KU Leuven only. Comparison of results with other institutions would
be very valuable to improve on institutional heterogeneity.
3.7 Tables & Figures
Table 3.1: Distribution of researchers over organizational units
Organizational Unit Freq. Percent
Group Exact Sciences 483 46.9
Faculty of Science 192 18.6
Faculty of Engineering 214 20.8
Faculty of Applied Bioscience and Engineering 77 7.5
Group Biomedical Sciences 547 53.1
Faculty of Medicine 460 44.7
Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences 36 3.5
Faculty of Physical Education & Kinesiology 51 5.0
Total 1030￿ 100.0
￿ Six people switched between groups and/or faculties in the period 1992-2001
and are not shown in this table.
Table 3.2: Distribution of researchers over disciplines
Main Discipline Freq. Percent
None (inactive researchers) 222 21.5
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II (Non-internal Medicine Specialties) 190 18.4
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I (General & Internal Medicine) 157 15.2




Agriculture & environment 36 3.5
Biology (Organismic & Supraorganismic level) 31 3.0
Biomedical research 26 2.5
Mathematics 26 2.5
Geosciences & space sciences 19 1.8
Neuroscience & behavior 13 1.3
Total 1034￿ 100.0
￿ Two researchers had a tie in terms of their number of publications for two or more disciplines and are not shown.
130Table 3.3: Individual and career-related variables by persistence category (yearly
averages)






mean s.d. mean mean mean mean
Male 0.89 0.32 0.93 0.94 0.87 0.86
Age 47.74 8.98 47.84 46.68 46.83 50.95
% age cohort 1 (age<40) 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.16
% age cohort 2 (40￿age<50) 0.32 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.26
% age cohort 3 (50￿age<60) 0.31 0.37 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.35
% age cohort 4 (60<age) 0.13 0.29 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.24
Entry cohort
￿
% entry cohort 1 (1955-1980) 0.19 0.39 0.33 0.20 0.17 0.18
% entry cohort 2 (1981-1988) 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.31 0.15 0.14
% entry cohort 3 (1989-1991) 0.24 0.43 0.07 0.24 0.26 0.23
% entry cohort 4 (1992-...) 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.25 0.42 0.45
Years of employment in 1992-2001 7.51 2.88 6.61 8.95 7.45 6.48
Fulltime at university 0.80 0.38 0.98 0.97 0.86 0.47
Rank
￿￿
% rank 1 (junior) 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.27 0.37
% rank 2 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.28
% rank 3 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.17 0.13
% rank 4 (senior) 0.25 0.02 0.62 0.37 0.20 0.14
Rank seniority
￿￿￿ 5.71 6.69 8.62 5.85 5.37 5.64
rank 1 (junior) 2.41 2.26 0.93 1.88 2.28 3.01
rank 2 3.10 2.68 1.30 2.14 3.17 3.75
rank 3 4.25 5.00 4.08 3.01 4.55 5.77
rank 4 (senior) 12.26 8.51 11.78 10.28 13.02 16.97
Teaching load (year-hours) 4.18 4.09 4.51 4.75 4.16 3.38
rank 1 (junior) 1.49 1.77 1.04 1.35 1.42 1.72
rank 2 3.08 3.11 3.56 2.97 3.20 2.81
rank 3 4.95 3.67 2.66 4.03 5.61 4.81
rank 4 (senior) 7.96 4.40 5.75 7.85 8.67 8.31
Project funding
% with type I funding 0.09 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.00
as promoter 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.00
as co-promoter 0.07 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.00
% with type II funding 0.11 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.02
as promoter 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01
as co-promoter 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.01
N 1036 61 218 535 222
￿ For 44 researchers this information is missing.
￿￿ Only the four main ranks shown. People may be in other ranks which are of lesser concern here
(e.g. ’jury member PhD’) or may combine one of these other ranks with one of the main ranks.
￿￿￿ This is the expected rank seniority for someone in a given rank; not the total number of years
scientists tend to spend in each rank.
















Agriculture and Environment 3.5 3.3 1.6 1.8 1.7
Biosciences 7.5 5.7 8.6 7.5 6.5
Chemistry 5.5 3.8 3.2 2.8 3.1
Engineering 2.1 2.9 1.0 1.1 1.1
Geosciences and Space Sciences 2.5 3.9 2.1 3.0 2.6
Mathematics 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.0
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II 3.3 5.0 2.8 2.8 2.5
Neuroscience and Behavior 3.0 3.3 3.4 5.5 5.4
Physics 5.2 5.1 2.7 3.1 3.0
Biomedical Research 4.1 4.4 4.4 4.0 4.0
Biology 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.3 3.8
Total 4.4 4.8 3.8 3.4 3.4
(s.d.) (6.38) (5.62) (6.63) (3.19)
￿ The average number of citations received by a paper in a 3-year forward citation window, for papers published
by KU Leuven researchers in 1992-2001
￿￿ The average number of citations received by a paper in a 3-year forward citation window, for papers published
in 1992-2001 at the world level (source: Center for R&D Statistics, Leuven, based on ISI-data)
131Table 3.5: Mobility matrix for 1992/1993 - 1993/1994
Performance in 1993/1994
Performance in 1992/1993 low medium top Total
low freq. 301 23 2 326
% 92.3 7.1 0.6 100
medium freq. 36 125 17 178
% 20.2 70.2 9.6 100
top freq. 8 20 89 117
% 6.8 17.1 76.1 100
Total freq. 345 168 108 621
% 55.6 27.1 17.4 100
Pearson chi2(4) = 635.14
Performance measure used = number of publications
Number of exits (researchers present in 92, but not in 93): 26
Number of entries (researchers not present in 92, but present in 93): 58









Number of researchers 1,036 61 218 535 222
% 100.0 5.9 21.0 51.6 21.4
Publications per author 3.3 14.3 6.6 2.2 n/a
(5.1)
Co-authors per publication 4.7 4.9 4.6 4.8 n/a
(3.7)
Citations per publication 3.0 5.1 4.5 3.4 n/a
(4.2)
Impact measure per publication 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.1 n/a
(2.4)
(co-)Promoted PhDs 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0
(0.5)
Standard deviations in brackets
Table 3.7: Output of persistent top researchers at KU Leuven with world average
(citations/publication by discipline)








Agriculture and Environment 4 24.1 1.8
Biosciences 6 241.8 7.5
Chemistry 7 70.4 2.8
Engineering 5 13.8 1.1
Geosciences and Space Sciences 2 66.7 3.0
Mathematics 2 11.7 1.0
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I 11 134.9 5.0
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II 17 29.4 2.8
Neuroscience and Behavior 1 85.4 5.5
Physics 3 102.5 3.1
Biomedical Research 1 11.5 4.0
Biology 2 102.9 3.3
￿ The average number of citations received by a paper in a 3-year forward citation window, for papers published
by KU Leuven researchers in 1992-2001
￿￿ The average number of citations received by a paper in a 3-year forward citation window, for papers published
in 1992-2001 at the world level (source: Center for R&D Statistics, Leuven, based on ISI-data)
132Table 3.8: Cox models for ￿rst top performance
First top performance Path to ￿rst top performance
Haz. Ratio z Haz. Ratio z
male 1.86** (2.06) 1.17 (0.43)
age 0.91 (-0.89) 0.87 (-0.87)
age squared 1.00 (0.14) 1.00 (0.50)
main discipline
biosciences 1.51 (1.07) 0.36 (-1.09)
chemistry 4.37*** (4.21) 2.69 (1.29)
engineering 4.04*** (3.32) 4.67** (2.04)
geosciences 6.51*** (3.63) 9.19** (2.11)
mathematics 5.69*** (4.03) 5.44* (1.90)
medicine I 2.73*** (3.15) 2.24 (1.33)
medicine II 3.58*** (4.09) 3.31** (2.00)
neuroscience 7.30*** (4.18) 11.10*** (3.17)
physics 5.61*** (4.47) 7.83*** (2.79)
biomedical 3.25** (2.42) 3.87* (1.84)
biology 2.25 (1.61) 4.67** (2.26)
faculty membership
fac of science 1.99 (1.44) 0.96 (-0.06)
fac of engineering 1.53 (0.88) 0.89 (-0.19)
fac of agriculture 3.97*** (2.70) 1.59 (0.71)
fac of medicine 3.85*** (3.22) 2.21* (1.67)
fac of pharmacy 3.23** (2.37) 1.92 (0.92)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 0.13*** (-6.45) 0.10*** (-5.53)
rank 2 in t-1 0.24*** (-6.92) 0.16*** (-5.14)
rank 3 in t-1 0.36*** (-4.41) 0.38*** (-3.26)
other rank in t-1 0.41*** (-3.04) 0.33** (-2.32)
seniority in rank 0.98 (-1.10) 0.99 (-0.36)
head of unit in t-1 1.52** (2.51) 1.94*** (2.86)
fulltime at university 3.34*** (2.99) 1.51 (0.92)
entry as professor ￿ 1992 1.63** (2.02) 1.83* (1.90)
career age 1.02 (1.01) 0.99 (-0.23)
teaching load 0.96* (-1.82) 0.96 (-1.18)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.77*** (2.78) 0.85 (-0.43)
type II funding in t-1 0.92 (-0.36) 0.55** (-2.01)




Base categories: agriculture & environment (main discipline), faculty of physical education & kinesiology (fac-
ulty membership), rank 4 (rank)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01









Haz. Ratio z Haz. Ratio z Haz. Ratio z
male 2.11*** (2.82) 1.59** (1.96) 1.49** (2.15)
age 0.93 (-0.86) 0.91 (-1.33) 0.90** (-2.05)
age squared 1.00 (0.14) 1.00 (0.55) 1.00 (1.32)
main discipline
biosciences 0.98 (-0.07) 1.61* (1.89) 1.26 (1.16)
chemistry 2.90*** (3.52) 3.10*** (5.42) 2.11*** (4.41)
engineering 3.91*** (4.05) 3.04*** (4.37) 2.09*** (3.47)
geosciences 4.05*** (3.20) 2.47*** (2.93) 1.82** (2.03)
mathematics 5.06*** (4.45) 3.69*** (5.18) 2.17*** (3.47)
medicine I 1.65* (1.73) 2.06*** (3.20) 1.62*** (2.70)
medicine II 2.43*** (3.14) 2.67*** (4.40) 1.85*** (3.41)
neuroscience 3.22*** (2.58) 3.20*** (3.13) 2.49*** (3.66)
physics 4.19*** (4.25) 3.91*** (4.96) 2.87*** (4.80)
biomedical 2.06* (1.80) 2.25*** (2.59) 1.60* (1.90)
biology 1.36 (0.64) 1.72 (1.55) 1.84** (2.30)
faculty membership
fac of science 1.56 (0.98) 1.31 (0.69) 0.94 (-0.19)
fac of engineering 1.41 (0.78) 1.14 (0.34) 1.04 (0.14)
fac of agriculture 4.22*** (3.19) 2.94*** (2.69) 2.18*** (2.66)
fac of medicine 3.79*** (3.46) 2.34** (2.40) 1.83** (2.32)
fac of pharmacy 3.44*** (2.65) 1.93 (1.62) 1.54 (1.52)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 0.12*** (-10.34) 0.21*** (-8.19) 0.41*** (-5.99)
rank 2 in t-1 0.21*** (-9.14) 0.42*** (-5.70) 0.56*** (-4.82)
rank 3 in t-1 0.36*** (-7.22) 0.63*** (-3.96) 0.72*** (-3.56)
other rank in t-1 0.50*** (-2.95) 0.67** (-2.36) 0.82 (-1.43)
seniority in rank 0.98 (-0.99) 0.98 (-1.46) 0.99 (-1.40)
head of unit in t-1 1.22* (1.85) 1.16 (1.63) 1.09 (1.27)
fulltime at university 4.79*** (4.23) 3.54*** (3.68) 2.79*** (3.05)
entry as professor ￿ 1992 1.18 (0.88) 1.45** (2.56) 1.31** (2.38)
career age 1.02 (1.31) 1.02** (2.04) 1.02* (1.82)
teaching load 0.94*** (-3.48) 0.99 (-0.77) 1.00 (-0.51)
project funding
type I funding 1.54*** (2.75) 1.11 (0.94) 1.07 (0.68)
type II funding 1.26** (2.06) 1.02 (0.21) 1.10 (1.27)
previous top performances
nr previous top performances 1.52*** (16.89)
nr previous top perf’s = 1 13.67*** (23.23)
nr previous top perf’s = 2 9.40*** (16.02)
nr previous top perf’s = 3 15.48*** (18.74)
nr previous top perf’s = 4 17.07*** (18.47)
nr previous top perf’s = 5 19.39*** (19.23)
nr previous top perf’s = 6 21.99*** (19.74)
nr previous top perf’s = 7 24.48*** (19.34)
nr previous top perf’s = 8 26.54*** (18.24)
N 5562 5562 5562
ll -5343.58 -5136.85 -4942.66
chi2 498.75 893.41 1565.56
base categories: rank4 (rank), faculty of physical educ. & kinesiology (faculty membership), agriculture
& environment (main discipline), nr previous top perf’s = 0 (event counter dummies)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01











ual frailties and gender
interaction
Haz. Ratio z Haz. Ratio z Haz. Ratio z
male 1.59** (1.96) 1.66** (2.00) 2.32*** (2.88)
age 0.91 (-1.33) 0.98 (-0.28) 0.96 (-0.47)
age squared 1.00 (0.55) 1.00 (-0.55) 1.00 (-0.35)
main discipline
biosciences 1.61* (1.89) 1.91* (1.87) 1.94* (1.94)
chemistry 3.10*** (5.42) 4.63*** (4.89) 4.45*** (4.86)
engineering 3.04*** (4.37) 4.85*** (4.28) 4.66*** (4.26)
geosciences 2.47*** (2.93) 5.12*** (3.28) 4.90*** (3.26)
mathematics 3.69*** (5.18) 5.85*** (4.48) 5.66*** (4.50)
medicine I 2.06*** (3.20) 2.59*** (2.92) 2.67*** (3.05)
medicine II 2.67*** (4.40) 3.87*** (4.29) 3.89*** (4.37)
neuroscience 3.20*** (3.13) 7.24*** (4.05) 7.03*** (4.08)
physics 3.91*** (4.96) 7.36*** (5.63) 6.97*** (5.59)
biomedical 2.25*** (2.59) 3.10*** (2.64) 3.09*** (2.69)
biology 1.72 (1.55) 2.94*** (2.90) 2.44** (2.40)
faculty membership
fac of science 1.31 (0.69) 1.39 (0.80) 1.44 (0.90)
fac of engineering 1.14 (0.34) 1.25 (0.52) 1.28 (0.58)
fac of agriculture 2.94*** (2.69) 4.16*** (3.24) 4.21*** (3.33)
fac of medicine 2.34** (2.40) 3.16*** (3.30) 3.06*** (3.27)
fac of pharmacy 1.93 (1.62) 2.63** (2.12) 2.67** (2.20)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 0.21*** (-8.19) 0.18*** (-6.89) 0.18*** (-6.97)
rank 2 in t-1 0.42*** (-5.70) 0.36*** (-5.71) 0.35*** (-5.88)
rank 3 in t-1 0.63*** (-3.96) 0.52*** (-4.35) 0.52*** (-4.40)
other rank in t-1 0.67** (-2.36) 0.60** (-2.53) 0.60** (-2.57)
seniority in rank 0.98 (-1.46) 0.98 (-1.32) 0.98 (-1.30)
head of unit in t-1 1.16 (1.63) 1.17 (1.48) 1.15 (1.35)
fulltime at university 3.54*** (3.68) 3.68*** (4.59) 3.62*** (4.57)
entry as professor ￿ 1992 1.45** (2.56) 1.42* (1.86) 1.36* (1.67)
career age 1.02** (2.04) 1.04** (2.32) 1.04** (2.16)
teaching load 0.99 (-0.77) 0.98 (-1.44) 0.98 (-1.41)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.11 (0.94) 1.23 (1.51) 1.25 (1.63)
type II funding in t-1 1.02 (0.21) 1.06 (0.46) 1.07 (0.57)
nr previous top performances 1.52*** (16.89) 1.29*** (8.99) 2.33*** (4.19)




N 5562 5562 5562
ll -5136.85 -5117.46 -5113.52
chi2 893.41 337.02 361.54
base categories: rank4 (rank), faculty of physical educ. & kinesiology (faculty membership), agriculture
& environment (main discipline)
￿ Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) = 38.77
￿ Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) = 31.87
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
135Table 3.11: Logit regression results
Temporal top performance Persistent top performance
(by 2-year moving window)
Odds Ratio z Odds Ratio z
male 2.35*** (2.62) 1.24 (0.37)
age 0.95 (-0.42) 0.92 (-0.33)
age squared 1.00 (-0.22) 1.00 (0.02)
main discipline
1
biosciences 0.60 (-0.99) 0.83 (-0.22)
chemistry 3.87*** (3.12) 2.86 (1.38)
engineering 5.94*** (3.83) 3.98 (1.56)
geosciences 6.42*** (2.67) 3.74 (1.02)
maths 8.62*** (4.18) 3.95 (1.32)
medicine I 1.69 (1.37) 0.90 (-0.14)
medicine II 2.99*** (2.90) 1.99 (0.99)
neuroscience 9.72*** (3.80) 1.39 (0.22)
physics 6.79*** (4.12) 1.47 (0.37)
biomedical 2.32 (1.45) 0.76 (-0.22)
biology 1.59 (0.68) 1.66 (0.53)
faculty membership
2
fac of science 1.54 (0.76)
fac of engineering 1.40 (0.59) 0.74 (-0.43)
fac of agriculture 6.04*** (2.95) 1.96 (0.89)
fac of medicine 5.87*** (3.64) 3.38* (1.86)
fac of pharmacy 7.19*** (2.91) 4.14* (1.66)
rank
3
rank 1 0.04*** (-9.66) 0.03*** (-4.55)
rank 2 0.08*** (-9.20) 0.08*** (-4.20)
rank 3 0.21*** (-7.03) 0.12*** (-3.17)
other rank 0.32*** (-2.94) 0.11*** (-2.60)
seniority in rank 0.98 (-0.80) 0.99 (-0.09)
head of unit
4 1.41* (1.93) 1.59 (1.10)
fulltime at university
5 5.69*** (3.94)
entry as professor >= 1992 1.32 (1.03) 1.59 (0.71)
career age 1.03 (1.11) 1.00 (0.02)
teaching load 0.90*** (-3.69) 0.90 (-1.56)
project funding
6
type I funding 2.17*** (2.81) 2.26* (1.71)
type II funding 1.48** (2.15) 1.79 (1.37)




1 base category = agriculture & environment
2 For the temporal top model, base category is the fac. of physical education & kinesiology. For the persistent
top model, base category is the fac. of science + fac. of physical education & kinesiology (no persistent top
researchers in the latter faculty).
3 Base category = rank 4 (most senior rank). For the temporal top model, this indicates the rank in the previous
period. For the persistent top model, this indicates the rank in the ￿rst observation period.
4 For the temporal top model, this indicates head of unit status in the previous period. For the persistent top
model, this indicates head of unit status in the ￿rst observation period.
5 For the persistent top model, we only consider fulltime researchers.
6 For the temporal top model, this indicates funding status in the previous period. For the persistent top model,
this indicates whether the researcher had the funding in the ￿rst observation period in 1992-2001 or before 1992
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Figure 3.2: Baseline hazard for repeated top performance
1373.A Appendices
3.A.1 Appendix 1. Constructing the database
The publication and citation data originate from the Science Citation Index (SCI)
of the Institute of Scienti￿c Information (ISI). As there is no one-to-one matching
between authors and their af￿liation address in the ISI data, publications in each of
the ten yearly publication ￿les were initially retained when at least one author was
af￿liated with the KU Leuven so that a number of non-KU Leuven related authors
remained present. In a second step, we narrowed the number of publication records
by means of a merge with the KU Leuven personnel ￿les in order to only retain KU
Leuven af￿liated authors (see infra).
Since the ISI records do not allow distinguishing between primary- and co-
authorship, we used a ￿full integer￿ counting scheme for calculating the perfor-
mance data. This means that a publication was counted as ￿1￿ for all authors of
the paper. The same goes for citations: the full number of citations was added to
the credits of each author of the paper, whereby an author was identi￿ed by his or
her surname plus the ￿rst initial. This gives rise to homonyms: within the yearly
publication ￿les it is not possible to distinguish between authors that have the same
name. As discussed below, most of these homonyms could be resolved during the
merge with the university personnel ￿le.
Because a researcher’s last name plus the ￿rst initial is the only piece of
information that is shared between the ISI publication records and the university
personnel ￿le, the two datasets were combined using this key. In this way, the non-
KU Leuven af￿liated researchers that were still present in the dataset but whose
name did not occur in the personnel ￿les were ￿ltered out. Before carrying out this
merge operation, 45 homonyms were dropped from the KU Leuven personnel ￿le
since we could not distinguish between these staff members. However, this does
not completely rule out mistakes due to homonyms during the merge of the two
￿les. In particular, although homonyms were removed from the personnel ￿le, it
is still possible that a homonym occurs between a KU Leuven af￿liated author and
138an external authors within the publications ￿le. Because the name occurs in the
personnel ￿le, the publication data of both these author records will be mapped on
the staff record, biasing upwards the performance of the staff member. Because
the ISI records do not allow linking authors unambiguously to their af￿liation, this
problem cannot be resolved nor can its magnitude be estimated. We deem it to be a
minor issue though, and point out that the merge key used inherently mitigates the
problem since researchers with identically spelled last names but a different initial
do not yield a ’false positive’.
3.A.2 Appendix 2. The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Foundedin1425, theKatholiekeUniversiteitLeuven(KULeuven)istheoldestand
largest university in Flanders and Belgium, encompassing all academic disciplines.
About 1,400 tenured professors and more than 3,500 researchers are currently em-
ployed at KU Leuven, which has a student population of more than 30,000 students
each year.
It has the legal status of a private institution, but receives most of its funding
from the Belgian Government, both in a direct and in an indirect, competitive way.
The basic public funding of the university, that pays for the salaries of the acad-
emic personnel, has remained roughly stable in the last decade, which has resulted
in a more or less stable total number of professors at KU Leuven. The funding for
research on the other hand has increased continuously. Most of this funding is ob-
tained on a competitive basis: about one quarter is private funding from industry,
abouthalfcomesfromprojectfundingfromnational, regionalandEUgovernments
and about one quarter is from the regional government allocated to the KU Leuven
based on its share of regional publications, citations and PhDs. The latter funding
is redistributed within the KU Leuven on a competitive basis. We have data on two
majortypesofprojects. ￿TypeI￿projects
102 areintendedtosupportresearchgroups
from all disciplines with demonstrated scienti￿c value based on international peer
reviews, publications and other indicators of scienti￿c quality. Type I projects typi-
102 The actual name of these funds is ’GOA’ (Geconcerteerde Onderzoeksactie). We use the generic
indication ’Type I’ in the paper.
139cally receive funding of around 900,000 Euros for a total duration of ￿ve years (up
to 1,625,000 Euros if several research groups are involved). ￿Type II￿ projects
103
are somewhat more modest in set-up and are intended to stimulate potential for
fundamental research. They can be awarded to individual researchers as well as
research groups with a good track record in research or with the intention to start
up a new line of research aiming at high quality output. Type II projects receive a
maximum funding of 475,000 Euros for a total duration of four years. Both types
of funding are allocated on the basis of competitive, external peer review evalua-
tion of past team performance and project proposal. Of the pre-screened proposals
that are allowed to pass the full procedure, less than 50% obtain funding.
The KU Leuven has as mission statement in the observed period to be among
the top 25 European research universities in a wide number of scienti￿c disciplines.
But it aims to be among the top particularly in those disciplines in which it is
already strong: biochemistry, biosciences, biomedical and several disciplines in
medicine, among which are hematology, oncology and cardiology.
In terms of career structure, we distinguish between four main ranks, with
rank 1 the entry level (￿assistant professor￿) and rank 4 the highest possible rank
(￿full professor￿). KU Leuven offers tenure to assistant professors who success-
fully pass the judgment of their work in the years following their hiring. After this
initial tenure decision, for which young professors are primarily evaluated on their
research output as opposed to other activities, they can be promoted in successive
ranks up to full professor based on their research and teaching performance, as well
as duties performed within the university, with the latter typically gaining impor-
tance as one progresses through the ranks. While rank 2-4 have tenure, rank 1 are
the untenured researchers. The power of the tenure decision is however limited,
since in its still recent history of tenure track, the KUL has no or little records of
not granting tenure.
While of￿cially the faculty as organizational unit is mostly responsible for
the teaching programs, and the department is the organizational unit for research
103 The actual name of these funds is ’OT’ (Onderzoekstoelage). We use the generic indication
’Type II’ in the paper.
140activities, in practice both hierarchical levels are intertwined, particularly with re-
spect to recruiting and promotion of researchers. The faculty level has a higher
hierarchical position, with the dean being a member of the bureau that decides on
recruitment and promotion, on the basis of advice from the departments.
141Chapter 4: The Great Divide in Scienti￿c




104 use a quantile regression approach to estimate the effects of age, gender,
funding, teaching load and other observed characteristics of academic researchers
on the full distribution of research output. We employ recent advances in quantile
regression that allow its application to count data, i.e. numbers of publications and
citations. We account for unobserved heterogeneity of researchers by estimating a
random-effects model, exploiting the panel nature of our dataset. Estimation of the
model for a panel of biomedical and exact scientists at the KU Leuven in the period
1992-2001showsstrongsupportforourquantileregressionapproach, revealingthe
differential impact of regressors along the distribution. We also ￿nd that variables
like funding, teaching load and cohort have a different impact on research quantity
than on research quality.
4.1 Introduction
Research output plays an increasingly important role in funding and promotion
decisionsinscience. Therefore, alotofattentionhasbeendevotedtounravelingthe
determinants of research productivity, both at the level of the individual researcher
and at more aggregate levels such as the research lab. Understanding what makes
a researcher productive is of interest to administrators of research organizations as
it allows for more informed decisions regarding the design of jobs, career paths,
incentive systems, etc.
104 This chapter is joint work with Reinhilde Veugelers.
142This paper starts from a well documented feature of the research productiv-
ity distribution, viz. its skewness (starting with the observation by Lotka, 1926).
Despite this indication of substantial heterogeneity in the researcher population,
studies that analyze research output tend to explain average productivity only. Pre-
vious work on research productivity has focused on how individual and institu-
tional characteristics affect average productivity (see for example Stephan & Levin
(1992) and Stephan (1996) for a survey). A recent exception is the paper by Rauber
& Ursprung (2006) who ￿nd evidence of life-cycle effects in research for German
economists using pooled quantile regressions. This paper focuses upon the estima-
tion of the effects of a range of potential productivity drivers on the entire produc-
tivity distribution, at the level of individual researchers. Such an approach allows to
determine, for example, whether the often observed ￿gender effect￿ operates con-
sistently along the whole distribution versus at the lower or upper tail only. The
characterization of the effect of a productivity driver can therefore be very infor-
mative with respect to the introduction, or the expected results, of policy measures
by university administrators. In this paper we estimate the impact of a range of pro-
ductivity drivers at several quantilesof the productivity distribution, looking at both
quantity and quality of output. To allow for the estimation of the conditional quan-
tiles of integer counts of publications and citations, we employ recent advances in
the literature that extend the quantile regression approach to count data (Machado
& Santos Silva, 2005).
An important issue is to accurately estimate the causal effect of the char-
acteristics of researchers and their working environment on productivity. Unob-
served heterogeneity among researchers makes it dif￿cult to pin down the impact
of several variables on research output. For example, whether a researcher has a
high or low teaching load may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the
researcher. To deal with such dif￿culties one may use instrumental variable esti-
mation to deal with potentially endogenous variables. Another approach is to use
panel data in order to separate the individual effect of the researcher from the true
impact of variables expected to affect productivity. Only recently efforts have been
made to combine panel data techniques with quantile regression. The primary rea-
143son is the problem to apply the usual differencing approach to quantiles. Using
Chamberlain’s correlated random effects model (1982, 1984), we control for unob-
served heterogeneity in the quantile estimations by allowing the researcher random
effect to be related to the observed characteristics. For example, whether a profes-
sor carries a high teaching load or not, is likely to be correlated with unobserved
characteristics such as a high af￿nity for teaching. By explicitly modeling the ran-
dom effect as a function of teaching load (and other variables), we are able to iden-
tify the causal effect of teaching load on research output. Previous applications of
the correlated random effects model in the context of quantile regression include
Abrevaya & Dahl (2005), addressing the effect of smoking and prenatal care on in-
fant birthweight. To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst effort to analyze research
productivity using quantile regressions for panel data.
Using a panel of biomedical and exact scientists at the KU Leuven in the
period 1992-2001, we ￿nd that the effect of most regressors differs signi￿cantly
at different points in the distribution, yielding strong support for our quantile re-
gression approach. This conclusion holds for both the quantity (publications) and
quality (citations) distribution. These results allow to gain a fuller understanding
of the role of productivity drivers compared to the classical approach where only
the impact of a regressor on the conditional mean output is considered. This pa-
per contributes to the economics of science literature on research productivity by
estimating the impact of productivity determinants on the whole productivity dis-
tribution.
Furthermore, a formal test of the correlated random effects model clearly
rejects a pure random effects approach where the random effects are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the observables. For the variables that are taken up in the random
effect speci￿cation, we thus successfully distinguish between their true effect and
the part that is correlated with the (unobserved) individual effect of the researcher.
We also ￿nd that observables like funding, teaching load, gender and entry
cohort have a different impact on the quantity distribution than on the quality distri-
bution. These results have implications for science policy at the institutional level.
In particular, this increased understanding of the research productivity process may
144assist in the putting forward the right expectations of a given science policy. For
example, the impact of small research grants on research quality remains roughly
constant across the distribution while the impact of this funding on research quan-
tity is the highest at the bottom end of the distribution and then decreases monoto-
nously towards the upper end. Although one must be cautious generalizing the
results found here, this ￿nding implies that an extreme selectivity in the assign-
ment of research funds based on the argument that the researchers who were the
most productive in the past ￿give the most bang for the buck￿ may be misdirected.
Therefore, an understanding of the full productivity distribution may lead to better
informed management decisions in research organizations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by discussing
the data, providing details on the key aspects that we wish to address. The next
section details the quantile regression approach motivated by the correlated random
effects model, and the necessary adjustment to estimate conditional quantiles for
count data. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results, comparing the quantile
estimates from the panel regressions with those from the cross-sectional approach.
The ￿nal section summarizes and concludes.
4.2 The Data
We constructed a unique panel of 1,036 scientists within the ￿elds of biomedical
and exact sciences, in the period 1992-2001, employed at the KU Leuven, the
largest and oldest university in Belgium. In terms of research, the KU Leuven
has the ambition to establish a top position in ￿poles of excellence￿, and have a
good performance in the other areas
105. To this end it allocates research funding to
research proposals on the basis of (international) peer review of excellence in re-
search. Recruitment and promotion decisions also carry a strong research quality
requirement. In addition, research output (quantity and quality) of its entire acad-
105 For background on institutional features of the KU Leuven, see appendix 2 of chapter 3.
145emic staff is regularly monitored (see Appendix 2 of chapter 3 for a description of
the KU Leuven).
We pooled different sources of data sets, combining information from the
personnel administration of the KU Leuven with bibliometric data
106. The dataset
contains the following information:
￿ Scienti￿c output (per researcher per year
107) i.e. publications in ISI journals
classi￿ed by scienti￿c discipline
108,
109;
￿ Individual and career-related variables (per researcher per year) i.e. gender,
age, cohort (year of entry at KU Leuven), career age, rank (assistant
professor, associate professor, professor and full professor), seniority in
rank, full-time versus part time position;
￿ Organizational membership at group- (exact versus biomedical sciences),
faculty- (e.g. medicine) and department (e.g. microbiology and
immunology) level;
￿ Other information relevant for examining scienti￿c performance, viz. actual
teaching load, other administrative duties within KU Leuven, being head of
a research unit, and involvement as a promoter or copromoter of research
projects awarded on a competitive basis. Two major types of funding can be
106 We refer to the appendix of a companion paper (Kelchtermans & Veugelers, 2005) for details
on the construction of the database.
107 "Year" always refers to a "database year" i.e. the year in which the publication was taken up in
the ISI records.
108 A key characteristic of the dataset is that it allows controlling for scienti￿c discipline-speci￿c
effects: the KU Leuven Centre for R&D Statistics classi￿ed every journal covered by the SCI into
one or more twelve high-level disciplines, all within the ￿eld of exact or biomedical sciences.
This allowed us to assign to each scientist the disciplines in which she published a paper in that
year. About 21% of all researchers could not be assigned to a main discipline because they did
not publish in the period 1992-2001. For all others, we determined a ’main discipline’ for each
researcher, which is de￿ned as the discipline, taken from the twelve high-level disciplines, in
which the researcher has the most publications in the period 1992-2001. For 58 researchers there
was a tie i.e. they published an equal amount of papers in at least two disciplines. For them we
randomly assigned a main discipline from the tie disciplines. Table 4.2 shows the ￿nal distribution
of the researchers in the sample over the disciplines.
109 There is also scienti￿c output that does not fall under the scope of the Science Citation Index
of the ISI. For instance, the ISI database does not include proceedings, which in some disciplines,
like engineering, are an important publication outlet.
146identi￿ed: the larger Type I (excellence) and the smaller Type II funding.
See Appendix 2 of chapter 3 for a description of the KUL research strategy
and the type of funding it awards.
Most researchers in the sample were not employed for the full 10 years: some
of them retired or left the university before 2001, others joined after 1992. These
entries and exits yield an unbalanced panel and allow examining cohort effects.
The data set holds on average 778 researchers per year in an unbalanced panel
110.
Wenowbrie￿ydiscussdescriptivestatisticstointroducethedata. First, Table
4.1 and table 4.2 present the distribution of scientists over the respective faculties
and disciplines within the Biomedical and Exact Science groups of the KU Leu-
ven. Both groups, each comprising three faculties, are comparable in size. Within
the group of Exact Sciences, the faculty of Science (192 professors) and the one of
Engineering (214) are the largest. In the group of Biomedical Sciences, the faculty
of Medicine (460 professors) clearly dominates in terms of size. The vast majority
of all researchers in the panel (94%) is professor and hence combines research and
teaching activities. Most of them have or reach tenure in the observation period
(78%). Considering both scienti￿c discipline and organizational membership al-
lows disentangling scienti￿c discipline-speci￿c in￿uences from organizational and
managerial effects.
As shown in Table 4.3, on average a researcher publishes 3.3 articles per
year
111. But this average has a high standard deviation (5.1). The propensity to
publish varies greatly among disciplines: Table 4.4 shows the quantiles of the pub-
lication distribution by main discipline of the researcher. These quantiles are ob-
tained by comparing the yearly publication output of all researchers who share the
same main discipline
112 and are then averaged across years. The characterization of
110 Given our focus on persistence, we restricted the dataset to researchers whom we observe for
at least 2 periods. For 97 researchers there was only one observation in the dataset; these were
dropped, leaving 1,036 researchers.
111 A publication gets on average 3 citations and has an impact measure of 3.2. A scientist collab-
orates on a paper on average with 4.7 co-authors. She acts as as (co-)promoter of 0.3 PhD’s per
year.
112 Formally, the 100￿th quantile of the publication distribution Y given x is given by QY (￿jx) =
minf￿jP (Y ￿ ￿jx) ￿ ￿g.
147the publication distribution in this table includes the output of the 814 researchers
for whom we observe at least one publication in 1992-2001
113. Although the 222
researchers with a persistently blank publication record are ignored here
114;115, note
that the prevalence of zeroes is still very high, as can be observed by the small (dif-
ferencesin)percentilevaluesatthebottomofthedistribution. Formostdisciplines,
in each year there is at least 10% of zero in￿ation, so that the 10th percentile equals
zero. For engineering, zero in￿ation even amounts to 25%. All this re￿ects the
importance of scienti￿c discipline speci￿c effects when examining research pro-
ductivity. Finally, the Lorenz curves in ￿gure 4.1 con￿rm the skewed distribution
of research quantity (publications) and show that the pattern for research quality
(citations) is very similar
116.
Table 4.5 reports averages for the individual and career-related characteris-
tics of the researchers, comparing the whole sample with the inactive versus the
active reseachers. For the latter group we analyze the characteristics conditional
on publication output, comparing different ￿percentile bands￿. Researchers are as-
signed to a percentile band as follows. Their publication output in a particular year
is compared with the percentile values for their main discipline in that year
117 i.e.
the values for which the yearly averages were reported in Table 4.4. For example,
a researcher may publish enough articles in a given year to beat the 50th percentile
in her discipline but not enough to reach the 75th percentile: for that year, she is
113 Active researchers tend to publish in several of the 10 disciplines. A researcher’s main disci-
pline is de￿ned as the discipline in which she has published the most articles between 1992-2001.
Consequently, inactive researchers i.e. for whom we don’t observe any publications in 1992-2001,
cannot be assigned a main discipline.
114 All researchers, including the ‘persistent zeroes’, are included in the empirical analysis later on.
115 Inspection of the data reveals that we can attribute this apparent ‘inactivity’ (at least partially)
to the involvement of staff as practitioners in their ￿eld of expertise. In other words, some staff
members may have a full-time position at the university but are nevertheless not expected to carry
out research. In particular, there are four departments where more than one third of full-time staff
doesn’t show up in the ISI publication records. It concerns the departments of architecture, public
health (where general physicians are trained), sports & motion sciences and kinesiology.
116 Citations are counted using a three-year forward citation window. The publication and citation
counts were supplied by the Centre for R&D Statistics in Leuven, using ISI-data.
117 Note that this procedure, by comparing researchers with their peers in the same disicpline, con-
trols for discipline-speci￿c publication patterns and therefore avoids that researchers from disci-
plines characterized by lower publication rates are all classi￿ed in the lower percentiles.
148classi￿ed in the 50%-75% percentile band
118, and in this band only
119. Because a
researcher’s output may vary across years, she may be part of a different percentile
band in each year, although researchers tend to be very immobile in their output
levels (see Kelchtermans & Veugelers (2005), based on the same dataset). Note
that persistently inactive researchers are not included in the determination of the
yearly percentile values and therefore also kept separate from active researchers in
the table, i.e. they are not added to the lowest percentile band.
In the whole sample about 89% of researchers are male. In line with pre-
vious studies on scienti￿c productivity, we ￿nd that female researchers are over-
represented among the inactive and underrepresented among the most productive
researchers. The inactive researchers seem older than average (47.7 years) but no
clear age pattern emerges for the active researchers. On average, the youngest age
cohort (professors less than 40 years old) constitutes one quarter of all researchers.
The youngest cohort is underrepresented among the inactive researchers, the old-
est cohort is overrepresented. For the active researchers the distribution over age
cohorts at different points in the distribution seems roughly consistent with the dis-
tribution in the whole sample, again suggesting a minor role for age, if any. 38%
of the researchers entered as a professor after 1992. Recent entry cohorts are over-
represented at the lower end of the distribution, while the situation is reversed at
the upper end. A similar pattern emerges with respect to a rank. We distinguish be-
tween four main ranks, with rank 1 the entry level (￿assistant professor￿) and rank
4 the highest possible rank (￿full professor￿). One quarter of researchers have the
most junior rank, whilst about the same quantity have reached the top of the career
ladder. The junior ranks are more prevalent in the lower half of the distribution.
80% of the scientists have a full-time position at the university either in one single
contract or in a combination of several positions. For the upper half of conditional
productivity distribution the proportion of full-time researchers rises to more than
118 As mentioned, due to zero in￿ation it is possible that both the 10th and 25th percentile equal
zero. In that case, researchers with zero publications are classi￿ed in the 10%-25% percentile band,
leaving the <10% band empty.
119 In other words, researchers are assigned to the highest percentile band they qualify for. So if
a researcher’s publication record in a given year ‘beats’ 52% of other publication records, she is
classi￿ed in the 50%-75% percentile band.
14990%. The average teaching load for a professor amounts to 4.18 year-hours
120 and
increases monotonously with rank. The averages by percentile band do not suggest
the substitution research output by teaching, on the contrary. On average 9% of
the sample is involved in a type I project as a promoter or copromoter, while 11%
(co-)promotes a type II project. Involvement in these research projects is strongly
associated with research output.
4.3 Quantile regression framework
Section 4.3.1 starts by explaining why a simple differencing strategy is not an op-
tion to control for individual effects when the goal is to estimate conditional quan-
tiles. As a solution, we specify a correlated random-effects model (Chamberlain,
1984). Section 4.3.2 discusses the smoothing approach that allows quantile regres-
sion for count data (Machado and Santos Silva, 2005).
4.3.1 Conditional quantiles of productivity with panel data


















are the vectors of observed








. Xit denotes the variables that are expected to correlate with the indi-
vidualeffectasopposedtothoseincludedinZit (thisdistinctionisdiscussedfurther
below). The unobserved individual effect is denoted by ￿i and "it is the error term.
It has been argued before in the literature (e.g. Fox, 1983) that the reason why
some scientists are very proli￿c while others are not, may lie in the possession of
a unique talent for research such as motivation and creativity. These idiosyncratic
but unobserved characteristics are captured by the individual-speci￿c effect ￿i that
120 A year-hour gives the average weekly teaching load in an academic year. One year-hour corre-
sponds to 30 teaching hours.
150is assumed to be stable over the sample period. Different assumptions for the unob-
served individual effect lead to different ￿avors of panel-data models. The random
effects model assumes that ￿i is uncorrelated with Xit, an assumption which is
usually hard to maintain in empirical applications. The ￿xed effects model allows
￿i to be correlated with Xit in an unspeci￿ed way. In a least squares framework,
￿ and ￿ can be consistently estimated by transforming Y , X and Z to deviations
from individual means
121. More speci￿cally, because an expectation is a linear
operator we can write E
￿
Yit ￿ Y ijXi;Zi
￿












￿ with Xi ￿ (Xi1;:::;XiT) and Zi ￿ (Zi1;:::;ZiT).
This differencing approach is not available for quantile regressions since quan-
tiles are not linear operators, the critical requirement for this strategy to work
(Koenker & Hallock, 2001; Koenker, 2004). So in general Q￿
￿
Yit ￿ Y ijXi;Zi
￿
6=




, with Q￿ (Y jX) the ￿-th conditional quantile
function for ￿ 2 (0;1).
Two major options for estimating conditional quantiles accounting for indi-
vidual effects exist in the literature. An approach proposed by Koenker (2004) con-
sists of adding a penalty term to the quantile objective function as a way to impose
structure on the ￿xed effects. While offering the advantage of leaving the relation
between the ￿xed effect and the observables unspeci￿ed, the choice of the ￿tuning
parameter￿ that controls the degree of structure is an open research issue. Recently,
Lamarche (2006) has made progress in developing a selection mechanism for the
value of this tuning parameter that minimizes the estimated asymptotic variance,
provided an additional assumption for the individual effects distribution is made.
In this paper, we adopt a different approach. In line with other research
(e.g. Levin and Stephan, 1991) we expect that the unobserved individual-speci￿c
effect is correlated with some of the determinants of research productivity. There-
fore, we base our quantile regressions on Chamberlain’s correlated random-effects
model (1984), which employs a random effects speci￿cation that allows for such
correlation. With this approach we are able to address potential endogeneity of
time-varying variables with respect to the individual-speci￿c effect. In particular,
121 Under the appropriate assumption i.e. E ("i1jXi;Zi;￿i) = ::: = E("iTjXi;Zi;￿i) = 0 8i
151Xit denotes the time-varying variables for which we expect correlation with ￿i. An
example is teaching load: a researcher who dislikes teaching may actively avoid a
heavy teaching load. The correlated random effects estimator uses a linear speci￿-
cation for the unobservable ￿i consisting of the observables Xit plus an additional
error term ￿i:







where ￿ is a constant and ￿i is uncorrelated with Xit and T ￿ 10
122. We enter
the following time-variant variables into the random effects speci￿cation: rank,
seniority in rank, head of unit, additional project funding, number of coauthors and
teaching load. This means that for each of these variables we are able to separate
the direct effect ￿ on the ￿-th conditional quantile of research output from the
indirect effects ￿ working through the unobservable ￿i.
Note that the correlated random-effects model can not take into account po-
tential correlation between time-invariant variables and the individual effect. We
argue that the time-invariant variables considered in our model, viz. gender, cohort,
research discipline and faculty membership, can be regarded as exogenous with re-
spect to research productivity since they are not real ￿choice￿ variables. They are
not under control of the individual researcher, or at least not to the same extent, as
variables in Xit such as teaching load, number of co-authors, being the head of a
research unit, etc. Also the time-variant variables age, career age and calendar year
are considered exogenous in our model because they are not under control of the
researcher. We use Zit to denote the time-invariant variables as well as the time
varying variables that are considered exogenous with respect to ￿i. Section 4.3.3
gives a line-up of the variables that we include in X versus those included in Z.
Based on this correlated random-effects model, the conditional quantile func-
tions are written as linear functions of the observables. For t = 1 the function for
quantile ￿ is written as:
122 Since we have an unbalanced panel, the number of observation periods varies by individual i
(we observe an individual on average 7.5 years). To simplify notation, we write Ti = T. The
estimates reported in section 4.4 use T = 2. Higher values of T do not alter the results.






















￿. Theconditionalquantilefunctionsfort 6= 1areanalogous
to (4.1).
We impose the following restrictions to our empirical model:
￿ The direct effects of the variables Xi on the conditional quantiles are




￿ 8t. For example, the direct effect
of teaching load on scienti￿c output is assumed to be constant in every
observation period.
￿ The effects of the variables Zi on the conditional quantiles is constant across
time: ￿t
￿ = ￿￿ 8t. For example, the impact of a researcher’s discipline is
assumed to be the same in every observation period.
We can rewrite (4.1) as:












Again, the conditional quantile functions for t 6= 1 are analogous. A simple
estimation strategy for (4.2) is by a pooled quantile regression on the stacked data,
written as (for the ￿-th quantile): 2
6 6
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The computation of the standard errors should account for the dependence
between the repeated observations of a single researcher. This means that the stan-
dard formula for to calculate the asymptotic variance of the quantile estimators
(Koenker & Bassett, 1978) cannot be applied. Following Abrevaya & Dahl (2005),
we adopt a clustered bootstrapping procedure where the bootstrap sample contains
153all observations of a researcher if that researcher is drawn to be included in the
bootstrap sample.
4.3.2 Quantile regression for count data
The main problem when estimating conditional quantiles for a count variable Y is
that, becauseithasadiscretedistribution, Q￿ (Y jX;Z)isnotacontinuousfunction
of the parameters. To be able to apply quantile regression to count data, arti￿cial
smoothness must be imposed. Machado and Santos Silva (2005) suggest a ￿jit-
tering approach￿ where the needed smoothness is achieved by adding to the count
variable Y a random variable U, leading to a new variable V = Y + U. U is inde-
pendent of Y , X and Z and uniformly distributed in the interval [0;1). The authors
show that it is possible to perform inferences about Q￿ (V jX;Z), the conditional
quantile function of the smoothed data. Further, they relate the quantiles of the
random variables V and Y , which is crucial since the ultimate interest lies in the
quantile function of the original count data:




P (Y = yjX;Z)
P (Y = Q￿ (Y jX;Z)jX;Z)
(4.3)
Thus, a continuous distribution is achieved by interpolating the discrete jumps in
the conditional quantile function of the counts. Q￿ (V jX;Z) can be estimated
using standard quantile regression techniques
123.
Alternatively, by rewriting (4.2), the conditional quantile function of V for
t = 1 can be written as
124:












123 In particular, several jittered samples are generated and used for estimation, after wich the esti-
mates are averaged to yield the ￿nal parameters
124 Machado & Santos Silva (2005) impose an additional restriction on the quantile process of the
smoothed variable V by ￿rst applying a monotone transformation to V . The transformed V is then
speci￿ed to be a linear function of the regressors, rather than specifying V itself as a linear quantile
function as in (4.4). We abstract from this transformation in our exposition for simplicity.
154with the conditional quantile functions for t 6= 1 analogous.
Finally, we point out that this approach is particularly useful to analyze the
lower end of the research output distribution. Let xk
it denote the k-th element from
Xit and ￿
k
￿ the k-th element from ￿￿. Expression (4.3) shows
125 that if e ￿
k
￿ 6= 0,
then the probability distribution at or below Q￿ (Y jX;Z) depends on xk
it. Note
that it is possible that for a given quantile, say ￿0, e ￿
k
￿0 6= 0 and yet a change in
xk
it does not impact the ￿0-th quantile of the count variable Y . An example of
this occurs when the data is characterized by zero in￿ation, which is the case for
the publication and citation output we study here. Speci￿cally, in a dataset with
100 ￿ ￿ percent of zero in￿ation, all of the quantiles of Y up to ￿ = ￿ will be
identically zero, even if the corresponding quantiles of V depend on xk
it. Therefore,
it is easier to pick up dependence of the distribution of Y on X and Z by looking
at Q￿ (V jX;Z) than by looking at Q￿ (Y jX;Z). Machado & Santos Silva (2005)
refer to this as the ￿magnifying glass effect￿ of Q￿ (V jX;Z). Given the skewness
of the productivity distribution for both publications and citations, this represents a
considerable advantage as it allows studying the lower part of the distribution.
4.3.3 Variables
Our empirical analysis investigates the impact of a series of variables on different
quantiles of productivity. First, we indicate for each of these variables the expected
impact on average output based on the ￿ndings of previous research. We hypothe-
size a single effect that is expected to hold for both quantity and quality of research
output, based on the correlation between these two output measures
126. The vari-
ables are grouped depending on whether they are part of the random effect speci￿-
cation (see section 4.3.1). Subsequently, we formulate a hypothesis with respect to
the differential impact of these variables along the productivity distribution.
The following characteristics are taken up as part of the X-variable, i.e. they
are part of the random effect speci￿cation:
125 The same argument holds for z
g
i1 as the g-th element from Zi1 and ￿g
￿ the g-th element from ￿￿
126 The correlation coef￿cient for publications and citations in our dataset is 0:77.
155Rank. Researchers up for promotion are expected to have a higher motiva-
tion to provide research effort. Thus, in lower ranks, researchers should have more
incentives to put in effort to get promotion. On the other hand, the higher ranks
also have a strong incentive to put in effort in order to ￿prove their rank￿. In ad-
dition, having a more advanced rank may in￿uence the way research is done. E.g.
a full professor may have access to research assistants, may have a more exten-
sive research network as well as an established reputation that allows for a more
steady stream of output compared to more junior professors. Note that since past
research output is taken into account when hiring and promoting, it is likely that
current performance will increase the probability of getting a higher rank. To take
this endogeneity (at least partly) into account, we lag the rank indicators by one
period
127.
Seniority in rank. The variable seniority in rank should capture increasing
pressure to provide effort, the longer a researcher is in his current rank (since the
more likely she is to be up for promotion). We might expect a non-linearity: once
a researcher is far beyond the expected seniority (typically two years), this might
re￿ect a structurally reduced probability to get promotion. Also, the more senior,
the higher is the wage and thus the smaller is the marginal bene￿t from increasing
wage with rank. Especially in the end rank (full professor) seniority in rank looses
its speci￿c function and will correlate with age.
Head of a research unit. Heading a research lab may boost someone’s out-
put by having access to resources for research as well as being involved in more
projects with the possibility of claiming coauthorship. Conversely, a proli￿c re-
searcher may ￿nd that such duties hamper her from spending time on doing the
127 For researchers who became a professor before 1992 (the ￿rst period of observation of our data,
which covers 1992-2001) we observe the rank they had in 1991 so the one-period lagged rank
variable can be assigned. For researchers entering in or after 1992 we do not have information on
their rank in the year prior to entry. For these researchers we set the lagged rank variable in the
￿rst period of observation equal to "other rank", i.e. not one of the four main ranks. We consider
this a fair assumption since these would typically be junior faculty who were active as post-docs
before becoming a professor. Note that a missing value would completely remove those individuals
from the dataset: due to the set-up of the CRE model, where all lagged rank variables enter the
individual’s yearly output function, a missing value for one of them would show up in every year,
effectively removing the individual from the panel. An analogous comment applies to the de￿nition
of the lagged variables for funding and for head of unit status.
156actual research. Given that high performers are more likely to become heads of
unit, there is an issue of endogeneity, so we lag this variable by one period.
Project funding. Someone’s publication record is expected to bene￿t from
havingaccesstoadditionalresearchfundssincetheyrepresentadditionalresources.
Especially the Type I funding involve serious amounts of research funding. Since
research performance is typically taken up as a criterion to judge research propos-
als, we lag this variable by one period.
Number of coauthors. We include a researcher’s number of coauthors in
every year in the model as a way to capture a researcher’s collaborative style. Sci-
entists that cooperate intensely with colleagues are expected to be more proli￿c
than their peers who work in more solitary manner.
Teaching load. The inclusion of actual teaching load should be able to correct
for the lost time for research when having to teach students. Therefore, we expect
a negative impact of teaching load on research output. Due to self-selection of pro-
fessors with an unobserved preference for teaching vis-￿-vis research, controlling
for such unobserved individual heterogeneity may reduce the effect.
The following characteristics are taken up as part of the Z-variable:
Gender. Previous research has repeatedly identi￿ed a productivity gap in the
favor of male researchers.
Age and career age. A higher (biological) age may be bene￿cial for perfor-
mance, given that it takes time and experience to build an advantage, although we
expect a decreasing effect with time. We also include seniority as professor (fre-
quently referred to as career age). This variable might be important beyond the
seniority in rank in terms of the incentive to provide effort, since wages received
by professors in Belgium are not only determined by rank, but also, and strongly,
by seniority as professor.
Entry cohort. To disentangle age from cohort effects, we also include dum-
mies for entry into the sample. The most important cohort effect seems to be a
157marked increase in hiring by the KU Leuven in 1992
128, for which we include a
dummy variable.
Time. Apart from entry cohort effects, we include calendar year dummies in
our model to control for trends such as increased publication pressure.
Discipline. All existing studies indicate the importance of controlling for
scienti￿c discipline idiosyncrasies.
Faculty membership. This allows capturing the in￿uence of organizational
structure and strategy to promote and provide incentives for research, to the extent
that these units are responsible for developing a good research environment. It also
allows correcting for the impact of spillovers from the quality or prestige of the
group to which the researcher belongs.
Full-time versus part-time. Whether a professor holds a full-time position
at the university has obvious implications for available research time and more
generally captures whether a professor is expected to do any research at all. Part
time appointments, mostly occurring at the engineering faculty in our sample, are
typically for people from industry who are hired and evaluated on teaching rather
than research.
With respect to the impact of these variables at different points in the distri-
bution we expect for all of the observed characteristics mentioned above that they
have a smaller impact at the top of the distribution than at the bottom. We hypothe-
size that the individual effect primarily captures the researcher’s talent and that this
is the predominant ￿key success factor￿ in the upper tail of the productivity dis-
tribution where it dwarfs the effect of variables like age, gender, funding, teaching
load, etc. Conversely, these observed characteristics are expected to manifest them-
selves more clearly at the bottom end of the distribution where the endowments in
terms of research talent may be expected to be more modest. Alternatively, it may
be the case that variables like research funding may no longer act as high-powered
incentives at the top of the distribution. For example, for an established star scien-
tist yet another research grant is unlikely to represent a major impulse to increase
128 This peak in hiring corresponds mainly to a growing number of retiring faculty that needed to
be replaced.
158her output even further. In other words, also the loss of incentives power at the top




The cross-sectional results are reported in table 4.6. Estimates for ￿ve quan-
tiles
129 are shown together with, in the ￿nal column, the results of a zero-in￿ated
negative binomial model explaining average publication output
130, as a benchmark
for the quantile estimates. We formally test the difference of parameters across
quantiles in section 2. The panel-data results are reported in table 4.7
131. Again, es-
timates for ￿ve quantiles are shown
132 together with the results of a random effects
negative binomial model
133 explaining average publication output. The speci￿ca-
tion for the panel-data model follows expression (4.2). The speci￿cation for the







129 Our choice of quantiles follows the one commonly made in the ￿eld of quantile regression.
Other quantiles naturally would lead to different parameter estimates. However, we do not expect
this to alter our conclusions.
130 Note that the coef￿cients in this model cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. The reported
parameters allow to judge the signi￿cance and the direction of the effect on the average number
of publications per researcher and per year. The magnitude of the parameters in the zero-in￿ated
negative binomial model should not be directly compared to the quantile regression parameters
since the latter show the marginal effect on the respective conditional quantiles.
131 The unobserved heterogeneity parameters ￿
t are not reported. The estimates are available from
the authors on request. The role of these parameters is discussed further in section 4.4.2 where we
test their joint signi￿cance.
132 The parameters reported here are based on 380 bootstraps and 10 jittered samples for each quan-
tile, accounting for 380x5x10=19,000 regressions. A robustness check using 50 jittered samples for
each quantile (instead of 10) shows that the point estimates are very robust.
133 In the random effects negative binomial model the dispersion varies randomly across researchers
such that the inverse of one plus the dispersion follows a Beta(r,s) distribution. Both r and s are
signi￿cantly different from zero. A likelihood ratio test that compares the negative binomial panel
estimator with the pooled estimator (i.e. the negative binomial estimator with a constant dispersion
across researchers), strongly favors the panel data estimator.
159of the parameters focuses on the comparison between the cross-sectional and the
panel-data results for the quantile regressions.
Age. Support for an age effect is very limited. We ￿nd a small positive effect
in the 90% quantile in both the cross-sectional and panel estimates. The positive
age effect at the 10% quantile for the cross-sectional model is not con￿rmed in the
panel-data results.
Career age. The models offer little or no evidence for any in￿uence of career
age: the marginally signi￿cant and negative effect in the lower quantiles of the
cross-sectional model is not robust in the panel-data results.
Seniority in rank. The panel estimates show a signi￿cant negative in￿uence
on publication output with a decreasing effect higher up in the distribution, which
disappears at the very top in the 90% quantile. Seniority in rank has no effect in
the cross-sectional speci￿cation.
Rank. The three junior ranks are less productive than the most senior rank
(full professor, the base category) with the productivity differential decreasing with
rank. The difference between ranks is less outspoken in the panel-data model than
in the cross-sectional model, especially between rank 3 (professor) and the most
senior rank (full professor, the base category). Further, in both models the pro-
ductivity differential between ranks becomes smaller the higher up we look in the
distribution.
Head of a research unit. Heading a research unit has a positive impact on
publication output but in the cross-sectional model the effect disappears for the up-
per half of the distribution. In the panel model, the effect remains present through-
out the whole distribution, although it is clearly smaller in the 75% and 90% quan-
tiles.
Project funding. Having access to project funding is positively related to
research output, as expected. However, for the big type I funding it is mainly the
lower quantiles that bene￿t. Similarly, the more modest type II research grants
boost the output in the lower quantiles but this type of funding also makes the very
proli￿c researchers even more productive. The effects of funding are comparable
in both models.
160Number of coauthors. The number of coauthors shows up as an signi￿cant
control variable in both models, with a positive effect on output, although the mag-
nitude is small.
Teaching load. The cross-sectional estimates show a small but signi￿cant
negative impact on output, mainly for the lower quantiles. The panel data model
shows a different picture: here we ￿nd a negative, albeit small, impact only at
the top of the distribution (75% and 90% quantile). We attribute this difference to
unobserved heterogeneity, with professors having an af￿nity for teaching likely to
engage more in such activities.
Gender. There is evidence of a gender effect with male researchers more
productive than their female colleagues. It is interesting to see the irregularity of
the gender effect along the distribution: while absent for the 10% quantile, it is
strongest for the moderately active researchers (25% quantile) and then decreases
gradually for the higher quantiles, but remains signi￿cant up to the very top of
the distribution (90% quantile). The gender effect in the panel-data model is very
robust compared to the one in the cross-sectional model, as expected, since we did
not endogenize this variable.
Full-time versus part-time. The control for being full-time at the university
is very signi￿cant, as expected. For both models, the highest value appears in the
10% quantile, which con￿rms the intuition that being full-time primarily explains
whether a researcher is engaged in research at all.
Entry cohort. Being part of the cohort that entered professorship in or after
1992 has a negative impact on publication output but only for moderately pro-
ductive researchers (25% and 50% quantile in the panel-data results). The cross-
sectional model offers no support for an entry cohort effect.
Time (not reported in the table). The dummies for calendar year, which may
capture general trends like increased publication pressure, show a small and posi-
tive effect for the later years in the cross-sectional model. In the panel model they
show a pattern, suggesting an increasing publication trend with the higher quantiles
responding quicker than the lower quantiles: the 90% quantile shows a clealry sig-
ni￿cant positive coef￿cient from 1995 onwards (parameter value of 0.12 in 1995)
161with some of the lower quantiles joining in 1997. The magnitude of the effect tends
to be greater for the lower quantiles than for the 90% quantile: we ￿nd, for exam-
ple, parameter values of 0.99 and 0.66 for the 10% and 25% quantile respectively,
versus 0.21 for the 90% quantile in 1999, all relative to 1992 as the base year
134.
Discipline and faculty membership (not reported in the table). Controlling
for discipline and organizational unit is important, with similar estimates in both
models
135.
To allow for an easy comparison of the cross-section and panel-data results,
we show the quantile estimates for a selection of parameters from Tables 4.6 and
4.7 in Figure 4.2. The solid line indicates the point estimates for the ￿ve quantiles
of the panel-data model with the dashed lines marking the 95% con￿dence interval.
The dotted line are the cross-sectional estimates.
Quality
Since research quantity tends to correlate with research quality, we do not
expect strong differences with the results in the previous section. Rather, we look
for differences in the importance of productivity drivers along the quality distrib-
ution, as compared to the quantity distribution
136. The cross-sectional results are
reported in table 4.8. Again, the estimates for the ￿ve quantiles are shown together
with, in the ￿nal column, the results of a zero-in￿ated negative binomial model.
Table 4.9 shows the panel-data results
137. Estimates for ￿ve quantiles are shown to-
gether with the results of a random effects negative binomial model
138 explaining
134 All these estimates are signi￿cant at the 5% level.
135 The effect of discipline across quantiles depends on the discipline considered. For example,
the productivity difference with the faculty of kinesiology & physical education (the base category)
increases with quantile for the faculty of agriculture, while it decreases with quantile for the faculty
of pharmacy.
136 When comparing quantity and quality results, we focus on signs and signi￿cance since it is
questionable to compare the effect of a regressor on the number of publications with the effect on
the number of citations, i.e. putting aside a purely mathematical interpretation, it is hard to argue
that a variable that raises a given conditional quantile by 1.0 for publication output versus 0.5 for
citation output has a ‘stronger impact on quantity than on quality’.
137 The unobserved heterogeneity parameters ￿
t are not reported. The estimates are available from
the authors on request.
138 In the random effects negative binomial model the dispersion varies randomly across researchers
162average citation output. The cross-sectional and panel-data quantile estimates are
compared in Figure 4.3.
Focusing on the panel-data results, the common ￿ndings for both productiv-
ity measures include:
￿ The absence of both a (biological) age effect and a life cycle effect (career
age).
￿ The negative effect of rank seniority decreases from lower to higher
quantiles. At the top of the distribution effect on publications or citations is
no longer signi￿cant.
￿ The productivity difference between the three junior ranks and the full
professor rank (in the favor of the latter) decreases from lower to higher rank
and from lower to higher quantiles. For both the quantity and the quality
model, the panel estimates are smaller than the cross-sectional estimates.
￿ The positive and decreasing effect of heading a research lab. At the top of
the distribution the impact on publications or citations is no longer or only
marginally signi￿cant.
￿ The positive effect of type I ￿excellence￿ funding decreases from lower to
higher quantiles.
￿ The positive effect of the number of coauthors increases from lower to
higher quantiles.
￿ The positive effect on productivity of gender, in favor of male researchers,
is found for both the quantity and the quality model, where in both cases it
remains absent for the extreme left side of the distribution (10% quantile).
such that the inverse of one plus the dispersion follows a Beta(r,s) distribution. The s parameter
is estimated signi￿cantly different from zero. A likelihood ratio test that compares the negative
binomial panel estimator with the pooled estimator (i.e. the negative binomial estimator with a
constant dispersion across researchers), strongly favors the panel data estimator.
163￿ The positive effect of being employed full-time at the university decreases
from lower to higher quantiles.
￿ The positive time trend.
￿ Similar patterns for the dummies for discipline and organizational unit
membership across quantiles.
Based on the panel estimates, noteworthy differences between the quantity
and quality regressions are:
￿ The positive effect of type II funding remains roughly constant from
lower to higher quantiles of research quality while it was decreasing with
quantile for research quantity. This indicates that small chunks of additional
funding represent an upward shift in quality for researchers throughout the
distribution, irrespective of their research talent. The reason this constant
upward shift does not hold for type I funding may be due to the nature of
this funding: while type II funds are more modest research grants most
likely used by the researcher herself (to attend conferences, buy software,
etc.), the large type I funds are awarded to large group of researchers and the
impact on the personal output of the project’s (co-)promoter
139 may be less
pronounced.
￿ For the quality distribution, we ￿nd a negative effect of teaching load located
at the lower end (10% and 25% quantile) and the top end (90% quantile),
with the lower end ￿suffering￿ more from teaching duties. For the quantity
distribution there is a very small negative effect at the top end only. This
may indicate that teaching duties do not prohibit research as such, but rather
that unproductive (or less able) researchers may have dif￿culties keeping up
the quality of their research when facing time constraints.
139 Recall that the funding dummies measure promotorship of a research project, not the mere
involvement as a researcher in a project that was ￿nanced with those funds.
164￿ The effect of entry cohort is differs: for both quantity and quality, we ￿nd
a negative effect of being part of the most recent entry cohort, but only
for the 25%-50% quantile (quantity) and the 25% quantile (quality). For
research quality, there is an additional point in the distribution that shows a
positive effect of the most recent entry cohort, namely at the very top of the
distribution. This may again point to the role of ability: while the very able
and recently entered researchers are able to deliver a quality surplus relative
to older cohorts, they do not publish more than their more experienced
colleagues. Conversely, those recent entrants with more modest research
talent endowments (in the midst or lower half of the distribution) apparently
face a disadvantage relative to their more experienced colleagues, which is
translated into fewer publications, usually of lesser quality. In this part of the
distribution, the smaller stock of research knowledge (or perhaps the lesser
experience with the research process) for the younger cohort may not be
compensated for by research talent.
4.4.2 Hypothesis testing
Herewediscusstheresultsofvarioushypothesistestsforwhichweusetheminimum-
distance framework of Buchinsky (1998). We test the correlated random effects
speci￿cation as well as the difference between parameters across quantiles.
Minimum-distance testing framework
Let r denote the number of quantiles we estimate: ￿1;:::;￿r. For a given
quantile ￿, the parameter vectors ￿￿; ￿
t










￿0, and ￿￿ = (￿￿1;:::;￿￿G)
0, with K the number
of variables in Xit, G the number of variables in Zit and L = T ￿ K. The full




















has dimension r(K + L + G + 1) ￿ 1. Let b ￿ denote the estimator of ￿ and b A the
165estimated variance-covariance matrix ofb ￿, obtained via bootstrapping. This matrix
allow us to test hypotheses involving parameters from different quantiles.
In the minimum-distance framework, the estimator of the restricted model is











b ￿ ￿ R￿
R
￿
where R is the restriction matrix, the precise form of which depends on the hy-
pothesis under consideration. The detailed speci￿cation of the restriction matrix
R for the tests in the following sections is given in Appendix 1. Since we only
consider linear restrictions, b ￿
R
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with R; b A￿1 and b ￿ known. The asymptotic variance of b ￿
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The null hypothesis is formulated as H0 : ￿ = R￿
R. Under H0, the following
test statistic has a limiting chi-squared distribution:
￿













with M the number of restrictions i.e. M = rows(R) ￿ columns(R).
Test results
Test of correlated random effects
Here we test whether our approach of modeling the individual effect in terms
of observables is valid. The null hypothesis states that the ￿ parameters are jointly
equal to zero, H0 : ￿
1
￿ = ::: = ￿
T
￿ = 0, simultaneously for all ￿ with ￿ 2
f0:10;0:25;0:50;0:75;0:90g. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected with a p-
value very close to zero.
Test of equality of individual parameters across quantiles
Here we test whether a certain variable has a differential effect across quan-
tiles, informing us whether looking at quantiles really gives us additional informa-
tion compared to regressions on the mean. For example, we test whether the gender











￿=0:90. The test results for the cross-sectional and
the panel-data speci￿cation are reported in Table 4.10, for both quantity and quality
of output. We report the ￿2-values and indicate the signi￿cance. These tests yield
strong evidence that for most parameters the estimates vary over the ￿ve quantiles.
The only exceptions are rank seniority (cross-sectional publications model) and
teaching load (panel-data publications model). Naturally, pairwise comparisons of
quantiles would show fewer signi￿cant differences than comparing the estimates
of a given parameter across all quantiles
140, but overall we consider this as strong
support for a quantile regression approach, compared to an analysis of mean pro-
ductivity only.
4.5 Conclusions and further research
This paper has estimated the impact of various productivity drivers along the pro-
ductivity distribution, both in terms of quantity and quality. To account for un-
observed heterogeneity in the estimation of the conditional quantiles, we used a
correlated random effects model, exploiting the panel nature of our dataset. We
subjected the integer counts of publications and citations to a randomization ap-
proach to allow for quantile estimation.
We found strong support for our quantile regression approach vis-￿-vis re-
gressions on the conditional mean only, as indicated by the differential impact of
most variables along the distribution. Further, we ￿nd support for the hypothe-
sis that the top of the distribution is mainly driven by talent (or a loss of incentive
power of the observed variables), as opposed to the lower end where the impact of
other characteristics is more visible. The evidence is provided by the stronger im-
pact of several observed variables on the lower quantiles versus a weaker (or even
insigni￿cant) effect on the higher quantiles. In both the quantity and the quality
models, the effect of rank, seniority in rank, head of unit, big research grants
141
140 As noted above, we ackowledge that the choice of quantiles is somewhat arbitrary, and a differ-
ent selection of quantiles may yield different results, but we do not expect this to have a substantial
impact on our results.
141 For the quantity model, also the impact of the smaller type II funding decreases with quantile.
167and full-time position followed a monotonously decreasing pattern across the ￿ve
estimated quantiles. A notable exception is the gender effect that, although also
satisfying the decreasing impact towards the top end of the distribution, does not
play any role at the extreme lower end. The role of entry cohort across quantiles is
hard to pin down as a simple pattern.
As far as the comparison between the analyses for research quantity and re-
search quality is concerned, we found several observed factors to have a very sim-
ilar effect, viz. age & career age (no effect), rank & rank seniority, type I funding,
head of unit, and the control variables (co-authors, fulltime position, discipline,
time, faculty membership). Given the correlation between quantity and quality of
research, this strengthens our con￿dence in the ￿ndings. The effects of small re-
search funds, teaching load and entry cohort show a different pattern across the
quantity versus quality distribution.
Although we caution against generalizations based on this study of a single
university, we believe our ￿ndings are informative with respect to the management
of scientists in research organizations. In particular, the results may instill the right
expectations in administrators who implement incentive programs or make funding
decisions. For example, our estimates indicate that a reduced teaching load for not
very productive researchers in an attempt to ￿pull them on board￿ may not lead to
the expected increase in publications.
With respect to funding, the results indicate that this tends to reduce output
inequality between researchers: the positive effect of funding is generally larger
for the lower quantiles than is observed at the top of the distribution. One must
be careful not to interpret this as meaning that the less productive researchers are
more apt in converting additional funding into publications or citations than more
proli￿c researchers
142: the estimates are conditional on the actual distribution of
research funds. As Table 4.5 shows, this distribution is inegalitarian with the top
For the quality model, type II funding follows a reverse U-shape although this precise pattern may
depend on the choice of quantiles that are estimated.
142 In addition, a full evaluation of funding decisions on productivity should take into account their
impact on all researchers part of the receiving research group, and not only on the (co-)promoters
of the projects, as in the regressions presented here.
168scientists getting most of the funding, so there likely is an issue of diminishing
returns. Nevertheless, the results show that research money ￿owing to the lower
half of the distribution may be well spent, cautioning against an extreme selectivity
in awarding research funds.
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Figure 4.1: Lorenz curves for yearly research output
169Table 4.1: Distribution of researchers over organizational units
Organizational Unit Freq. Percent
Group Exact Sciences 483 46.9
Faculty of Science 192 18.6
Faculty of Engineering 214 20.8
Faculty of Applied Bioscience and Engineering 77 7.5
Group Biomedical Sciences 547 53.1
Faculty of Medicine 460 44.7
Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences 36 3.5
Faculty of Physical Education & Kinesiology 51 5.0
Total 1030￿ 100.0
￿ Six people switched between groups and/or faculties in the period 1992-2001
and are not shown in this table.
Table 4.2: Distribution of researchers over disciplines
Main Discipline Freq. Percent
None (inactive researchers) 222 21.5
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II (Non-internal Medicine Specialties) 190 18.4
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I (General & Internal Medicine) 157 15.2




Agriculture & environment 36 3.5
Biology (Organismic & Supraorganismic level) 31 3.0
Biomedical research 26 2.5
Mathematics 26 2.5
Geosciences & space sciences 19 1.8
Neuroscience & behavior 13 1.3
Total 1034￿ 100.0
￿ Two researchers had a tie in terms of their number of publications for two or more disciplines and are not shown.
Table 4.3: Research output (yearly averages)
Variable Mean
Publications per author 3.3
(5.1)
Coauthors per publication 4.7
(3.7)
Citations per publication 3.0
(4.2)




Number of researchers 1036
Standard deviations in brackets
170Table 4.4: Percentiles for publication output, by discipline (yearly averages)
Percentiles
Main discipline 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Agriculture and Environment 0.0 0.1 1.9 5.2 8.8
Biosciences 0.6 1.6 4.3 8.4 14.3
Chemistry 0.0 0.8 3.7 8.0 13.3
Engineering 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.0 5.6
Geosciences and Space Sciences 0.0 0.1 1.0 4.0 6.8
Mathematics 0.0 0.1 1.2 2.9 4.8
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I 0.0 1.4 4.0 7.1 12.1
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II 0.0 0.2 2.0 4.8 8.4
Neuroscience and Behavior 0.1 0.3 1.5 4.5 7.7
Physics 0.0 1.0 3.5 7.6 13.3
Biomedical Research 0.1 0.3 2.2 6.8 12.2
Biology 0.2 0.5 2.4 6.0 10.4
Average 0.1 0.5 2.4 5.7 9.8
Since a researcher’s main discipline can only be determined if she has any output, this table only

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































172Table 4.6: Cross-sectional estimation results, publication data
Quantile regressions Zero-in￿ated
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial
age 0.14** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.01
(2.81) (0.11) (0.31) (0.79) (1.68) (0.17)
age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00
(-3.30) (-0.47) (-0.86) (-1.57) (-2.51) (-0.47)
career age -0.03* -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.69) (-1.65) (0.13) (0.37) (0.65) (0.11)
seniority in rank 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.64) (0.11) (-0.08) (0.31) (1.17) (-0.31)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -1.18** -0.94** -0.75** -0.53** -0.38** -0.61**
(-10.12) (-14.03) (-5.42) (-5.31) (-7.30) (-5.97)
rank 2 in t-1 -0.73** -0.68** -0.59** -0.36** -0.23** -0.38**
(-2.94) (-7.28) (-5.94) (-12.98) (-11.06) (-5.08)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.33* -0.35** -0.37** -0.24** -0.12** -0.22**
(-1.84) (-2.77) (-3.66) (-6.77) (-9.65) (-3.30)
other rank in t-1 -0.78** -0.87** -0.69** -0.44** -0.26** -0.42**
(-7.19) (-7.02) (-11.68) (-6.19) (-6.99) (-5.15)
head of unit in t-1 0.51** 0.35** 0.17** 0.07 0.04 0.10**
(3.23) (3.50) (2.10) (1.35) (0.50) (2.02)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.14** 0.63** 0.26** 0.14** 0.03 0.17**
(10.69) (8.73) (4.02) (10.87) (0.73) (2.73)
type II funding in t-1 0.77** 0.56** 0.27** 0.22** 0.17** 0.12*
(9.08) (26.45) (22.09) (7.94) (15.16) (1.82)
nr of co-authors 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02**
(3.17) (3.97) (9.51) (17.55) (23.12) (8.03)
teaching load -0.07** -0.03** -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** -0.03**
(-7.17) (-4.46) (-4.95) (-3.90) (-2.01) (-2.49)
male 0.91 0.57** 0.37** 0.24** 0.17** 0.21
(1.31) (3.17) (5.30) (14.75) (3.71) (1.56)
fulltime 1.28** 0.74** 0.88** 0.70** 0.57** 0.43**
(4.77) (7.70) (10.55) (8.31) (17.68) (3.20)
entry ￿ 1992 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14* -0.09 -0.02 -0.06
(-0.59) (-1.45) (-1.72) (-1.54) (-0.17) (-0.64)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
Observations 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10 jittered samples, the standard errors
are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples (clustering by by individual).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05
173Table 4.7: Panel-data estimation results, publication data
Quantile regressions Random effects
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial
age 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03** 0.08**
(1.64) (0.24) (0.37) (0.96) (2.62) (3.96)
age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00**
(-2.16) (-0.62) (-0.76) (-1.57) (-4.06) (-6.07)
career age -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04**
(-0.68) (-1.61) (-0.39) (0.02) (0.88) (5.24)
seniority in rank -0.08** -0.05** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01**
(-3.26) (-3.76) (-3.36) (-2.71) (-0.90) (-2.52)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -0.78** -0.84** -0.61** -0.39** -0.21** -0.25**
(-6.22) (-5.46) (-4.23) (-3.12) (-3.43) (-4.35)
rank 2 in t-1 -0.28 -0.40** -0.45** -0.21** -0.09** -0.13**
(-1.23) (-3.64) (-12.25) (-3.44) (-5.80) (-2.81)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.02 -0.11 -0.20** -0.10 -0.01 -0.11**
(-0.17) (-1.49) (-5.45) (-1.32) (-1.27) (-2.66)
other rank in t-1 -0.59** -0.77** -0.57** -0.28** -0.13** -0.25**
(-5.13) (-10.91) (-6.16) (-2.17) (-3.42) (-4.55)
head of unit in t-1 0.48** 0.37** 0.21* 0.07* 0.08* 0.07**
(4.12) (4.12) (1.96) (1.93) (1.77) (2.15)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 0.76** 0.54** 0.20* 0.12** 0.03 0.09**
(6.20) (7.83) (1.80) (3.42) (0.61) (2.63)
type II funding in t-1 0.55** 0.39** 0.24** 0.18** 0.17** 0.09**
(11.77) (14.60) (8.58) (5.25) (7.53) (3.29)
nr of co-authors 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.00**
(2.13) (7.80) (13.66) (44.16) (20.06) (28.70)
teaching load -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01
(-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.01) (-2.43) (-4.33) (-1.64)
male 0.66 0.58** 0.34** 0.25** 0.18** 0.36**
(0.78) (3.50) (2.34) (15.21) (2.93) (3.41)
fulltime 1.27** 0.67** 0.81** 0.68** 0.61** 0.39**
(4.04) (11.80) (13.07) (6.75) (17.42) (5.69)
entry ￿ 1992 -0.30 -0.40** -0.21** -0.06 0.10 -0.17*
(-1.12) (-3.82) (-2.03) (-0.74) (0.76) (-1.76)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
N 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10 jittered samples, the standard errors
are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples (clustering by by individual).





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































175Table 4.8: Cross-sectional estimation results, citation data
Quantile regressions Zero-in￿ated
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial
age 0.16* -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06*
(1.87) (-0.59) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-0.67) (-1.79)
age squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-2.20) (0.07) (-0.44) (-0.23) (-1.17) (0.97)
career age -0.03** -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(-2.12) (-0.95) (-0.31) (0.47) (1.17) (-0.29)
seniority in rank -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00
(-0.44) (-0.35) (0.47) (-0.21) (1.11) (0.23)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -1.61** -1.49** -1.07** -0.53** -0.35** -0.30**
(-7.59) (-6.09) (-6.55) (-3.10) (-21.77) (-2.67)
rank 2 in t-1 -1.19** -1.08** -0.89** -0.46** -0.26** -0.21**
(-5.54) (-6.67) (-7.08) (-8.32) (-2.37) (-2.31)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.61** -0.44** -0.50** -0.34** -0.17** -0.11
(-2.45) (-2.48) (-3.23) (-7.11) (-9.93) (-1.31)
other rank in t-1 -1.49** -1.46** -0.99** -0.58** -0.33** -0.27**
(-8.92) (-5.80) (-23.87) (-5.66) (-7.44) (-2.70)
head of unit in t-1 0.60** 0.53** 0.27** 0.13* 0.07 0.06
(5.01) (3.18) (3.54) (1.95) (0.79) (0.86)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.80** 1.13** 0.73** 0.51** 0.30** 0.40**
(17.99) (11.50) (5.81) (6.22) (3.13) (5.90)
type II funding in t-1 1.17** 0.94** 0.58** 0.55** 0.45** 0.20**
(6.74) (6.55) (12.35) (11.15) (10.07) (3.42)
nr of co-authors 0.01** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.02**
(3.09) (3.63) (9.26) (12.56) (12.89) (7.74)
teaching load -0.09** -0.06** -0.04** -0.03** -0.02** -0.02
(-6.03) (-3.90) (-6.35) (-14.61) (-2.01) (-1.09)
male 1.21 1.05** 0.81** 0.35** 0.12** 0.14
(1.35) (4.75) (4.32) (6.04) (2.91) (1.20)
fulltime 1.20** 1.10** 1.17** 0.90** 0.53** 0.02
(5.03) (13.14) (5.48) (8.94) (9.53) (0.14)
entry ￿ 1992 0.07 -0.11 -0.15 -0.25** -0.09** -0.13
(0.26) (-0.87) (-1.35) (-2.36) (-2.00) (-1.48)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
Observations 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10 jittered samples, the standard errors
are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples (clustering by by individual).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05
176Table 4.9: Panel-data estimation results, citation data
Quantile regressions Random effects
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial
age 0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03
(1.57) (-0.95) (0.05) (-0.23) (-0.18) (1.16)
age squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00**
(-2.05) (0.38) (-0.62) (-0.30) (-0.63) (-2.72)
career age -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
(-0.24) (-0.96) (-1.03) (0.03) (0.30) (1.45)
seniority in rank -0.11** -0.09** -0.06** -0.04** -0.01 -0.00
(-2.62) (-3.74) (-2.46) (-20.79) (-1.03) (-0.10)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -1.28** -1.11** -0.76** -0.37** -0.31** -0.56**
(-4.57) (-3.02) (-4.45) (-2.15) (-3.99) (-7.00)
rank 2 in t-1 -0.62** -0.62** -0.53** -0.29** -0.20** -0.36**
(-3.15) (-2.26) (-16.90) (-2.88) (-2.22) (-5.56)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.43** -0.06 -0.26* -0.23** -0.15** -0.22**
(-2.45) (-0.47) (-1.92) (-2.68) (-11.10) (-3.89)
other rank in t-1 -1.34** -1.23** -0.77** -0.47** -0.34** -0.53**
(-4.68) (-7.28) (-11.44) (-2.89) (-5.00) (-6.69)
head of unit in t-1 0.78** 0.67** 0.32** 0.14** 0.05 0.18**
(3.30) (4.22) (2.25) (3.51) (0.96) (3.98)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.20** 1.06** 0.64** 0.40** 0.30** 0.41**
(10.28) (5.22) (4.04) (3.08) (2.60) (7.58)
type II funding in t-1 0.50** 0.76** 0.54** 0.52** 0.45** 0.26**
(2.73) (4.41) (9.07) (13.30) (6.53) (6.16)
nr of co-authors 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.00**
(2.48) (8.31) (9.61) (20.90) (27.07) (26.39)
teaching load -0.07** -0.06** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02** -0.03**
(-2.64) (-2.25) (-1.02) (-1.22) (-3.03) (-4.19)
male 1.03 1.19** 0.76** 0.35** 0.18** 0.47**
(1.19) (4.29) (2.94) (2.83) (2.31) (5.77)
fulltime 1.20** 1.10** 1.15** 0.92** 0.55** 0.74**
(6.14) (9.59) (5.95) (13.78) (8.35) (9.02)
entry ￿ 1992 -0.36 -0.48** -0.17 -0.10 0.16** -0.25**
(-0.73) (-4.65) (-1.12) (-1.34) (2.96) (-3.55)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
Observations 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10 jittered samples, the standard errors
are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples (clustering by by individual).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































178Table 4.10: Test of equality of individual parameters across quantiles (chi-squared
values)
Publications Citations
cross-section panel data cross-section panel data
age 7.64 5.36 21.43** 18.34**
age squared 11.59** 7.09 30.80** 26.50**
career age 43.37** 31.24** 40.29** 65.89**
seniority in rank 7.81* 113.67** 11.92** 103.25**
rank
rank 1 in t-1 223.19** 32.45** 233.37** 116.60**
rank 2 in t-1 80.96** 204.38** 43.59** 45.53**
rank 3 in t-1 22.76** 93.50** 21.48** 12.39**
other rank in t-1 75.82** 97.69** 419.91** 228.51**
head of unit in t-1 409.46** 115.70** 211.04** 94.35**
project funding
type I funding in t-1 488.44** 488.54** 741.94** 250.83**
type II funding in t-1 244.39** 136.41** 43.31** 17.71**
nr of co-authors 1,267.21** 96.18** 1,742.02** 117.95**
teaching load 69.02** 4.19 31.28** 35.09**
male 24.48** 86.68** 135.72** 118.56**
fulltime 17.64** 27.20** 179.55** 390.31**
entry ￿ 1992 5.18 123.02** 28.57** 173.39**
The variance-covariance matrix is calculated using bootstrapping. For the publication panel-data results, 2 out of 380
bootstraps were dropped due to outliers; for the other models 1 out of 380 bootstraps was dropped.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05
1794.A Appendix: Restriction matrices for hypothesis testing
Here we give the detailed speci￿cation of the restriction matrix R used in the hy-
pothesis testing in section 2 of this chapter.
Test of correlated random effects
Test of H0 : ￿
1
￿ = ::: = ￿
T


















5 with I the identity
matrix, O a matrix of zeroes and ￿ the Kronecker product, so that M = rL.














with i a matrix of ones
143, so that M = r ￿ 1.
143 This de￿nition of R requires that the r parameters to be tested (one from each quantile) are the
￿rst r elements in ￿. Therefore, ￿ is resorted prior to calculating the test statistic.
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